Peaking Capacity in Restructured Power Systems by Doorman, Gerard
PEAKING CAPACITY IN
RESTRUCTURED POWER SYSTEMS
Gerard L. Doorman
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Telecommunications
Department of Electrical Power Engineering
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
doktor ingeniør
URN:NBN:no-2136
URN:NBN:no-2136
Peaking Capacity in Restructured Power Systems i
___________________________________________________________________________
PREFACE
All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed.
Third, it is accepted as being self-evident  - Arthur Schopenhauer
The work with this thesis started in 1996 under the supervision of the late Professor Øivin
Skarstein, whose untimely death shocked us all in the summer of 2000. Because of the
direction this research took as time went by, supervision was taken over by Professor Ivar
Wangensteen in the spring of 1999. Professor Bjørn Nygreen has been supporting supervisor
in the field of operations research. All three have given their invaluable contributions to the
final result of the work.
The research has been primarily financed by the Effekt program, funded by the Research
Council of Norway and a number of organizations in the Norwegian electricity industry. My
employer, SINTEF Energy Research, has contributed with additional funding.
The subject at hand is complicated and involves many angles of incidence from various
disciplines: technical, economic, political and sociological, among others. The approach taken
here has been from the technical and economic sides, but within neither of these fields, it has
been possible to give all the answers. My hope is that the present work will contribute to a
better understanding of the problem that has been studied, and that it will be a basis for the
development of good practical solutions.
Apart from the three professors already mentioned, many people have contributed to this
work. Taking the risk of forgetting some, I will at least mention:
• Sverre Aam, managing director and Nils Flatabø, research director, both of SINTEF
Energy Research
• Many of my colleagues, and especially Anders Gjelsvik, Olav Fosso, Ståle Huse and Arne
Johannesen
• Professor Michel Roland from the University of Laval, Canada, for significant
contributions to Chapter 6
• My brother Maarten for some essential support during a difficult phase
• Last but not least, my wife Anbjørg and my sons Jan Henrik and Thomas for love and
support
This work is dedicated to the memory of my father, who died suddenly a few months
before this thesis was finished.
Trondheim, November 2000.
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SUMMARY
Background
The theme of this thesis is the supply of capacity during peak demand in restructured power
systems. There are a number of reasons why there is uncertainty about whether an energy-
only electricity market (where generators are only paid for the energy produced) is able to
ensure uninterrupted supply during peak load conditions.
Much of the public debate in Europe has been about the present surplus generation
capacity. However, in a truly competitive environment, it is hard to believe that seldom used
capacity will be kept operational. This is illustrated by developments in Sweden. For this
reason, the large surplus of generation capacity in the European Union may vanish much
faster than generally assumed. In the USA, much of the debate has been about California.
During the last three summers, California has occasionally experienced involuntary load
shedding and prices have been very high during these periods. To some extent, the
Californian situation illustrates the relevance of the subject of this thesis: in a deregulated
system generators may not be willing to invest in peaking capacity that is only needed
occasionally, even though prices are very high during these periods.
A good solution to the problem of providing peaking power is pivotal to the success of
power market restructuring. Solutions that fail to create the right incentives will result in
unacceptable load shedding and can endanger the whole restructuring process. On the other
hand, solutions that pay too much for investments in peaking power will lead to generation
capacity surpluses and thus represent a societal loss.
Why is peaking capacity a problematic issue in energy-only markets?
Traditionally, probabilistic methods are applied to calculate the required generation capacity
to obtain a desired level of reliability. In a centrally planned system, this level of generation
capacity is developed in a least-cost manner. A single utility or central authorities can thus
control the level of reliability directly. This is not possible in a market-based system, if
suppliers are only paid for the energy produced.
Under the assumption of certainty and continually varying prices, generators fully recover
their variable and investment costs under ideal market conditions. When uncertainty is taken
into account, generators will cover their expected costs. However, revenues will be extremely
volatile, especially for peaking generators. Combined with a risk-averse attitude, it is unlikely
that investments will be sufficient to maintain the traditional level of reliability in an energy-
only market. Consequently, one would expect reserve margins to decline in such markets.
This effect is very clear in Sweden that deregulated in 1996, and less explicit in a number of
other cases like Norway, California and Alberta.
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Pricing and Consumer Preferences
The theory of electricity pricing was originally developed for vertically integrated utilities,
but elements from this theory are also valuable in a restructured context. Many authors have
agreed on the presence of a capacity element in the optimal price during peak-load conditions,
while price should equal marginal cost during low-load conditions. An important assumption
is that prices have to be stable. More recently, spot pricing of electricity has been advocated.
A number of papers have been written about how to efficiently include security
considerations in the spot price.
Because the availability of capacity cannot be directly controlled in an energy-only spot
market, the probability of occasional capacity shortages increases. It is important to be
prepared for this situation. The core of the problem is that demand is de facto inelastic in the
short-term because of traditional tariff systems. It is shown that considerable economic gains
are obtained when demand elasticity can be utilized, even if only minor shares of demand are
elastic in the short-term. Better utilization of demand elasticity was also profitable in
traditional systems, but after restructuring the gain is much larger: the alternative is not
expensive generation but random rationing, which is unacceptable in modern society.
It is possible to go one step further. Consumers have different preferences for the use of
energy and reliability. Some consumers have a low tolerance about being disconnected, while
others are more willing to accept this. This will be reflected by their willingness to pay for
reliability. A better solution would emerge if consumers could buy electricity and reliability
more or less as separate commodities, based on their preferences.
In the context of pricing it should be pointed out that profile-based settlement that allows
small consumers to freely choose their supplier without hourly metering is detrimental with
respect to the correct pricing of capacity. It should only be used in the initial phases of
opening a market.
Improved utilization of system resources
Even in the short-term, demand and the availability of generation and transmission resources
are uncertain. Therefore, it is necessary to have reserves available in a power system. When
capacity becomes scarce, it is difficult to satisfy the reserve requirements. If these
requirements are strict, the only possibility is to resort to what can be called preventive load-
shedding to satisfy the reserve requirements. This is obviously an expensive solution, but
there are no obvious ways of balancing the (societal) cost of preventive load shedding against
reduced system security. In this thesis, a model is developed for unit commitment and
dispatch with a one-hour time horizon, with the objective of minimizing the sum of the
operation and disruption costs, including the expected cost of system collapse. The model is
run for the IEEE Reliability Test System. It is shown that under conditions where there is not
enough capacity available to satisfy the reserve requirements, large cost savings can be
obtained by optimizing the sum of the operation and disruption costs instead of using
preventive load-shedding. In the model, it is also possible to directly target reliability indexes
like the Loss of Load Probability or Expected Energy not Served. It is shown that increased
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reliability (in terms of the values of the indexes) can be obtained at a lower cost by targeting
the indexes directly instead of resorting to reserve requirements. This is especially the case if
flexible load-shedding routines are developed, making it possible to disconnect and reconnect
the optimal amounts of load efficiently.
The use of alternatives to fixed reserve requirements as a means to maintain system
security does not solve the problem about how to ensure the availability of peaking capacity.
However, in a situation with occasional capacity shortages, it gives the System Operator a
tool to find the optimal balance between preventive load shedding and system security, which
can result in significantly lower disruption costs in such cases. More research and
development in this area is necessary to develop methods and tools that are suitable for large
power systems.
Ancillary Services
Investment in peaking capacity is insufficient in restructured systems because expected
revenues are too low or too uncertain. If generator revenues are increased, the situation
improves. One way to obtain this is to create markets for ancillary services. In the thesis, a
model is developed for a central-dispatch type of pool. In this model, markets for energy and
three types of ancillary services are cleared simultaneously for 24 hours ahead. Market prices
are such that volumes and prices are consistent with the market participants self-dispatch
decisions  i.e. given these prices, market participants would have chosen the same
production of energy and ancillary services as the outcome of the optimization program. With
this model, it is shown that markets for ancillary services increase generator revenues, but this
effect is partly offset by lower energy prices. This shows that markets for ancillary services
can contribute to improving the situation, but given the remaining uncertainty, this is hardly
enough to solve the problem.
Capacity Subscription
Because consumers have preferences for two goods: electricity and reliability, they should
ideally have the choice of purchasing the preferred amount of each of these. Traditionally this
is not possible  reliability is a public good, produced or obtained by a central authority on
behalf of all consumers. Technological progress is presently changing this. Capacity
subscription is a method that allows consumers to choose their individual level of reliability,
at the same time creating a true market for capacity. It is based on the concept of self-
rationing. Consumers anticipate (for example on a seasonal basis) their need for capacity at
the instant of system-wide peak demand. Based on this anticipation, they procure their desired
level of capacity in a market, where generators offer their available capacity. Demand is
limited to subscribed capacity by a fuse-like device that is activated when total demand
exceeds total available generation. In this way, the capacity payment only influences the
market when demand is close to installed capacity, and does not distort the energy price in
other periods. Demand is not limited when there is ample capacity. Demand will never exceed
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supply, because it can be limited in an acceptable way when this situation occurs. Moreover,
both consumers and suppliers can adapt to situations with scarce or ample capacity, and the
price of capacity will reflect this situation. There is one problem with the method: as
consumers do not reach their subscribed capacity simultaneously, there will be a capacity
surplus at the instant the fuse-devices are activated. Two methods to solve this problem are
analysed, and it is shown that the problem can be solved optimally by giving consumers who
prefer this the opportunity to buy power in excess of their subscription on the spot market.
Policy evaluation
Six alternative policies to assess the peaking power problem are analysed based on the
following criteria:
 Static efficiency: the welfare-optimal match of consumption and supply
 Dynamic efficiency: the ability to create incentives for innovation
 Invisibility: with invisible strategies, each market actor pursues his or her own objectives
without worrying about anyone elses
 Robustness: a robust policy is less sensitive to deviations from assumptions
 Timeliness: the ability of a policy to be employed at the right time
 Stakeholder equity: the degree to which all the involved parties are treated equitable
 Corrigibility: the extent to which a policy can be corrected once it is employed
 Acceptability: the degree to which the policy is acceptable to all parties
 Simplicity: ceteris paribus simple strategies are preferable over more complicated
strategies
 Cost: the cost of implementing the policy
 System security: the policys ability to obtain an acceptable level of system security
The policies are, in short (an example is given in parentheses):
 Capacity obligation: suppliers are obliged to keep sufficient capacity (PJM)
 Fixed capacity payment: a fixed payment is offered for available capacity (Spain)
 Dynamic capacity payment: capacity payment is based on the Loss of Load Probability
(England and Wales)
 Energy-only: no explicit payments or obligation (Scandinavia, California)
 Proxy prices: very high administrative prices are used as a proxy to the Value of Lost
Load when load shedding is necessary (Australia)
 Capacity subscription: cf. the description above (not implemented)
As could be expected, no single policy performs best on all criteria. The obligation and
fixed payment methods do not perform well on market efficiency criteria, as essentially they
are not market-based policies. The proxy prices policy is a reasonable policy on most criteria.
It is easy, cheap and quick to implement. Because there is little experience with the method so
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far, there is some uncertainty with respect to if it is effective. One can anticipate that the
threat of having to buy power at rationing prices will motivate market participants to avoid
coming in a buying position in such cases, and that this will stimulate the adaptation of
innovative solutions, especially on the demand side.
The capacity subscription policy looks very promising on the issues of efficiency,
robustness and system security. This is especially true for dynamic efficiency: consumers will
weigh the cost of capacity against the cost of innovative load control devices, and if the price
of capacity is high, a market for such technology will emerge. However, there is a
considerable threshold prior to the introduction of capacity subscription, caused by the
implementation costs and complexity.
The conclusion on policies is thus that in an early stage after restructuring it may be
appropriate to resort to the capacity obligation or payment method if the capacity balance is
tight at the time of transition. For the medium-term, or if there is ample capacity initially, it is
sensible to introduce proxy market prices to transfer the risk of a capacity deficit to market
participants, with due attention being paid to the appropriate price level. Capacity subscription
can be a long-term objective.
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TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AGC - Automatic Generator Control
AMPL - A Mathematical Programming Language
B&B - Branch and Bound
BTU - British Thermal Unit
CC - Capacity Charge
CCGT - Combined Cycle Gas Turbine
CEGB - Central Electricity Generation Board (the pre-restructuring utility in the UK)
CHP - Combined Heat and Power
CPLEX - Solver for mathematical problems
DP - Dynamic Programming
EENS - Expected Energy Not Served
EIR - Expected Index of Reliability
F&D - Frequency and Duration
FERC - Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FOR - Forced Outage Rate
GWh - Gigawatthour (=1000 MWh)
HLI - Hierarchical Level I (generation)
HLII - Hierarchical Level II (generation & transmission)
HLIII - Hierarchical Level III (generation & transmission & distribution)
IEA - International Energy Agency
IEEE - The Institution of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
ISO - Independent System Operator (does not own the transmission system)
IP - Integer Programming
IPP - Independent Power Producer
KKT - Karoush-Kuhn-Tucker
KvF - Kraftverksföreningen (the Swedish Power Association)
LOLE - Loss Of Load Expectation (days/year)
LOLP - Loss Of Load Probability
LR - Langrangian Relaxation
LRMC - Long Run Marginal Cost
MBTU - Million BTU
MC - Marginal Cost
MTTF - Mean Time To Failure
MWh - Megawatthour (= 1000 kWh)
MO - Market Operator
NGC - National Grid Company
NEPOOL - New England Power Pool
NERC - North-American Reliability Council
NOK - Norwegian Krone
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Nordel - The organization for Nordic power cooperation
NordPool - The Nordic Market Operator
NPV - Net Present Value
NVE - Norges Vassdrags og Energidirektorat, (the Norwegian Directorate for
water resources and electricity)
ORR - Outage Replacement Rate
PJM - Pennsylvania, Jersey and Maryland
PPP - Pool Purchase Price
PV - Present Value
PX - Power Exchange
RTS - Reliability Test System
SEK - Swedish Krona
SEP - Samenwerkende Electriciteits Productiebedrijven (the pre-restructuring
body for cooperation between Dutch generators)
SMP - System Marginal Price
Statnett - The Norwegian grid owner and System Operator
SRMC - Short Run Marginal Cost
Svenska Kraftnät
- The Swedish grid owner and System Operator
TSO - Transmission System Operator
TWh - Terawatthour (= 1000 GWh)
UC - Unit Commitment
UCTE - Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (in Europe),
formerly UCPTE
VOLL - Value Of Lost Load
URN:NBN:no-2136
Peaking Capacity in Restructured Power Systems
___________________________________________________________________________
ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE ________________________________________________________________ i
SUMMARY _______________________________________________________________ii
TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS____________________________________________vii
Chapter 1: Introduction _____________________________________________________ 1
1.1 Peaking capacity and the present debate on power system restructuring ______________ 1
1.2 The motivation for power market restructuring _________________________________ 3
1.3 Central elements of restructuring ____________________________________________ 5
1.4 Why is peaking power an issue in restructured systems? __________________________ 7
1.5 The structure of the thesis __________________________________________________ 9
1.6 References _____________________________________________________________ 10
Chapter 2:The capacity balance in restructured power markets ___________________ 12
2.1 The capacity balance issue ________________________________________________ 12
2.1.1 Capacity definitions ____________________________________________________ 13
2.1.2 Capacity- and energy constrained systems___________________________________ 14
2.1.3 Expansion planning in traditional systems ___________________________________ 16
2.2 Power system reliability __________________________________________________ 17
2.2.1 The analytical approach: indexes __________________________________________ 18
2.2.2 The simulation approach ________________________________________________ 20
2.2.3 The choice of reliability level_____________________________________________ 20
2.2.4 System adequacy after restructuring________________________________________ 21
2.3 Uncertainty ____________________________________________________________ 21
2.3.1 Sources of uncertainty __________________________________________________ 21
2.3.2 A simple price model ___________________________________________________ 24
2.3.3 The effect of uncertainty_________________________________________________ 26
2.3.4 Uncertainty and investment decisions ______________________________________ 27
2.4 Experience from existing markets ___________________________________________ 28
2.4.1 Norway ______________________________________________________________ 28
2.4.2 Sweden ______________________________________________________________ 30
2.4.3 England and Wales _____________________________________________________ 32
2.4.4 Other countries ________________________________________________________ 34
2.5 Will the lights stay on? ___________________________________________________ 34
2.6 References _____________________________________________________________ 35
URN:NBN:no-2136
Peaking Capacity in Restructured Power Systems
___________________________________________________________________________
x
Appendix A.2.1: Cooperation between hydro- and thermal systems ________________ 37
Appendix A.2.2: Examples of a simple price model ______________________________ 39
Chapter 3: Pricing theory and consumer preferences ____________________________ 43
3.1 A review of electricity pricing theory ________________________________________ 43
3.1.1 Historical overview_____________________________________________________ 43
3.1.2 The controversy about LRMC and SRMC___________________________________ 46
3.1.3 Spot pricing of electricity ________________________________________________ 48
3.2 The generation system and quality of supply __________________________________ 51
3.2.1 Power system security __________________________________________________ 51
3.2.2 Reserve requirements ___________________________________________________ 52
3.2.3 The public good view ___________________________________________________ 53
3.3 Consumer willingness to pay for electricity ___________________________________ 54
3.3.1 Elastic demand ________________________________________________________ 56
3.3.2 Inelastic demand _______________________________________________________ 56
3.3.3 Seemingly inelastic demand ______________________________________________ 58
3.3.4 Demand used as reserve capacity __________________________________________ 61
3.4 Willingness to pay for electricity and quality of supply __________________________ 64
3.4.1 Quantification of quality of supply_________________________________________ 65
3.4.2 A utility function for electricity and quality of supply__________________________ 66
3.4.3 Characteristics of the two-good utility function_______________________________ 68
3.5 The demand side role in restructured power systems ____________________________ 71
3.6 References _____________________________________________________________ 72
Chapter 4: The short-term, capacity constrained equilibrium _____________________ 75
4.1 A model for the short-term capacity constrained equilibrium______________________ 75
4.2 Mathematical formulation of the model ______________________________________ 78
4.2.1 Modelling of elastic demand _____________________________________________ 78
4.2.2 Symbol definitions _____________________________________________________ 80
4.2.3 Mathematical formulation _______________________________________________ 81
4.2.4 Price calculation _______________________________________________________ 84
4.2.5 Reserve requirements ___________________________________________________ 85
4.2.6 Load uncertainty_______________________________________________________ 85
4.2.7 Multi-area modelling ___________________________________________________ 85
4.2.8 The possibility of system collapse _________________________________________ 86
4.2.9 Constraints on EENS, LOLP and the probability of system collapse ______________ 88
4.2.10 Model solution _______________________________________________________ 89
4.3 Simulations with fixed reserve requirements __________________________________ 89
4.3.1 Inelastic demand _______________________________________________________ 90
4.3.2 Elastic demand ________________________________________________________ 93
4.3.3 Seemingly inelastic demand ______________________________________________ 93
URN:NBN:no-2136
Peaking Capacity in Restructured Power Systems
___________________________________________________________________________
xi
4.3.4 Demand side reserves ___________________________________________________ 94
4.4 Simulations with optimal reserve requirements ________________________________ 95
4.4.1 Cost minimization without additional requirements ___________________________ 95
4.4.2 The cost of system collapse ______________________________________________ 96
4.4.3 Constraint on Expected Energy Not Served __________________________________ 97
4.4.4 Constraint on Loss Of Load Probability_____________________________________ 98
4.4.5 Constraint on the Probability of System Collapse _____________________________ 99
4.5 Conclusions regarding short-term constrained operation ________________________ 100
4.6 References ____________________________________________________________ 102
Appendix A.4: The IEEE reliability test system 103
A4.1 System data__________________________________________________________ 103
A4.2 Computation of reserve requirements______________________________________ 104
Chapter 5: Integrated Pricing of Energy and Ancillary Services__________________ 107
5.1 An integrated market for energy and ancillary services _________________________ 107
5.1.1 Existing solutions and the proposed model _________________________________ 107
5.1.2 Mutual exclusivity ____________________________________________________ 108
5.1.3 Ancillary services _____________________________________________________ 109
5.1.4 Market operation______________________________________________________ 109
5.1.5 Market prices for energy and ancillary services______________________________ 111
5.2 Mathematical formulation ________________________________________________ 112
5.2.1 Symbol definitions ____________________________________________________ 112
5.2.2 Generator model ______________________________________________________ 114
5.2.3 Demand model _______________________________________________________ 115
5.2.4 Bid formulation_______________________________________________________ 115
5.3 Single hour market clearing_______________________________________________ 116
5.3.1 Branch and Bound (BB) solution _________________________________________ 117
5.3.2 Lagrange Relaxation (LR) solution _______________________________________ 117
5.4 Multiple bidding rounds _________________________________________________ 118
5.5 Results from test calculations _____________________________________________ 119
5.5.1 Model verification ____________________________________________________ 119
5.5.2 Multiple ancillary services ______________________________________________ 122
5.5.3 Demand side participation ______________________________________________ 124
5.6 Ancillary service markets and unit profits____________________________________ 125
5.7 Conclusions on ancillary services markets ___________________________________ 126
5.8 References ____________________________________________________________ 127
Appendix A.5: Test system data 129
Chapter 6: Capacity subscription ___________________________________________ 130
6.1 Random allocation of excess capacity_______________________________________ 133
6.1.1 The consumer problem _________________________________________________ 133
URN:NBN:no-2136
Peaking Capacity in Restructured Power Systems
___________________________________________________________________________
xii
6.1.2 The producer problem _________________________________________________ 135
6.1.3 Welfare-optimal solution with random allocation of excess capacity _____________ 136
6.2 Optimal allocation of excess capacity _______________________________________ 136
6.3 Implementation issues ___________________________________________________ 138
6.4 The use of capacity subscription in restructured power systems___________________ 139
6.5 References ____________________________________________________________ 140
Appendix A.6: Derivations and example 141
A6.1 Derivations __________________________________________________________ 141
A6.2 Capacity Subscription and Market Operation - A Simple Example_______________ 144
Chapter 7: Avoiding a capacity deficiency  a policy analysis ____________________ 147
7.1 Criteria for policy analysis _______________________________________________ 147
7.2 Policy description ______________________________________________________ 149
7.2.1 Capacity Obligations __________________________________________________ 150
7.2.2 Fixed Capacity Payment________________________________________________ 152
7.2.3 Dynamic Capacity Payment _____________________________________________ 153
7.2.4 Energy-Only _________________________________________________________ 154
7.2.5 Proxy market prices ___________________________________________________ 155
7.3 Policy discussion _______________________________________________________ 157
7.3.1 Static efficiency ______________________________________________________ 157
7.3.2 Dynamic efficiency____________________________________________________ 158
7.3.3 Invisibility___________________________________________________________ 159
7.3.4 Robustness __________________________________________________________ 160
7.3.5 Timeliness___________________________________________________________ 160
7.3.6 Stakeholder equity ____________________________________________________ 161
7.3.7 Corrigibility _________________________________________________________ 163
7.3.8 Acceptability_________________________________________________________ 163
7.3.9 Simplicity ___________________________________________________________ 163
7.3.10 Implementation cost __________________________________________________ 164
7.3.11 System security______________________________________________________ 164
7.3.12 Policy analysis summary ______________________________________________ 165
7.4 References ____________________________________________________________ 167
8. Conclusions ___________________________________________________________ 169
URN:NBN:no-2136
URN:NBN:no-2136
URN:NBN:no-2136
Peaking capacity and the present debate on power system restructuring 1
___________________________________________________________________________
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION
The theme of this thesis is the supply of capacity during peak demand in deregulated or,
rather, restructured1 power systems. It may seem odd that this should be a problem. After all,
the point of restructuring is to substitute central planning by a market-based structure. In the
new environment, it should not be necessary for central authorities or planning bodies to
bother about supply: the market should ensure an efficient balance between supply and
demand at any point in time.
However, there are a number of reasons why there is well-founded doubt about the ability
of an energy-only electricity market (where generators are paid only for the energy
produced2) to ensure uninterrupted supply during peak load conditions. This is partly the
theme of this introductory chapter, and the main theme of the next chapter.
Section 1.1 places the theme of this thesis in the context of the present debate on power
system restructuring. As a general background, Section 1.2 discusses the motivation for
power system restructuring. This is a very broad item in itself, and the short description here
will only serve as a reference for the remainder of the thesis. In Section 1.3, the central
elements of power system restructuring will be outlined. Section 1.4 shows that a number of
authors have been engaged in the question of the provision of peaking power after
restructuring. In that section, the problem is also discussed in some more detail. Section 1.5
shortly outlines the structure of the remainder of the thesis.
1.1 Peaking capacity and the present debate on power system restructuring
Apart from some countries that started early (e.g. the UK, Scandinavia), the restructuring
process in Europe is strongly influenced by EU Directive 96/92/EC on common rules for the
internal market in electricity, which came into force in February 1997. The Directive gives the
minimum requirements the EU member states have to satisfy with relation to power market
restructuring. Some countries aim at satisfying the minimum requirements (e.g. France),
while others go much further in the direction of liberalization (Spain, the Netherlands). Much
1 A note on terminology is appropriate. The terms deregulation, liberalization, restructuring, and
even privatization are used somewhat arbitrarily by different authors for either similar or different
concepts. The proper term for the ongoing process, is restructuring, or possibly the more artificial
reregulation. As pointed out by Jaffe and Felder [1.6], Government can and must establish the rules
under which competition will occur. () The notion that we can get government out of the way and let
the market rip is devoid of serious meaning. This observation somewhat disqualifies deregulation.
Liberalization also understates the need for a comprehensive regulatory framework. As to
privatization, this will often but must not necessarily (cf. the Nordic experience) accompany
restructuring.
2 There may be payments for other (ancillary) services as well in an energy-only market. The essential
characteristic is that payments are basically short-term, and that there are no additional instruments to
remunerate available capacity.
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of the public debate has been about the present surplus generation capacity in Europe. In this
situation, there is no imminent threat of a capacity deficiency, and the subject of this thesis
may not seem very relevant. However, in a truly competitive environment, it is hard to believe
that existing capacity that is hardly ever used is kept operational in the longer run. The
situation in Sweden illustrates this, as will be shown later. For this reason, the large surplus of
generation capacity in the European Union may vanish much quicker than generally
assumed3. If that happens, the theme of this thesis will become very relevant.
In the United States, the drive for the restructuring process comes from FERC Order 888 of
June 1996 (Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access; Non-discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities). Like in Europe, the speed of the process is very different in the
various states. It has come furthest, and has created most debate in California, where the new
electricity market was launched on 1 March 1998. The Californian market structure is
complicated, and has been adjusted more or less continually since its introduction. During the
last three summers, California has experienced several periods of very hot weather and
consequently high demand. During these periods it has occasionally been problematic to
provide sufficient reserves, and involuntary load shedding has occurred. Moreover, prices
have been very high during these periods. This situation has created considerable debate about
the viability or at least desirability of the reform. To some extent4, the Californian situation
illustrates the relevance of the subject of the thesis: in a deregulated system generators may
not be willing to invest in peaking capacity that is needed only occasionally, even though
prices are very high during these periods.
This thesis will provide a number of arguments why the simplest market organization,
where generators are paid only for the energy produced, does not create the incentives for
investment in peaking power. Following this argumentation, it will analyse a number of ways
to improve this situation. Several market organizations that have additional instruments will
be compared.
A good solution to the problem of providing peaking power is one of the keys to the
success of power market restructuring. Solutions that fail to create the right incentives will
result in unacceptable load shedding and claims to abandon the whole restructuring process.
3 The closing of unprofitable plants can be seen as an indicator of the degree of real competition in this
market. As long as these plants are kept operational, without creating any profits for their owners, the
motivation to cut costs is clearly not too high, indicating a lack of real competition.
4 Only to some extent, because in California there is clearly not one single cause of the problems. In
contrast to Europe, demand is still rising considerably in California, but partly due to tough
environmental laws, no new plants have been built in the last decade [1.1]. New entrants are
burdened with part of the cost of stranded assets built by incumbents, making it difficult for them to
compete effectively on price. Finally, price caps are used frequently, creating additional uncertainty for
investors in new capacity.
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On the other hand, solutions that overcompensate investments in peaking power will lead to
generation capacity surpluses, representing a societal loss. The impact of the latter situation
may seem less dramatic than that of the former, but unnecessary investments of hundreds of
millions, possibly billions of USD can be avoided by implementing the right policy.
The objective of this thesis is on the one hand to exploit ways to reduce the impact of
occasional capacity shortages and on the other hand to analyse alternative policies to reduce
the probability of such situations occurring. The realm of the work is within the power sectors
of highly industrialized countries with low growth of electricity demand. The situation is
clearly different in high-growth countries, where the major concern is to obtain sufficient
investment in new capacity, while the societal losses of (limited) overinvestment are small -
they will be overtaken by next years growth.
The problem of covering peak demand is not unique for the power market, but is seen in
many other situations as well: road queues during rush hours, taxis on New Years Eve,
charters to attractive destinations on the first day of a holiday, telecommunication systems etc.
However, a power system has some specific characteristics that require special solutions.
1.2 The motivation for power market restructuring
Starting in Chile in 1978 [1.2], power market restructuring has now become a world-wide
phenomenon both in developed and developing countries. A good overview over the
background for this development is given by Paul Joskow in e.g. [1.3], [1.4] or [1.5]. Joskow
recognizes the following motives:
Generation construction costs and investment decisions. There is substantial variation
across utilities in the construction costs of similar generating units, which cannot be explained
by differences in underlying cost opportunities5.
Operating cost of generating units. A traditionally organized6 electricity sector offers a
great opportunity for the political system to pursue other objectives, e.g. the use of domestic
fuels. According to Newberry [1.7],  competition is the key to improving the efficiency of
the electricity industry, in part because it makes it more difficult for government or
5 Joskow gives three references to sustain this case. Tenenbaum et al. give some examples of this in
their note 3 in [1.11]. No research has been done on this topic in Norway to this authors knowledge,
possibly because such comparisons are much harder to conduct for hydropower projects.
6 The term traditional organization is used for the broad spectre of organizational structures
dominating electricity sectors around the world before the restructuring process started. Often vertical
organization is used, but this does not completely cover all the different forms of traditional
organization. The Norwegian system, for example, has always consisted of a combination of vertically
integrated utilities, a great number of distribution companies and a number of clear-cut power
producers. This is far from the single-utility organization in France and in the United Kingdom before
1990.
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bureaucrats to intervene. This view is also supported by Tenenbaum et al. Subsidies are
easier to sustain when concealed in the purchases or operating expenses of government owned
electricity enterprises. Moreover, some utilities appear to be systematically better operators
than others. Finally, utilities may have incentives to keep generating units operating even
when they should be closed.
Employment practices and wages. Experience after restructuring suggests that public
enterprises and private firms subject to price and entry regulation employ too many workers
(have too low levels of labour productivity).
Pricing inefficiencies: In traditionally organized systems, prices are often poorly aligned
with the relevant marginal costs, because tariffs are designed to recover costs. As a result,
when there is excess capacity, prices tend to rise, and when capacity is short, prices tend to
fall, the opposite of how a market would work.
Innovation. Experience from both the UK7 and the US suggests that when the restructuring
process starts and entry barriers are removed, innovation in generation technology is
stimulated.
Related to the first point there is also the problem of excessive costs and prices [1.5] in
developed countries, due to overinvestment8,9. The opposite problem, the inability of the
electricity sectors to attract adequate investment capital, occurs in developing countries. It
looks contradictory at first sight that opposite problems (over- and underinvestment) should
be solved by the same remedy (restructuring). The common denominator, however, is an
inefficient allocation of capital under traditional systems.
The motivation for the Norwegian restructuring shares many common properties with the
general points given above [1.13]:
• A questionable order in the development of hydropower resources (more expensive projects
before cheaper ones)
• Cross-subsidizing in vertically integrated utilities
• Regional obligations to supply had resulted in large price differences
• Discrimination of small consumers compared with large industrial users
7 The restructuring of the power system in England and Wales is generally referred to as the British
deregulation or the deregulation in the UK. This may be due to poor geographical knowledge or
limited acquaintance with the geographical spread of the reform. The most probable reason, however,
is linguistic: England and Wales is evidently much more bothersome to write than the alternatives. In
this thesis all three variants will be used.
8 Cf. Newberry [1.7], , most privatizations in mature markets start with excess capacity and
considerable slack, Joskow [1.4], , the US industry has been plagued by excess capacity for most
of the last two decades (in spite of the fact that the US always has had a high share of private
ownership) or Unda regarding the Spanish system [1.8].
9 The magnitude or, ultimately even the presence of excess investment is not straightforward to
demonstrate, due to the necessity of keeping sufficient reserves, and a potential disagreement on
what is sufficient. This will be discussed in much more detail later in this thesis.
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• Regulated import and export, impeding an efficient international power trade
• Mixed and unclear objectives for the power sector as a whole (the use of energy policy for
other goals like regional settlement, employment, regional policy, industry policy etc)
By creating a new market structure where generators can compete at wholesale and retail
free from regulation, there should be good chances that at least some of the inefficiencies
associated with the institution of regulated monopoly will be reduced under the pressure of
competition10.
1.3 Central elements of restr ucturing
Although there is a huge variation between how power sectors are restructured around the
world, a credible deregulation at least has to include the following elements:
• The generation sector is potentially competitive, and must be organized as separate business
entities. To obtain an adequate level of competition, the number of generating companies
should be large enough. How many is enough mainly depends on a number of external
factors, which are outside the scope of this section. Depending on past practice in the
country concerned, privatization will often accompany this process.
• The transmission network and probably some ancillary services11 are natural monopolies12
and provide a critical platform upon which competition among generators depends. The
transmission network must be operated by an entity that is independent from the generation
and distribution companies.
• Approaches to transmission pricing must be adopted that allow equal access to the
transmission network for all parties.
In case the distribution companies continue to supply a bundled product (essentially energy
and transport) to retail consumers that they serve exclusively in a geographic area, one refers
to a wholesale competition model or portfolio model.
10 Of course, new inefficiencies may occur, due to shortcomings in the new structures. An example is
the low level of competition in the UK market. This is documented, among others, by Green and
Newberry in [1.9] and Newberry in [1.7]: All the gains were reaped by shareholders, and the reason is
that the price of electricity did not fall anything like as much as the cost of fuel or the reduction in non-
fuel costs. Another good argument for this viewpoint is given by Wolak et al.: ., these two
generators (National Power and PowerGen) are able to obtain prices for their output substantially in
excess of their marginal costs of generation [1.10].
11 The definition of ancillary services may be given as activities that pertain to the provision of all
electric services necessary for efficient and reliable generation, transmission and delivery of active
power with a sufficiently stable frequency and voltage.
12 A natural monopoly is described in [1.14] as an industry where Average cost is diminishing over a
broad range of output levels, and minimum average cost can only be achieved by organizing the
industry as a monopoly. A more thorough treatment may be found in [1.15].
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If the wire business of the distribution companies also has a natural monopoly character,
and is organized as a number of independent entities, retail customers buy limited wires
services from the local distributor and arrange for their own power supplies directly with
generators or competing suppliers. This case is referred as a retail competition model.
During the last decade, extensive literature on restructuring issues has emerged. Important
issues that have been discussed thorougly are:
Transmission pricing and access. As indicated above, a transparent, well-functioning
transmission pricing system, giving equal access to all parties, and preferably with a proper
incentive structure, is an absolute prerequisite to obtain real competition13.
Transmission congestion management. This may be viewed as a special case of
transmission pricing, but it is an extremely important issue in its own merit.
Short-term operation and ancillary services. Many authors seem to agree that the short-
term operation of power systems in developed countries was reasonably efficient before
deregulation14. The challenge is to retain efficient operation subject to a large array of
constraints in a multi-owner environment.
Stranded assets. This issue addresses the question of if and/or how to compensate (the
owners of) generation assets that become uneconomic in a restructured environment, due to
their unfavourable cost structure. This has primarily been a considerable issue in the US,
though remarkably less in Europe15.
Regulatory issues. The question of how to ensure an effective regulation of the parts of the
system that will continue to operate as monopolies.
Although many authors express a positive view of power system restructuring, some
critical voices can also be heard. As an example Walker and Lough [1.16] conclude that the
British, Norwegian, Argentinean and Chilean restructurings provide little support for a similar
process in the US. This is partly based on their observation that US electricity prices are low
already, partly because the US industry to a large degree has private ownership.
13 The Norwegian Energy Act came into function from 1 January 1991. However, first when the issue
of transmission tariffs was solved and introduced in May 1992, real competition emerged.
14 For example from [1.4]  the electric power networks in most developed countries operate with
very high levels of reliability and, given the short-run operating costs and availability of generators
connected to the system, come reasonably close to efficient generator dispatch.
15 In Sweden, some thermal generating capacity has been closed down without much discussion, at
least with respect to stranded assets. Very little discussion on the subject in the UK has emerged in
international forums. The different focus in the US and Europe may be related to a different starting
point: while generation capacity was almost exclusively in public hands in Europe, private investors
own more than 70 % in the US. The stranded costs issue is much easier to solve as a part of the
privatization process, than as part of a restructuring transition in an already privatized industry. This
argument is supported by the remark of Tenenbaum et al. in [1.11] that " it is infinitely easier to
make changes before privatization than to do so afterwards
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Another critical view is expressed by Casazza in [1.17]. His main conclusion is that the
changes in the UK have been harmful to consumers, but extremely beneficial to shareholders.
Also Casazzas main points against an American implementation of the British model are that
the industry in the US already is in private hands to a large extent, and that prices are low.
These are contestable views. Even if prices generally may be low, there are great regional
variations in the US, which was one of the motives for the Norwegian process. In addition,
Newberry [1.7] argues that competition, not privatization increased efficiency in the UK.
1.4 Why is peaking power an issue in restructured systems?
Despite the lack of focus so far, some authors and observers have questioned if the market
will provide enough generation capacity in the long run. Some examples:
• In [1.11] Tenenbaum et al. presuppose that Customers that withdraw from the franchise
(their local distributor) must be required to procure sufficient generating capacity to ensure
their security of supply. () In other words, a regime that permits customers to purchase
energy without any capacity responsibility is unfair to those customers who purchase the
capacity that provides emergency protection for everyone connected to the grid. These
authors characterize this as a network externality, implying that they do not believe the
market will provide the actual good (capacity) without intervention.
• In [1.22], Wangensteen and Holtan propose to establish a market for reserve capacity,
based on assumptions that the market will not provide sufficient reserves in the long run.
• Fink and Van Son [1.23] argue that Barring strong incentives to do otherwise, they
(independent power producers) could very well prefer high power factor units designed for
base load use, in preference to more expensive low power factor units. () Base load use
means very constrained response capability. It will almost certainly be necessary, in
contracts establishing access by producers to the bulk power network, to require that
generators be fitted with adequate, active, well maintained governors, otherwise this
expense is unlikely to be accepted by them. Clearly, the authors do not believe sufficient
reserve capacity will be available without special measures.
• In [1.24], the World Energy Council states: It remains to be seen, therefore, whether a
liberalised market will be able to support necessarily long-term investment ().
• In a comment in the January 1997 issue of Modern Power Systems, the editor cites that the
US Department of Energy believes that the real test of the new market will be delayed
until new capacity is needed and how high prices will have to get to stimulate investment.
• In a publication of KvF (the Swedish Power Association), Bo Källstrand, general manager
of Graninge, a medium-sized Swedish producer, expresses: Power producers can no
longer bear the extra costs for increased reliability that these units (thermal reserve units
being phased out) represent, because no compensation for these costs is offered [1.27].
• Several market solutions (notably the UK [1.10], Argentina, Chile [1.2], New England
[1.25] and the PJM Interconnection [1.26]) have included capacity payment or obligation
elements. This is no proof that this is a necessary measure, but indicates that the designers
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of these markets have concerns that enough capacity would not be provided by the market
without these elements.
In addition, a few recent incidents indicate that the issue deserves more attention:
• Four times during the winter 1998/99 Statnett, the Norwegian System Operator had to take
special measures to assure a sufficient level of reserves in the Norwegian market. In a
number of other occasions the system was operated with reduced secondary reserves level,
albeit with a considerable export. These occasions occurred under temperatures that by no
means could be characterized as extreme16.
• On Thursday 28 January 1999, Svenska Kraftnätt, the Swedish System Operator decided to
forbid exports to Germany to ensure a satisfactory reserve margin in the Swedish system.
These incidents are indications that generation capacity may not be sufficient under all
circumstances in the Norwegian and Swedish systems. Traditionally, the problem has been to
satisfy demand at the minimum cost at any point in time during the planning horizon. In a
restructured system, market agents have to make an investment that becomes profitable only
if the spot price becomes high enough for at least a necessary number of hours. Due to a
number of reasons, many mature power systems have had excess capacity (cf. footnote 8). So
far, this fact has hidden the special need for short-term peaking power.
In this context, it is also appropriate to shortly discuss the concept of capacity deficiency.
In the traditional power engineering view, to be discussed in Section 2.2, there is a capacity
deficiency when available capacity is insufficient to cover demand with an acceptable level of
reliability. From the view of economic theory, the whole concept of capacity deficiency is
curious: the market price should settle at a level that implies a balance between supply and
demand. However, there are two reasons why this may not happen:
• the public good character of reliability
• the majority of consumers buy electricity at a price that is fixed in the short run
Both these reasons will be discussed in this thesis. For now, it can be stated that as a result
of these conditions, a capacity deficiency may occur. In this context, it will be defined as
follows:
A capacity deficiency occurs when the power system is unable to satisfy
demand with agreed standards of reliability, resulting in involuntary load
shedding.
16 The Norwegian system has a high penetration of electrical heating, resulting in demand peaks
during cold periods.
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The resulting involuntary load shedding is the essential part of the definition. In a
restructured system, conditions will change considerably. It is very probable that a more
dynamic interaction between supply and demand will develop, resulting in various ways to
limit demand under peaking conditions. As long as the limiting of demand is price based and
consequently voluntary, there is no capacity deficiency, although installed capacity may be
considerably lower than in traditional systems17. But when existing agreements are
insufficient to secure a market balance, involuntary random load shedding may be necessary
to maintain system reliability, and there is a capacity deficiency.
1.5 The structure of the thes is
The theme of this thesis is broad, and must be analysed from different angles. The theoretical
foundations are found in the fields of economics and power engineering, while operations
research has been an invaluable tool in several of the analyses that will be described.
The objective of Chapter 2 is to make plausible that the provision of peaking capacity in
restructured systems actually is a problem. This is discussed from the viewpoints of power
system reliability and finance theory, and illustrated with experience from some currently
restructured systems.
In Chapters 3, 4 and 5 the problem is analysed from three different viewpoints:
• In Chapter 3, the starting point is pricing theory in traditional systems, which appears to
have considerable relevance. From this starting point, a natural move to consumers and
their preferences is made. The objective of the chapter is to show the importance of a real
inclusion of the demand side in the market to obtain efficient results.
• In Chapter 4, a completely different viewpoint is taken. Reduced availability of peaking
capacity challenges the system operators ability to operate the system with satisfactory
reliability. In power system operation, it is necessary to maintain a certain level of reserves
to cope with uncertainties in demand and the availability of generation. There can be little
doubt about the necessity of reserves, but their level and the corresponding level of
reliability is or at least should be a point of discussion, cf. [1.28]. In Chapter 4, a model is
developed to analyse the relation between reserves and reliability, and explore the
possibilities of reducing reserve levels, while maintaining acceptable levels of reliability.
In addition, the effects of a more flexible demand side are explored, creating a link to
Chapter 3.
• In Chapter 5, a third approach to the problem is taken. An important role of excess capacity
is to provide reserves, which in restructured systems are accommodated by so-called
ancillary services. One can hypothesize that market-based payment for ancillary services
increases the revenue from installed capacity, and create better incentives to make
investments in capacity. To explore this hypothesis, a model is developed to compute
17 In fact, this may be one of the major benefits of restructuring.
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market prices for energy and ancillary services in a perfectly competitive market, and a
number of analyses are done with the model, including the use of flexible demand
Partly based on the analysis in Chapter 3, the innovative concept of capacity subscription is
introduced in Chapter 6. This concept is based on the theory of self rationing, that is well
known from the economic literature on rationing. It is shown that this concept can be
economically efficient in restructured markets, and that it will solve several of the problems at
hand.
In Chapter 7, a comparison of several concepts to solve the peaking capacity problem is
made, while Chapter 8 gives the conclusions of the work.
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Chapter 2: THE CAPACITY BALANCE IN RESTRUCTURED
POWER MARKETS
This chapter presents the capacity balance issue in restructured power markets from different
viewpoints. The objective is to argue that shortage of peaking power and reserves may be
expected in restructured systems in the long run. The argument will be made both on
empirical and theoretical grounds.
It is important to notice at this point that the reference case for this chapter, and also for
other chapters where relevant, is the energy-only market form. With this market
organization, generators are paid only for the energy delivered. At this stage, payment of
reserves is not considered, but the implicit assumption is that there is no fixed payment for
reserves in the reference case, although there may be short-term, market based payment. (If
there was a fixed payment, investment could always be made attractive by making the
payment high enough, in which case one actually has chosen a particular policy to solve the
problem.) The energy-only market is chosen as reference because it is the natural market
form, normal in most other markets. One does not pay an additional fee on bread to guarantee
baking capacity, and nobody requires airlines to keep enough planes available for all
passengers that might wish to travel home the day before Christmas. So statements about the
lacking viability of a power market to provide sufficient peaking power or reserves relate to
the energy-only market. Other market organizations may be able to solve the problem, which
is the theme of Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis.
Section 2.1 discusses generation capacity, why it is needed and how it is supplied under
various market settings. Section 2.2 is based on power system reliability theory, and its use in
the determination of installed capacity. Section 2.3 discusses the role of uncertainty, and
shows the effect of uncertainty with the help of a simple conceptual model. Section 2.4
compares the development of the capacity balance in Norway, Sweden and the UK. Finally,
some conclusions are drawn in Section 2.5.
2.1 The capacity balance issue
The purpose of this Section is to provide the reason for why the balance between generation
capacity and peak demand may become a problematic issue in restructured power systems. At
this point, it is necessary to discuss the use of the word balance. In a well-functioning
market, there is a balance between supply and demand by definition. According to economic
theory, the price will settle at a level where this balance is obtained. If demand temporary
exceeds supply, the price will increase, depressing demand and/or increasing supply, until
they are equal  and the other way round when supply exceeds demand. Electricity is special
in that supply must equal demand at any point in time, because there are no storage
possibilities. At the same time, it has been common to charge users fixed prices over longer
time periods. It is clear that the combination of these two factors results in a market that
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cannot be well-functioning at all times, because there is no common market price seen by all
participants that could have ensured a balance between supply and demand. Briefly, this is the
background why there is a problem, and why it makes sense to discuss the capacity balance.
2.1.1 introduces some capacity definitions. 2.1.2 discusses the distinction between
capacity- and energy-constrained power systems, and their development over time. 2.1.3
gives a brief overview over the expansion planning process in traditionally organized systems.
2.1.1 Capacity definitions
The IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronic Terms, defines capacity for
electric-power devices as The capacity of a machine, apparatus, or appliance is the
maximum load of which it is capable under existing service conditions. This definition uses
the notion of load, which here will be interpreted as power, i.e. energy per time unit.
For a single generation unit, it seems straightforward to define this maximum power, given
its existing service conditions (for example ambient temperature, current operating point).
Even for a single unit, there may a number of reservations, which however, are less relevant
for the current discussion. It is a lot more problematic to define the capacity of a system of
generators. Because there is a certain outage probability for each unit and each plant, the total
capacity is a stochastic number. Other concerns complicate matters utterly, e.g.:
• the grid may reduce the possibility to utilize all generators at full capacity, but to which
degree will depend on which generators actually are online
• the possibility for grid outages increases uncertainty
• for run-of-river plants, availability of water may be difficult to predict
As an alternative to the capacity of the generation system, capacity may be viewed from
the demand side. From this point of view, four definitions of capacity demand may be
distinguished, as shown in Figure 2-1, which is based on Norwegian data from 1989-98
(Statnett). It shows the average per unit load duration curve together with the curve with the
lowest load factor for the actual period.
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Figure 2-1: Illustration of concepts for demand for capacity
The figure represents the following concepts:
1. The capacity to satisfy the demand for energy during the year.
2. The capacity to provide normal peak load demand
3. The capacity to provide extreme peak load demand
4. The capacity to provide extreme peak load demand with agreed-upon reserve margins
The first form is mostly of theoretical interest, though it sets focus on the importance of the
shape of the load-duration curve. The distinction between the second and third forms is
important with respect to the uncertainty regarding peak demand even in the short run1. This
uncertainty is due to annual variations in temperature. The impact of these variations depends
on the share of the load that is used for either cooling or heating. The capacity to provide
extreme peak load demand with agreed reserve margins must be available to secure reliable
system operations under all circumstances, at least as long as price cannot be used effectively
to constrain demand during peaking conditions.
2.1.2 Capacity- and energy co nstrained systems
One way to illustrate the role of generation capacity in power systems is to look at the
distinction between energy- and capacity constrained systems. In the traditional single-owner
view, a capacity constrained system is a system where the need for more capacity triggers
1 This uncertainty is added to the long-term demand uncertainty, based on general economic
development, fuel prices etc. A representation of historical maximum demand will always have a much
more erratic character than the smoother development of energy consumption.
Duration
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expansion. This is typically the case in thermal systems, where thermal capacity with a load
factor of 80-85 % (7000-7500 hours) easily can provide the energy needed for demand with a
load factor of 60-70 %. In an energy-constrained system, the need for more energy triggers
expansion. This is the case in hydro-dominated system with sufficient storage capacity and for
example a generation load factor of 45-50 % (4-5000 hours).
An illustration of the concepts is given in Figure 2-2. It shows optimal system expansion,
given a known demand level at a certain stage. Fixed cost is assumed a linear function of
system capability. If more capacity is built, fixed costs increase, while (net) operational costs
decrease, due to the opportunity to utilize the system in a more flexible way and possibly the
sales of surplus energy.
Figure 2-2: Optimal system expansion in capacity-constrained (left) and energy-constrained
systems
Important entities in this context are load-shedding and energy curtailment. The
former is here used for short-term, short-notice shedding of peak demand, the latter for
longer-notice reduction of energy demand due to energy shortage. Both are forms for
rationing, and are forms of market imperfections, resulting from the fact that consumers are
insufficiently exposed to price variations that could adapt demand to supply. This problem is
discussed in Chapter 3.
The left pane in Figure 2-2 shows a capacity-constrained system. The cost of load shedding
is the dominating cost when the system expansion level is well below optimum. The cost of
energy curtailment is zero far below the optimal level.
The right pane in Figure 2-2 shows an energy-constrained system. Here the cost of energy
curtailment becomes the dominating cost below optimum, while the cost of load shedding is
negligible at capacity levels of practical interest. The slope of the load-shedding cost curve is
much steeper than of the energy-curtailment curve, reflecting its much higher cost2.
2 The Value of Lost Load in the UK system is for example GBP 2.50/kWh (USD 4.03/kWh) [2.2], and
SEK 30.00/kWh (USD 3.56/kWh) in the Swedish system [2.4]. This may be compared with the cost of
energy curtailment in Norway before restructuring of NOK 0.70-5.00/kWh (USD 0.09-0.64/kWh) (the
highest number was only used for extreme and unrealistic levels of curtailment) and of SEK 3.00/kWh
(USD 0.36/kWh) (Exchange rates summer 1999).
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Total System Capability
Fixed Cost
Operation
Energy Curtailment
Load Shedding
TOTAL
Copt
Cost
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Energy surplus in capacity-constrained systems occurs because thermal plants have to meet
peak demand, which gives a considerable slack at low-demand hours. Capacity surplus in
energy-constrained systems may occur because the dimensioning criteria for hydro plants are
not peak demand, but for example to minimize spill.
Two examples of cooperation between systems with different dimensioning characteristics,
illustrating these features, are given in Appendix A.2 at the end of this chapter.
An interesting point is that this seemingly basic system characteristic is not necessarily a
static property. A capacity-constrained system may develop in an energy-constrained
direction because of load-factor increasing demand-side measures3. An energy-constrained
system may move in the opposite direction because of load-factor reductions4. Shifts may also
occur because of general changes in demand structure, for example changes in penetration of
electrical heating or cooling. Related to the figures above, this means that the cost curves of
load shedding and energy curtailment approach each other during such developments.
These tendencies, occurring isolated in separate systems, may be greatly enhanced when
power exchange between systems with different characteristics increases. For the Norwegian
system, stronger ties with neighbouring systems create the opportunity for large energy
imports, relaxing the energy constraint. At the same time, export contracts have been signed,
effectively decreasing the total demand load-factor. This means that the energy curtailment
curve shifts to the left, while the load-shedding curve moves to the right. Eventually the last
one may become the active constraint, turning the system to being capacity-constrained. The
opposite development may occur in thermal systems that start importing peaking power from
hydro-systems, shifting the load-shedding curve to the left, and the energy-curtailment curve
to the right.
2.1.3 Expansion planning in traditional systems
In this Section, a short description will be given of general characteristics of the traditional
planning process. The purpose is to give a background for comparison with the process in a
restructured system.
Normally, some governmental body will have the supervisory responsibility for expansion
of the power system. This organization basically takes responsibility for the following
activities:
3 This has happened in the Netherlands: its load-factor has been increased from 5800 hours in the
seventies to 6200 hours in 1997 and a forecast of 6400 hours in 2006 [2.5]. The last number
corresponds to 73 %. Although it would be far fetched to call the Dutch system energy constrained, 73
% is certainly approaching the 75 % settled down load factor for thermal plants used in IEA studies
[2.6].
4 This may be illustrated by the situation in Norway, where the load-factor has decreased from 6300
hours in the seventies to 5800 hours at the end of the nineties due to a fast growth of electrical heating
after the oil price increases in the seventies. The development was probably influenced by the fact that
partly capacity-based tariffs were substituted by pure energy-tariffs in the same period. Another
reason for this development has been demand growth in domestic and commercial sector, while
demand in the power intensive industry has been constant.
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• prepare load forecasts (energy and/or capacity, cf. 2.1.2)
• identify relevant options to satisfy the demand forecast
• identify constraints
• compute least cost options that satisfy all constraints
In many ways, the most interesting point in this process is the satisfaction of all
constraints. At first, naturally there are numerous technical constraints regarding the various
technologies, their viability in the system, reliability of supply, the extension and quality of
the grid5 etc. Second, society usually adds a number of non-technical constraints to the
planning process. These may be various objectives that a society attempts to obtain by using
energy policy as an instrument. Examples:
• the use of domestic fuels to decrease dependence on imports and preserve employment
• fuel diversification to avoid extreme dependence on one single energy source
• energy conservation and the use of renewables
• self-sufficiency, i.e. the objective to be dependent on domestic energy sources as far as
possible
• resistance against nuclear power
Generally, the reduced opportunities to use energy policy as an instrument to obtain other
objectives, is an important side effect of the restructuring process. Some view this as an
advantage [2.3], while others are opposed to power sector restructuring exactly for this
reason.
2.2 Power system reliability
Installed generation capacity is not 100 % available at all times. Firstly, planned outages are
necessary for periodical maintenance. The length of the maintenance period varies with the
type of plant: for thermal plants it may be from 4-6 weeks per year, for hydro normally just a
few days, but with longer periods for major overhauls every 10-20 years. Under special
conditions, annual maintenance of several weeks each year may also be necessary for hydro.
Secondly, unplanned outages due to equipment failing reduce plant availability. Also this
number is dependent on plant type, and has a stochastic character. For example in Holland,
with a 100 % thermal system, unplanned unavailability varied between 5 and 12 % from
1971-87 [2.7], while the number for hydro plants in Norway is 1-2 %.
5 Some authors argue that the lacking possibility to undertake integrated planning of generation and
grid may be the major drawback of power system restructuring, an argument that cannot be neglected.
On the other hand, in most developed countries there is considerable popular and political opposition
against further extension of the high voltage transmission grids. This fact does to some extent change
the grid operators and owners roles from planning grid expansion to maximizing the utilization of the
existing grid.
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The foreseeable character of planned maintenance does not constitute a planning challenge,
but the resulting need for extra capacity has to be taken into account. However, the stochastic
character of unplanned outages is a difficult planning problem, which has engaged researchers
at least since the 1930s. The development of this research is described in [2.8] and [2.9].
Power system reliability is associated with the systems ability to provide a reliable supply
of electrical energy. This very broad concept is usually subdivided in system adequacy and
security [2.11]. Adequacy relates to the existence of sufficient facilities within the system to
satisfy demand, which includes both generation, transmission and distribution facilities.
Adequacy is associated with static conditions. Security relates to the ability of the system to
respond to disturbances arising within that system. The majority of the research within the
field is in the domain of adequacy assessment, but some work has been done on parts of the
security problem, notably the quantification of operating capacity requirements.
The analysis of power system adequacy can be divided in three hierarchical levels.
Hierarchical level I (HLI) is concerned only with generation facilities. Hierarchical level II
(HLII) includes both generation and transmission and hierarchical level III (HLIII) also
includes the distribution system in an assessment of consumer load point adequacy. In this
section, the concern will be adequacy assessment at HLI only.
Two fundamentally different approaches have evolved over the years [2.12]. In North
America the emphasis has been on the development of adequacy indexes for the total system
and, at HLII, for every load point of the system. In Europe, particularly Italy and France, a
Monte Carlo simulation approach has been used, where the cost of reliability is one of three
cost components, the others being operating and capital costs.
2.2.1 The analytical approach: indexes
Historically, many utilities have measured the adequacy of both planned and installed
capacity in terms of a percentage reserve. As pointed out in [2.8], there are a number of severe
drawbacks with this measure: it does not recognize the very different requirements that may
be needed in different systems, it does not consider load pattern changes over time and neither
does it consider the impact of the addition of new large units. This last point is addressed by a
modification, that demands that reserve requirements should equate the size of the largest unit
plus a fixed percentage. Although this is an improvement, the economic aspects associated
with different standards of reliability can be compared only by using probability techniques.
After some initial publications in 1933-34, a large group of papers was published in 1947,
the most well known by Calabrese [2.12]. These papers introduced the methods that evolved
in what now are known as loss of load and frequency and duration approaches.
The kernel of the analytical approach is a component state-model with two states: available
and unavailable6, which can be described by a single parameter, the forced outage rate. With
this basic model, the probability of combinations of generator outages can be calculated, and
6 More advanced models may have more states, e.g. derated states (with partial availability) or a four-
state model for peaking units.
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the cumulative probability of a specified level of MW being unavailable. To avoid excessive
calculation times for large systems, outage combinations with a probability below a certain
level are normally not considered (e.g. lower than 10-6  10-9).
This generation model can be convolved with a load model to produce system risk indexes.
A number of different load models can be used, resulting in different indexes. In a simple and
widely used model, each day is represented by its peak load. These can be arranged in
descending order to form a daily peak load duration curve. Combined with a capacity outage
probability table, the expected risk of loss of load, the Loss Of Load Expectation, LOLE can
be calculated:
1
( ) days/year
n
i i i
i
LOLE P C L
=
= − (2-1)
where
Ci - available capacity on day i
Li - forecast peak load on day i
Pi(Ci-Li) - probability of loss of load on day i
n - number of days considered
The result is the mathematical expectation of the number of days during which loss of load
will be encountered. It is neither a frequency nor a duration. The simple basic model may be
enhanced in many ways. Examples are dividing the year in several periods with varying
availability due to maintenance, inclusion of derated states, or load forecast and forced outage
uncertainty.
Another natural load model is the duration curve of the individual hourly values. With this
model, the resulting index may also be regarded as a probability index, and is called Loss Of
Load Probability or LOLP. Furthermore, the sum of the individual hours capacity deficit may
in this case be considered as a measure of expected energy curtailment or Expected Energy
Not Served, EENS in MWh. By dividing EENS with expected energy demand W over the
whole period a relative measure is obtained. By subtracting this figure from one, an Energy
Index of Reliability (EIR) may be defined:
WEENSEIR −= 1 (2-2)
These indexes do not give any indication of the frequency of occurrence of an insufficient
capacity condition, nor its duration, which are the most useful indexes for customer or load
point evaluation. Therefore, indexes representing frequency and duration measures offer
increased compatibility in overall assessment. Naturally, this requires more generator outage
data. In this case, transitions between the available and outage states are described by failure
and repair rates, from which other quantities like mean time to failure/repair, cycle frequency
and cycle time can be calculated [2.8]. The load may be represented by an individual state
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load model, where daily load is represented by a low and a high level, the latter equal to daily
peak load. The number of hours with high load is called the exposure level. If this is one, the
original LOLE-model reappears. Probability, frequency, duration and cycle time for loss of
load events can be calculated with this model.
Apart from the use in HLIII analysis, it is not possible to state that the frequency and
duration (F&D) method is better than the simpler LOLE/LOLP/EENS concepts, but it offers
additional physical insight.
2.2.2 The simulation approach
In the simulation approach, the cost of reliability is obtained by developing a risk index in the
form of the expected yearly curtailed energy, which is transformed into a cost using some
appropriate value for unserved energy. The basic technique to accomplish this is the Monte
Carlo method. The main advantage of the method is the feasibility of taking into account
theoretically any random variable or contingency, but at the cost of excessive computing
times. Moreover, the Monte Carlo method aims at total cost minimization, where outage costs
are included in the total cost, while the index approach constrains the value of the relevant
indexes. Provided that a sufficiently representative set of outages can be simulated and that
the outage cost is reasonably realistic, the simulation approach should yield more theoretically
correct results, because it is independent of somewhat arbitrary, engineering-judgement based
index values.
2.2.3 The choice of reliability level
Regardless of which method and/or indexes are selected to determine the system adequacy,
this does not answer the question of what the correct level should be7. The theoretical answer
is simple: the level should be chosen such that the marginal cost of increasing it is equal to the
marginal benefit to customers of this increase. In practice, the necessary calculations are well
beyond todays level of knowledge (both methodical and especially on the necessary data)
and computing power. In reality, the acceptable level is based on engineering judgement,
cf. [2.10]. Because of the enormity of the (HLIII) problem [2.11], there will always be
uncertainty as to the validity of the answers. So especially if the theoretical result should
indicate lower optimal reliability levels than engineering judgement, decision makers will be
reluctant to change their policy, out of fear for the consequences.
According to the introduction to Part 1 of [2.9], The ultimate purpose of assessing the
adequacy of generation systems is to help in deciding how much additional capacity to install
and when. There is very little published material concerning the reliability criteria used by
utilities. Some examples are:
                                                
7 As stated at the end of the previous Section, the simulation approach avoids this problem  the
reliability level will be a result of the cost minimization.
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• In [2.14], criteria used by Canadian utilities are reported, based on a survey from 1979.
The most used criterion was LOLE, with values of 0.1 and 0.2 days/year. One utility
reported a value of 0.003 days/year when interconnections are taken into account.
• In Holland a more advanced version of the LOLE concept is used [2.7]. The year is
divided in 13 four-week periods, and LOLE is calculated for each period. LOLE must not
exceed 2 % in any period, and the geometric mean for all periods must not exceed 1 %.
The criterion results in a loss of load frequency of 0.25/year and duration of 2 hours. The
effect of interconnections is taken into account.
• In Sweden, a loss of load probability of less than 0.1 % has been used [2.15].
2.2.4 System adequacy after r estructuring
The previous Sections have given a rough overview over the methods and principal indexes
used to assess generation adequacy in power systems. It appears that the theoretical correct
level of adequacy, where its marginal cost equals its marginal benefit, is not used as a basis,
because there are presently no methods available to calculate this optimum. Instead
engineering judgement is used to establish index values, which traditionally have been
handled as hard constraints in the capacity optimization process. In a restructured system, this
approach comes under pressure, for two reasons:
• Parties involved may challenge the legitimacy of the values that are based on engineering
judgement.
• It is not clear how the entity responsible for short-term security (normally the Independent
System Operator or ISO) can enforce any specific level of long-term adequacy in an
energy-only market.
The latter point naturally depends on the market organization. An analysis of several forms
of market organization is given in Chapter 7. However, from the discussion so far, it is clear
that it may be difficult or even impossible to sustain traditional levels of reliability in a
restructured environment, at least without challenging the principles of the restructuring
process.
2.3 Uncertainty
2.3.1 Sources of uncertainty
Uncertainty is an important factor in all planning.  However, the economic risk facing utilities
planning generation expansion in traditionally organized systems is limited8. The main
uncertainties concern load growth and fuel prices, and the main objective is to satisfy demand
                                                
8 This statement may need some moderation. Especially investment in nuclear technology has proven
risky. Also at least one Norwegian utility faced severe economic problems after investment in
expensive hydro plants in the early eighties. But such examples do not change the general rule.
URN:NBN:no-2136
The capacity balance in restructured power markets 22
___________________________________________________________________________
under all circumstances at minimum cost. If demand forecasts turn out to have been too
high, costs can be recovered through tariff modifications to (captive) consumers. If fuel prices
increase more than forecasted, the effects can normally be compensated through consumer
tariffs.
In centrally planned systems, a uniform discount rate is used. The main motivation for the
choice of discount rate is to obtain a correct comparison between alternative projects. On this
basis, the least cost projects can be chosen. Moreover, using the same discount rate for
various public projects in principle assures an optimal allocation of resources between
different sectors9. The choice of discount rate is not motivated by profitability of the company
that realizes the project. Profitability is secured by calculating cost-covering tariffs10.
In a restructured system, uncertainty is of direct concern for the results of profit-
maximizing companies. When market prices substitute rates, it is impossible to compensate
for the consequences of a wrong decision by modifying revenues.
From a general point of view, price is the only uncertain factor. More specific, a company
assessing investment in new generation capacity will have to assess the important factors that
affect electricity prices:
Structural factors:
• general economic development
• fuel prices
• demand growth by sector
• shifts in electricity utilization (more or less heating/cooling)
• new capacity built by incumbents
• new entrance
These factors are closely related to the development of the international economy.
Stochastic factors:
• temperature
• in hydro systems: inflow
In many countries, demand has some sensitivity for ambient temperature. Although this
effect is smoothed out over a longer period, several (for the investor) unfavourable years may
occur immediately after the investment has been made, threatening an otherwise positive
result.
                                                
9 At least this was the motivation for the choice of discount rate in the pre-restructuring Norwegian
planning system.
10 In the 1979 Energy Statement from the Norwegian Government the principle of pricing according to
Long Run Marginal Cost was introduced. The principle was to some extent used in the next decade,
and was one of the reasons for increasing electricity prices in Norway throughout the eighties.
URN:NBN:no-2136
Uncertainty 23
___________________________________________________________________________
Unpredictable factor:
• political decisions
The political conditions may change, depending on many different factors from opinions
on emission control to budget balance. A potential investor has to take into account that the
profitability of an investment may change overnight by unexpected political decisions.
In addition to these general uncertainties concerning all investments, additional uncertainty
faces an investment in generation to provide peaking capacity. The need for marginal peaking
capacity is the difference between two uncertain quantities: peak demand and available
installed capacity. The resulting number is extremely volatile11. Another way to view this
uncertainty is to look at the variability for the need for peaking power based on the load
duration curve. Figure 2-3 illustrates this, where the three curves represent the upper parts of
the lowest, expected and highest demand based on temperature variability12.
Figure 2-3: Average, highest and lowest per unit load duration curve (referred average
annual load) for the Norwegian power system 1989-98 (source: Statnett)
Capacity exceeding 1.46 times average demand, is under normal conditions needed in T0
(~50) hours. In a cold year, it is needed for T1 (~300) hours, while in a warm year, it is not
                                                
11 This can be illustrated by assuming that these quantities are normally distributed. For example in
the Norwegian system, available capacity three years ahead may be a stochastic variable with an
expected value with µp = 23 GW and σp = 2 % or 0.46 GW. Let demand be a stochastic variable with
µd = 24 GW and σp = 2 % or 0.48 GW. Then the need for additional peaking capacity is a stochastic
variable with µm = µd - µp  = 1 GW and σm= √ (σd2 + σp2) = 0.66 GW or 66 %.
12  The example is given for a system with electrical heating; in a system with cooling, the same
reasoning is valid, but cold and warm must be exchanged.
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needed at all. Because prices will vary also, the variability of the revenue from a peaking
power plant will be even greater.
2.3.2 A simple price model
A simple, but interesting model to illustrate some principal relations was presented by Kay
[2.16]: Let there be k techniques, each with a running cost ai and capital cost bi per demand
cycle. Let there be n equal length subperiods, with xij per cycle the rate at which technique i is
operating in period j, and xi the capacity of technique i installed. Let qj be demand in period j.
The cost minimization problem may then be stated as:
,
MIN
i ij
i ij i i
x x i j i
a x b x+  (2-3)
subject to:
(uij) 0i ijx x i, j− ≥ ∀ (2-4)
(vj) jqx ji
ij ∀≥ (2-5)13
xi, xij ≥ 0 ∀ i, j
Equation (2-3) describes the total operation and investment costs, (2-4) restricts generation
from each technique to its capacity and (2-5) equals demand to generation. The dual variables
corresponding to each constraint are shown in parentheses in front of the constraints. The dual
formulation of the problem is:
,
MAX
j ij
j j
v u j
q v (2-6)
subject to:
(xij) j,iauv iijj ∀≤− (2-7)
(xi)
ibu i
j
ij ∀≤ (2-8)
vj, uij ≥ 0 ∀ i, j
The us are interpreted as capacity charges and the vs as shadow prices of outputs. Using
the complementary slackness properties of primal and dual, one obtains:
                                                
13 The alternative formulation ij j
i
x q= yields the same result because cost minimization results in
the left-hand side equalling the right-hand side. However, the chosen formulation simplifies the
interpretation of the dual, because with the equal sign, the vjs would not be restricted to positive
values.
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from (2-7):
0=+< ijijij x,uav or  0>+= ijijij x,uav or 0j i ij ijv a u , x= + = (2-9)
from (2-4):
0=< ijiij u,xx or  0>= ijiij u,xx or 0ij i ijx x , u= = (2-10)
from (2-8):
0>= i
j
iij x,bu or 0=< i
j
iij x,bu or 0ij i i
j
u b , x= = (2-11)
For completeness, the last column represents degenerated cases, which have no practical
impact on the conclusions. Equation (2-9) shows that if a technique is operating (xij > 0) the
price vj equals its running cost ai plus the capacity charge uij. From (2-10) the capacity charge
is zero as long as a technique is operating below its installed capacity. Thus  the price in any
period is equal to the running cost of any technique that is operating at a level less than its
installed capacity xi. All techniques with running cost greater than price will be inoperative
(2-9), and all for which running cost is less than price will be working at full capacity ((2-9)
and (2-10)). Where all techniques operate at zero or capacity outputs, price is demand-
determined at some level between the running costs of the most expensive technique
operating and the cheapest technique not operating. Any employed technique will exactly
earn its capacity cost from the capacity charges earned in the period when its running costs
are below the prevailing price (2-11). This can also be concluded directly from the fact that
for this well-defined linear problem, the values of the expressions (2-3) and (2-6) are equal
because of the strong duality property. Because (2-3) represents generator (fixed and variable)
costs and (2-6) generator revenues, this proves that revenues cover costs.
 If the periods are ordered according to decreasing demand, then the increase in demand
between two consecutive periods will always be covered completely by one technique. As a
result of this, the capacity of each employed technique will be equal to the difference in
demand between two distinct demand periods. The interesting consequence of this is that the
price vj equals marginal cost of some employed technique in all periods, except those periods
where the installed capacity of the marginal technique in that period is exactly utilized. With
few technologies and many periods, this means that almost all technologies recover their
capacity cost during periods that other techniques are price setting. The exception is the peak
technology (with lowest bi and highest ai), that must recover its capacity cost in the single
period it is used at its installed capacity, i.e. the only period that its uij > 0. A 3-period
example in Appendix A.2.2 illustrates the concept in some more detail.
The fact that capacity costs are covered for all techniques is somewhat surprising, and
indicates that there should be no peak-load problem because an investment in peak capacity
fully recovers its costs. However, it is the result of two strong assumptions: planning is done
under certainty and prices can be varied continuously. The effect of relaxing the first
assumption is examined in the next Section.
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2.3.3 The effect of uncertainty
It is possible to extend the simple model from the previous Section to include the effect of
uncertainty. For this purpose, it is assumed that uncertainty is represented by a number of
scenarios, each with a probability pk. For each scenario, demand is assumed to be qjk. In this
case, the formulation changes to:
,
MIN
i ijk
k i ijk i i
x x k i j i
p a x b x+  (2-12)
subject to:
(uijk) 0i ijkx x i, j ,k− ≥ ∀ (2-13)
(vjk) ijk jk
i
x q j,k≥ ∀ (2-14)
xi, xijk ≥ 0 ∀ i, j, k
The meaning of the symbols is as before, with the difference that xijk here represents
generation by technique i in period j in scenario k. The dual formulation of the problem now
becomes:
,
MAX
jk ijk
jk jk
v u k j
q v (2-15)
subject to:
(xijk) jk ijk k iv u p a i, j ,k− ≤ ∀ (2-16)
(xi) ijk ik j
u b i≤ ∀ (2-17)
vjk, uijk ≥ 0 ∀ i, j, k
In this case prices vjk and ijku  are scaled with the factors 1 kp , so jk jk kv' v p= is
interpreted as the shadow price for the output in scenario k14. Like before the complementary
slackness properties of primal and dual can be used to analyse prices (the degenerated cases
have been omitted here for clarity):
from (2-16):
0jk i ijk ijkv' a u' , x< + = or 0jk i ijk ijkv' a u' , x= + > (2-18)
from (2-13):
0ijk i ijkx x , u'< = or 0ijk i ijkx x , u'= > (2-19)
                                                
14 It can be seen that this is correct by looking at equation (2-15), that represents the total generator
revenue. This can alternatively be written as  'k jk jk
k j
p v q , from which the relation between vjk
and vjk follows.
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from (2-17):
0k ijk i i
k j
p u' b , x= > or 0k ijk i i
k j
p u' b , x< = (2-20)
Prices equal the running costs of all units not running at their capacity limit. Also in this
case capacity costs are recovered by the expected value of the capacity charges uijk. However,
while expected total revenue of the generators E(R) is given by (2-15), its variance is given by
2 2 21
jk jk
kk j
Var( R ) q v E( R )
p
 
 = −
 
 
 
This uncertainty is especially harmful for peaking plants. The plant with the highest
marginal cost ai will have to cover its investment cost during a few short periods where all
plants are running at their capacity limits. This is the only case where uijk for this plant is
positive according to (2-19). Without loss of generality, scenarios and periods can be defined
such that this is the case for only one scenario K and one period J. In that case, the expected
value of the revenue of this marginal peaking plant is P JK JKE( R ) q v=  and its coefficient of
variation 1 1P P K( R ) E( R ) ( p )σ = − . For example for a plant that is on average needed
every other year, 0 5Kp .= , with a resulting coefficient of variation of 100 %. An example of
the model including uncertainty is given in Appendix A.2.2.
2.3.4 Uncertainty and investment decisions
There is a wealth of economic literature about the effects of uncertainty on investment
decisions, and it is well outside the scope of this thesis to probe this subject in any depth. Still
it is appropriate to discuss shortly the concept of risk aversion. In economic theory it is
common to model an individuals preferences by way of utility functions, cf. [2.18] Chapter
4. Put simply, a utility function describes how an individuals utility changes as a function of
his wealth. A utility function is always increasing: the marginal utility of wealth is positive,
people prefer more wealth over less. The shape of the function indicates the individuals risk
attitude. If the utility function is linear, earning some amount gives the same numerical
change in utility as losing the same amount, and the individual is called risk-neutral. If the
utility function is convex, earning an amount gives a higher numerical change in utility than
losing the same amount  the individual is risk-seeking. Finally, if the utility function is
concave, earning an amount gives a lower numerical change in utility than losing the same
amount. This is called risk-aversion, and it is generally assumed that this is the most common
attitude towards risk.
A risk-averse individual (or company) will demand a compensation for taking a risk. As a
result, a company will require a higher rate of return for the investment, or alternatively, use a
higher discount rate to calculate its profitability. For investments in peaking capacity that
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have been shown to have great uncertainty, this means that very high discount rates will be
used. Therefore, investment will only occur when extremely high prices are foreseen, and
there are no risks of price caps.
2.4 Experience from existing  markets
This Section will give a brief overview over the availability of capacity in the nineties in some
countries. The objective is to find out if there is empirical evidence for the hypothesis that
peaking capacity will become scarce in restructured power systems.
2.4.1 Norway
The Norwegian power system is almost entirely based on hydropower (99 % of installed
capacity, the remainder mostly existing of CHP plants in industry and district heating).
Installed capacity in 1999 is 28.4 GW, with an estimated normal annual production of 113
TWh. Gross total consumption in 1998 was 120.3 TWh, with a peak demand of 20.6 GW.
Total consumption was covered with 116.7 TWh generation and 3.6 TWh import.
Net demand in Norway in 1998 existed of 71.5 TWh general demand (domestic,
commercial, services, transport, agriculture) and 29.0 TWh energy intensive industry15
(NVE). Moreover, 4.9 TWh was used by switchable boilers, and 0.8 TWh for seasonal16
pumping. A considerable part of general demand is used for space heating.
Norway was one of the first countries to undertake a comprehensive restructuring. The
current energy-only market is based on the Energy Act of June 1990, which in reality became
effective with the introduction of the point tariff system in May 1992. A more comprehensive
overview over the Norwegian restructuring process is given in [2.21] and [2.22]. Some
production and demand data from 1991-1998 is given in Table 2-1.
                                                
15 Energy intensive industry exists of smelters and various heavy metal industries, chemical industry
and to a certain extent pulp and paper industry. Typical for this sector is a load factor between 90 and
100 %. The distinction between general demand and energy intensive industry has always been
important in the Norwegian energy debate, because of the great share this industry takes of total
electricity consumption, alleged subsidies, regional policy etc.
16 Pumping in the Norwegian system has a seasonal character, in contrast with the daily pumping
cycle used e.g. in the UK pumped storage plants. The purpose of seasonal pumping is to move water
from small to large reservoirs in summer to save water for winter utilization.
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Table 2-1: Norwegian power consumption and capacity demand and installation
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
consumption (GWh) 99965 100441 101949 102926 104964 104146 105222 110666
installed capacity (MW) 27100 27100 27400 27500 28300 28400 28400 28400
maximum load (MW) 18700 18766 19418 19374 20302 21247 19528 20639
load factor (%) 66.1 66.2 66.0 66.6 65.4 61.1 67.6 66.7
maximum load with min
load factor (MW)
20228 20329 20968 21134 21744 21247 21613 22541
reserve margin (%) 44.9 44.4 41.1 41.9 39.4 33.7 45.4 37.6
reserve margin with min
load factor(%)
34.0 33.3 30.7 30.1 30.1 33.7 31.4 26.0
Because of the large share of space heating, Norwegian demand for peaking power is
highly dependent on temperature. A simple way to correct for varying temperatures between
years is to use the observed minimum load factor in the period concerned to calculate a worst
case17 peak demand. The reserve margin is define as:
margin = (Pinstalled  Pmax) / Pmax
where Pinstalled  equals installed capacity and Pmax equals maximum demand.
Figure 2-4 shows the development of the reserve margins for Norway. The figure suggests
that Norway still has a satisfactory reserve margin, although it is clearly decreasing, due to the
fact that only minor investments in generation capacity have been made in recent years.
Shutting down of hydropower units, in contrast with thermal units, cf. the next section, is
normally not profitable: because of their low running costs, hydro units will over time always
generate the electricity available from their inflow. However, when major refurbishment is
necessary, the cost of this must be weighed against future revenues and costs. In this context,
capacity in excess of 1000 MW may be mothballed in Norway in the period 2000-2002
[2.24].
The figure also shows a required reserve margin, which is of illustrative nature, because it
is difficult to estimate and actually an improper measure of system adequacy, cf. Section
2.2.1. It is based on an estimated availability of hydropower of 89 %18 and primary and
                                                
17 I.e. worst case for the period concerned. Without further analysis, there is no way of saying how
representative the corresponding temperature is in a longer perspective. This simple correction also
oversees the fact that utilization of electricity may change over time, for example through an
increasing or decreasing share of space heating.
18 This is a controversial number, notoriously difficult to verify, partly because of its dependence on
hydrological and hydraulic conditions. Investigations during the winter of 1996 indicated an availability
of 87 and 84 % on two occasions. In this case, full utilization of remaining resources is assumed. This
may prove difficult due to grid constraints.
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secondary reserve requirements of 513 and 1000 MW respectively [2.23]. The reason that the
required margin is somewhat decreasing is that the reserve requirement is an absolute number,
which decreases as a fraction of peak demand.
Figure 2-4: Development of reserve margins in the Norwegian power system
2.4.2 Sweden
Installed capacity in the Swedish system exists of 51 % hydro, 31 % nuclear, 17 % thermal
(CHP, conventional steam and gas turbines) and 1 % wind, totalling 32.0 GW19. Energy
production in 1998 amounted to 48 % hydro, 46 % nuclear, 6 % thermal and 0.2 % wind,
totalling 154.2 TWh, of which 10.7 TWh was exported. Estimated normal annual hydro
production is 64 TWh, which was exceeded with 9.7 TWh in 1998.
Net demand in Sweden in 1998 existed of 78.2 TWh for domestic use and services, and
54.6 industrial demand, of which 30 TWh can be characterized as energy intensive. From
1991 to 1995 between 4 and 8 TWh was used by switchable boilers, but no data are available
for this from 1996. Also in Sweden a considerable part of general demand is used for space
heating, though its share is lower than in Norway.
Sweden passed deregulation legislation in October 1995, and joined the existing
Norwegian market structure in January 1996. A market operator, NordPool was formed,
owned equally by Statnett and Svenska Kraftnät, the respective System Operators. More
information is given in [2.21] and [2.22].
Some production and demand data from 1993-1998 is given in the table below.
                                                
19 The statistical information in this Section is based on the annual publication Kraftåret 19xx from
the Swedish Power Association (KvF), in Swedish with some English comments.
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Table 2-2: Swedish power consumption and capacity demand and installation
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
consumption (GWh) 131051 129675 132305 132446 132205 132800
installed capacity (MW) 34329 34532 34116 34251 34044 31994
maximum load (MW) 24400 24400 24400 26300 25000 24600
load factor (%) 65.6 64.9 66.6 61.9 65.1 66.6
maximum load with min
load factor (MW)
25877 25586 26274 26300 26292 26476
reserve margin (%) 40.7 41.5 39.8 30.2 36.2 30.1
reserve margin with min
load factor(%)
32.7 35.0 29.8 30.2 29.5 20.8
Figure 2-5 shows the development of the reserve margin for Sweden. This margin is
obviously decreasing. Although it is difficult to establish absolute rules on a required margin,
20 % is obviously approaching this limit. Maximum load has been nearly constant for over a
decade (the new record peak in 1998 was only 100 MW higher than the previous one in 1987,
albeit at a considerably higher temperature in 1998). However, more than 2500 MW of
conventional steamplant has been shut down, with the explicit motivation that it is
unprofitable in a competitive market20. A report from the Swedish Energy Authority [2.25]
acknowledged this situation, but claimed that sufficient import capacity will be available, a
view that was heavily disputed by the industry.
Figure 2-5: Development of reserve margins in the Swedish power system
                                                
20 In addition, 600 MW of nuclear plant was shut down in 1999, but for altogether different (political)
reasons.
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2.4.3 England and Wales
Installed capacity in England and Wales at the end of 1996 existed of 57 % conventional
steam plants, 18 % nuclear, 17 % CCGT, 6 % hydro (including pumped storage), 2 % gas
turbines and oil engines and 1 % renewables21 of a total of 73.3 MW. In terms of energy
produced in 1996, the figures are 51 %, 27 %, 19 %, 0 %, 1 % and 1 % respectively of a total
of 347.7 TWh. In addition imports were 16.7 TWh. Total consumption by final users in 1996
was 305.6 TWh, of which 103.1 was industrial demand and 202.5 domestic, commercial etc22.
The share of space heating is low.
Often wrongly referred as the first open electricity market in the world, the reform that was
effectuated on 1 April 1990, was still one of the earliest and probably the most debated and
investigated. In the centre of this reform stands the Pool, to which all generation has to be
sold, based on bids for 48 half-hour periods. In the present context, it is important to notice
that the E&W market is not an energy-only market: it includes a capacity payment based on
the half-hourly loss of load probability and the value of lost load (cf. the description in
Section 7.2).
The supply side of the market originally existed of the three successors of the broken-up
CEGB, National Power, PowerGen and Nuclear Power. Since then, several large new
generators and many smaller IPPs have emerged. Retail competition was introduced
gradually, and at present consumers, regardless of size can choose their supplier. Numberless
descriptions of the system are available, among other a couple of the references already given.
Some production and demand data from 1991-1997 is given in the table below.
Table 2-3: UK power consumption and capacity demand and installation
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
consumption (GWh) 290840 291455 295142 291782 302637 314287 317486
installed capacity (MW) 70182 67499 69118 68998 70011 73261 72498
maximum load (MW) 54472 51663 54848 52362 55611 56815 56965
load factor (%) 66.9 70.1 66.7 70.8 68.4 69.6 69.9
maximum load with min
load factor (MW)
54616 54329 54848 55589 57059 59274 59673
reserve margin (%) 28.8 30.7 26.0 31.8 25.9 28.9 27.3
reserve margin with min
load factor(%)
28.5 24.2 26.0 24.1 22.7 23.6 21.5
                                                
21 The statistical information in this Section is based on leaflets UK Electricity and Electricity Industry
Review from the Business Information Centre of the Electricity Association.
22 The leaflets use slightly different numbers under the headers UK electricity supply and
consumption and UK public distribution system. Here the first numbers are used. Further on, the
distinction between energy intensive and other industry is not made in these leaflets, and did not
seem important enough in this context to pursue further.
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Load factors have been calculated by dividing gross generation by maximum load, which
gives slightly higher values than in the original EA source. Although the share of space
heating is low, the load factor still varies considerably, which may partly be due to a limited
use of electrical heating on very cold days. It is not clear if the higher load factors from 1994
are part of a trend or are caused by random variation.
Figure 2-6 shows the development of reserve margins for this system. There is a slight
reduction in the observed margin. This is caused by a considerable layoff of conventional
steam plant23, which however is counteracted by a huge increase in independent CCGT
plants. With the load factor of 1993, a considerable decrease in reserve capacity can be
observed, despite the capacity element present in this market.
Figure 2-6: Development of reserve margins in the England and Wales power system
                                                
23 The main reason is probably that conventional, coal based, plants cannot compete with modern
natural-gas fired CCGT plants. The latters superiority is partly due to low gas prices in the world
markets and an accelerating technological development, but there are indications that distortions in
the UK market also are a main reason for the dash for gas. There have been discussions, if the still
dominating generators National Power and PowerGen have deliberately closed existing capacity to be
able to keep up market prices, cf. [2.29] and [2.1]: Even though entry will cause the incumbents to set
lower prices, considerable social loss is caused by the large and unnecessary induced investments in
additional capacity. Another interesting development is illustrated by the Labour Government late-
1997 temporary moratorium on new power stations (and not in the least by the following White Paper),
seen by some as an attempt of support for the British coal industry. Apart from the question if this is
the case or not, it puts focus on an important restructuring consequence, the greatly reduced
opportunity for political control of the power sector. Even if this is often viewed as a positive effect, it
also reduces the authorities possibility to pursue long-term beneficial objectives. For example may fuel
diversification be a perfectly rational societal objective, which creates an externality. In this view, fuel
diversification may be seen as an element of long-term security, not seen by the market, in the same
way as the availability of reserves is an element of short-term security, not seen by the market either.
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2.4.4 Other countries
In South-America, some electricity markets (Chile, Argentina) were restructured already in
the 1980s, and consequently there is a long experience available in these countries. However,
investment-stimulating elements in the form of payment for available capacity are included in
these systems, so their experience does not answer the question if energy-only markets are
viable.
The experience in the US is presently too short to draw any conclusions with respect to
investment behaviour. The most developed markets are the PJM Interconnection and the New
England and Californian systems. The two first have capacity obligations (discussed Chapter
7), which makes them unsuitable to answer the current question. As referred in Section 1.1,
California has experienced capacity shortages, which partly may be due to generators
unwillingness to invest under the present uncertainty. But there are so many other factors
influencing the situation that the Californian case does not provide strong evidence.
Another interesting example is Alberta in Canada, where the Power Pool of Alberta has
been operating since 1 January 1996. This is also an energy-only market. There is clearly
some concern regarding the markets ability to attract new capacity, cf. [2.26]: The supply
cushion within Alberta has been eroding over time. and [2.27]: ... there has been
insufficient economic incentive to add generating capacity, despite supply constraints so
severe that the system is often operating at or near full capacity.
Apart from the countries referred earlier, the experience in the other European countries
and in Australia is too short to draw any conclusions.
2.5 Will the lights stay on?
Section 2.1 has introduced the central theme of this thesis: how to ensure that sufficient
capacity will be available in restructured power markets. A better way to express this is: how
to ensure that involuntary load shedding can be kept at a level that is acceptable to society.
The distinction between these two formulations is essential. The former concentrates on the
supply side, while the latter emphasizes a comprehensive view on both the supply and
demand side of the market.
The objective of Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 has been to argue, from three different
perspectives, that the supply of peaking power indeed is a problem in restructured systems.
The first perspective is from traditional power system reliability theory. A short review of the
theory has been given, and it has been argued that in a system with a pure energy spot market,
the traditional levels of reliability cannot be sustained during peak load. Naturally, this will be
possible by introducing additional instruments. This will be analysed later in this thesis.
The second perspective is through the effect of uncertainty. It is shown that investments in
peaking capacity are uncertain, with the help of a simple conceptual linear optimization model
for operation and investment. With the help of this model, it is shown that investment costs
are covered on an expected value basis, but that the volatility of the revenue of the marginal
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peaking technology is extremely high. For this reason it is doubtful if profit-maximizing
agents would invest in such peaking capacity.
The third perspective has been to investigate the existing markets in England, Norway and
Sweden. In the two first, reserve margins are lower than they were in 1990, but not
necessarily dramatically. This is somewhat difficult to judge because of climatic variability.
For Sweden, the effect of restructuring on capacity has clearly been dramatic.
The arguments in this chapter show that in an energy-only market structure, the probability
of involuntary load shedding may become unacceptably high.
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APPENDIX A.2.1: COOPERATION BETWEEN HYDRO- AND
THERMAL SYSTEMS
A thermal generation system is always capacity constrained, whereas a hydro system can
be either capacity constrained or energy constrained. In any case, there will be an economic
benefit in linking the two systems together.
1) Capacity constrained hydro system
This means that there is water available to increase the power generation in off-peak
periods. Demand is variable, and the system is designed to cover peak demand. There may be
load shedding during peak demand. In off-peak periods, there is spare capacity and water
available. In many cases a hydro generation system in an early stage of development will be
capacity constrained.
The benefit of connecting such a hydro system to a thermal one is an increased hydro
generation in off-peak periods at almost zero cost. That will replace thermal generation and
thereby save fuel in the thermal system. The net effect is a reduced operation cost in the total
system. A schematic illustration is shown in Figure A2-1.
Figure A2-1: Illustration of the benefit of connecting a capacity constrained hydro system
with a thermal system
load shedding
loss of water
hydro generation
thermal generation
hydro generation
thermal
generation
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The two panels to the left show the situation in each system separately. The hydro system
suffers load shedding during peak, but has overflow during off-peak. Combining the systems
relieves the load shedding, and makes it possible to utilize the excess generation capacity of
the hydro system during low load conditions. Naturally, this requires that the thermal system
has ample capacity, and that it is technically possible to operate with great load variations.
The benefit for the hydro system comes from the relieve of load shedding, and for the thermal
system from reduced total energy generation.
2) Energy constrained hydro system
The basic concern in an energy-constrained system, is the amount of water available. An
energy constrained hydro system will normally have a surplus of capacity. Figure A2-2
illustrates cooperation between two systems with the same demand curve as in the previous
example but in this case, the hydro system is energy-constrained. There is no load-shedding,
and no overflow during off-peak. After interconnection, the hydro system provides peaking
capacity, while the thermal system generates energy for the hydro system during off-peak,
resulting in a flatter, more economic production profile.
Figure A2-2: Illustration of the benefit of connecting an energy constrained hydro system
with a thermal system
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thermal generation thermal generation
hydro
generation
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APPENDIX A.2.2: EXAMPLES OF A SIMPLE PRICE MODEL
The model described in Section 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 can be illustrated with a 3 period  2
technology example. Demand for each period is shown in Figure A2-3.
Figure A2-3: Simple 3-period demand model
Technology 1 is supposed to have the lowest capital cost and the highest running cost.
Demand is sorted in descending order. Because this is an LP problem, there will always be a
solution lying at a vertex point. For the present problem this means that in the optimal
solution and starting with lowest demand, a technology will always either completely cover
incremental demand in a period, or not be used at all in that period. Disregarding the solutions
where one technology covers demand in all periods (because the other has either too high
running or too high capital cost), there are two possible solutions to the 3-period  two
technology problem:
A: technology 1 is used only in period 1, i.e. it covers the difference in demand between
periods 1 and 2; capacity of technology 2 equals demand in period 2.
B: technology 1 is used in periods 1 and 2, i.e. it covers the difference in demand between
periods 1 and 3; capacity of technology 2 equals demand in period 1.
For case A, the following equations emerge:
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Now 11 1u b= and 21 22 2u u b+ = . Technology 1 fully recovers its capital cost during the
peak period 1, while technology 2 covers its capital costs partly in period 1 and partly in
period 2. 12 13 23 0u u u= = = , 21 1 2 1u a a b= − +  and 22 2 1 2 1u b b a a= − + − , which is positive
because of the assumption about technology.
For case B, the solution becomes:
1 1 11
1 2 21
2 1
2 2 22
3 1
3 2 23
v a u
v a u
v a
v a u
v a
v a u
= +
= +
=
= +
≤
= +
In this case, 11 1u b= and 21 22 23 2u u u b+ + = . Technology 1 recovers its capital costs during
period 1, while technology 2 recovers its capital costs during all 3 periods. 12 13 0u u= = ,
21 1 1 2u b a a= + − , 22 1 2u a a= −  and 23 2 1 1 22u b b ( a a )= − − − .
A slightly more elaborate 5-period  3-technnology example is used to illustrate the model
of Section 2.3.3 with some numerical results. Demand scenarios and their probabilities are
given in Figure A2-4:
Figure A2-4: Example demand scenarios
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For the three technologies the following costs are given:
Table A2-4: Example model costs
technology variable cost (a) capital cost (b)
1 12 5
2 5 10
3 2 18
Capital costs are artificially low in this example because of the short number of periods.
The model was solved with AMPL using CPLEX as solver. Optimal installed capacities are
given by x1 = 40, x2 = 70, x3 = 130. The other results are given in the following table, where
the meaning of the symbols is as in Section 2.3.3. The last column shows the technology that
is directly price setting through its marginal cost. Where no value is given, price is between
the marginal cost of two technologies, except for the highest load period, where price is such
that the capital cost of technology 1 is covered.
Table A2-5: Example model results
scenario
/ prob.
period demand tech. 1
x1jk
tech. 2
x2jk
tech. 3
x1jk
u1jk u2jk u3jk vjk price
setting
1 240 40 70 130 25.0 32.0 35.0 37.0 -
2 170 0 40 130 0.0 0.0 3.0 5.0 2
3 140 0 10 130 0.0 0.0 3.0 5.0 2
4 130 0 0 130 0.0 0.0 3.0 5.0 -
high
 / 0.2
5 120 0 0 120 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 3
1 200 0 70 130 0.0 6.0 9.0 11.0 -
2 150 0 20 130 0.0 0.0 3.0 5.0 2
3 130 0 0 130 0.0 0.0 1.3 3.3 -
4 120 0 0 120 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 3
medium
/ 0.6
5 115 0 0 115 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 3
1 180 0 50 130 0.0 0.0 3.0 5.0 2
2 140 0 10 130 0.0 0.0 3.0 5.0 2
3 125 0 0 125 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 3
4 120 0 0 120 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 3
low
/ 0.2
5 115 0 0 115 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 3
The numerical results confirm the conceptual arguments. In period 1 of the high
scenario, all technologies produce at their installed capacity, and the price is such that
technology 1 covers its capacity cost. In period 1 of the medium scenario, the price is
between the marginal costs of technologies 1 and 2, and in period 3 of the medium scenario,
it is between the marginal costs of technologies 2 and 3. Technology 1 exactly covers its
capacity cost in the high load period of scenario high: 0.2 · 25 = 5. Technology 2 covers its
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capital cost in period 1 of scenarios high and medium: 0.2 · 32 + 0.6 · 6 = 10. Technology
3 covers its capital cost during several periods and scenarios. The coefficient of variation of
the revenues of technology 1 are given by:
2 20 2 37 7 4 14 8 2
7 4 7 4
p
p
. . .
E( R ) . .
σ
⋅ −
= = =
which conforms with Section 2.3.3 because 1 0 2 1 2. − = .
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Chapter 3: PRICING THEORY AND CONSUMER PREFERENCES
This chapter develops a theoretical foundation for the analysis of the relations between
pricing of, demand for and investment in capacity. The chapter starts with a review of a
selection of the literature on the subject of peak-load pricing in traditionally regulated
systems. Although written for a different environment, several of the insights from this
literature are valuable also after restructuring. A major problem, assessed directly or indirectly
by most authors, is how to combine the benefits of prices based on short-run marginal costs
with long-run revenue reconciliation. In some sense, this is also the central challenge for the
satisfaction of peak-demand in restructured power systems. Section 3.2 discusses the role of
the generation system in the provision of reliability. It may be regarded as a continuation of
Section 2.3, and at the same time a preparation for Chapter 4. The last part of the current
chapter is concerned with the theoretical foundation of an active demand side assessment. The
basic idea is that present market organization obscures the underlying demand elasticity. The
welfare gains of a more flexible demand side handling are discussed. Section 3.4 deals with
an alternative model, where electricity consumption and reliability are viewed as two different
products, where consumers receive utility from both. This gives insight in how electricity as a
product might be tailored to consumer preferences.
3.1 A review of electricity pr icing theory
3.1.1 Historical overview
Optimal pricing of electricity has been a subject of research for several decades, and a huge
literature is available. This section will give a brief overview over some important
contributions to this literature, focussing on items relevant for pricing and availability of
peak-load capacity. A broad survey of the theory is given in [3.1].
A natural starting point for a discussion is a paper by Boiteux, first published in 1949 in
French [3.2] and later in English in 1960 [3.3]. The analysis of Boiteux is static: it considers
pricing and optimal investment for a given demand level. In the first part of the paper,
Boiteux discusses the situation with constant demand. His initial conclusion is that The
theory of sale at marginal cost is concerned with the short-term marginal cost1 () for
existing plant. However, it is shown that this will lead to prices too low to pay for investment
costs. It is so proved that optimal pricing implies a price equal to short-run marginal cost,
which, provided there is an optimal investment policy, equals long-run marginal cost, cf.
Figure 3-1.
1 Boiteux uses the term differential cost
URN:NBN:no-2136
Pricing theory and consumer preferences 44
___________________________________________________________________________
 Figure 3-1: Determinations of the optimum scale for plant of rigid capacity [3.3]
Next, Boiteux moves to the case of periodical loads, first exemplified with two periods. He
then shows that, in an optimal situation, the price during the low load period must be equal to
short-run marginal cost. In the high load period, the price is set equal to short-run marginal
cost plus the plant development cost: Each demand must pay for its relevant energy cost. The
peak demand bears the complete plant charge 2, as power cost, cf.  Figure 3-2, where the
factor 2 comes from the fact that two periods of equal length have been assumed.
 Figure 3-2: Pricing for the two-period case [3.3]
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Boiteux makes two essential assumptions:
• Plant capacity can be adapted continually and quickly up and down to match demand
perfectly.
• Tariffs must be stable.
A paper by Williamson [3.4] in 1966 offered several new contributions. One was the
development of an over-all effective demand for capacity relation, which directly provided
optimal capacity in a straightforward graphical way. An important insight not treated
satisfactory by many other authors, was the effect of indivisibility of new capacity. Together
with uncertainty and a building lag, the result of this is that in the short run, capacity will
seldom be optimal. In this case the optimal price might be lower or higher than the classical
b+ (or +2 using Boiteuxs symbols).
The models of Ralph Turvey (e.g. [3.5],[3.6]) have a more dynamic character, because an
investments impact of future system operational costs is taken explicitly into account. Turvey
develops a short-run pricing rule and an investment rule:
• The price of electricity at each time, place and voltage is set equal to marginal running cost
per kWh delivered or, if it be higher, at the level necessary to restrict demand to capacity
• An investment is undertaken if the present worth to consumers of the consequential change
in their supplies, less the present worth of the total system costs with and without the
investment is positive
The short-run pricing rule is, as stated by Turvey, a direct expression of the analysis of
Boiteux, as illustrated in  Figure 3-2. The justification for this interpretation of short-run
marginal cost is simply the judgement () that rationing by price is preferred to rationing by
power cuts. Both rules require the consumer to pay the incremental running costs PV[dUm],
where PV stands for present value, dU is the load increment and m is the marginal cost2. In
addition, the long-run rule requires him to pay dP (the incremental capacity demand) times
the present worth of incremental capacity costs. The short-run rule requires him to pay dP
times the excess of price over incremental running cost per kWh which is necessary to restrict
demand to equal capacity at times of peak. Turvey shows that, if the optimal investment rule
is followed (under the assumption of certainty in demand forecasts), the long-run and short-
run rules result in the same price.
An important but controversial contribution was given by Brown and Johnson [3.7]. They
were the first to model uncertainty explicitly, and came to the surprising conclusion that the
optimal price should equal marginal cost. Naturally, others questioned this conclusion, which
2 It should be noted that PV[dUm] is not equal to the marginal cost at any given point in time, and
consequently, does not imply that marginal consumer utility (or willingness-to-pay) equals marginal
cost. In other words, it does not result in an optimal short-run solution.
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appeared to depend on the crucial assumption that demand could be rationed costless
according to willingness to pay. Visscher [3.8] showed that different assumptions regarding
rationing policy imply different results. However, even with the bluntest instrument, random
rationing, he still demonstrates an optimal price lower than Boiteuxs and Turveys classical
b+.
Carlton [3.9] uses a multiplicative (in contrast to Brown and Johnsons additive) model to
describe demand uncertainty, and shows that in this case the optimal price exceeds b+ if
random rationing is used. Furthermore, he makes the important observation with respect to
rationing that: When goods are not always available to consumers, the probability of
obtaining the good becomes a characteristic of the good. On this background, he challenges
the conventional use of expected surplus as the welfare function. A more comprehensive
treatment of this view is given in [3.10]. This is an interesting basis for the analyses in
Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
Meyer [3.11] presents a general treatment of uncertainty in a multi-period model. He
confirms the results of Brown and Johnson as a special case, but acknowledges the
dependence on the rationing strategy for the utility maximizer. For the profit maximizer,
however, he concludes that the rationing strategy is irrelevant, because he is only concerned
with his own costs and revenues. He criticizes the use of the welfare criterion because of the
important role of rationing, which () requires obtaining an estimate of marginal demand
schedules, i.e. schedules of marginal willingness to pay. () the prospects for empirically
determining it seem somewhat less than sparkling. This is an argument for organizing the
market in such a way that consumers can reveal their real willingness to pay. Meyer justifies
apparent excessive investment by stating that this may be simply an optimal economic
decision when the firm must meet high reliability standards for the service it provides. This
may true for the firm, but one can question the economic basis for this level of security.
The book of Crew and Kleindorfer [3.12] gives a broad treatment of the area of pricing and
investment. In their assessment of multi-period pricing investment with diverse technology,
the authors develop a model that shows the strong interaction between optimal technology
and optimal pricing. The more diverse the available technology, the less will be the tendency
to flatten demand through peak-loading, i.e. the flatter the optimal price schedule will be.
They also point out that inefficient rationing leads to high price differences between peak- and
off-peak periods. Price, capacity and reliability are higher the less efficient rationing is. Crew
and Kleindorfer state that reliability constraints (for example like LOLP < 0.1 days/year) may
be thought of as a surrogate for rationing costs. Highly inefficient rationing requires very high
reliability at optimum, and the problem then reduces to an equivalent deterministic problem.
3.1.2 The controversy about L RMC and SRMC
The discussion in the previous section makes clear that there has been considerable
disagreement about correct pricing and optimal capacity investment in traditional regulated
environments. On the one hand stand the proponents of the basic and intuitively appealing
ideas of Boiteux, where price in off-peak periods is set to SRMC, and in peak-periods to
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SRMC +  (=LRMC), where  is the appropriate share of investment costs to ensure cost
recovery. On the other hand stand the authors who, on various grounds, argue for peak-load
prices lower than SRMC + , or even down to SRMC. Some of the authors argue that there is
no contradiction here, because under optimality SRMC=LRMC.
In [3.14], Andersson and Bohman contest this view. They point out that this conclusion is
critically dependent on the unrealistic assumption that capacity is continuously variable both
when expanding and contracting, and that the investment policy follows a correct forecasting.
As stated in [3.14], it has been recognized in later years that the conditions characterizing
fully adjusted long-run equilibria are not usually met in the electricity area, with a reference to
[3.13]: In recent years electric utilities on both sides of the Atlantic have been operating in a
more-or-less continuous state of dis-equilibrium.
The trouble with the models of Turvey is that indivisibilities are ruled out. If there are no
indivisibilities, either regarding plant size or regarding construction and scrapping time, then
there is no reason to make a distinction between short-run and long-run. Turvey naturally is
aware of this, but is, like Boiteux preoccupied with the need of stable prices. The validity of
that requirement is disputable. Not the validity of the requirement, but the way it was treated
was contested by Kay [3.15]: The most suitable method of deriving optimal prices is as the
solution to some specified maximization problem in which the relevant constraints and
assumptions are made explicit, not as the by-product of some arbitrary definition of marginal
cost. Kay illustrates this statement with the model described in Section 2.3.2. As stated there,
one of the assumptions for the model is that demand is known beforehand, which is
unrealistic. However, it was shown in Section 2.3.3 that the result with respect to expected
revenue holds, even if uncertainty is taken into account. The assumption of varying prices
may have been unrealistic in 1971, but is more acceptable today. Turvey stated in [3.5]:
•  the solution (i.e. the design of dynamic tariffs, based on marginal cost and consumer
willingness to pay) requires far more knowledge of elasticities and cross-elasticities than
will ever be available.
• () the principles analysed in this chapter (Chapter 9 about more dynamic tariffs) will
never be capable of precise application.
The first statement is an argument for using market (SRMC-based) solutions: it will give
consumers the opportunity to reveal these elasticities. Decreasing prices and technological
development, reduce the validity of the second argument.
The dispute seems to be settled in favour of SRMC-based pricing. However, this does not
solve the problem of providing sufficient peaking capacity as long as demand is inflexible.
This was less of a problem in traditionally organized systems, but comes in the backdoor
through the revenue reconciliation requirement. Andersson and Bohman treat this problem
superficially only:  it would be wise to () rely on pricing on SRMC with due
consideration of budget constraints and other second best restrictions. Brown and Johnsen
also commented this in [3.7], where they conclude that short-run operating costs will be
recovered but capacity costs will not. Their solution lies, interestingly in a futures market,
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where customers that recognize the probability of shortage can buy the right to be served.
Through this mechanism they conclude a revenue balance can be secured.
3.1.3 Spot pricing of electricit y
In their book [3.16], Schweppe et al. develop a broad theoretical platform for the use of spot
prices. Their motivation is:
• Freedom of choice (provide  customers with options on cost and reliability)
• Economic efficiency (adjust electricity usage patterns to match marginal costs)
• Equity (reduce customer cross subsidies)
The main focus of the work is on a system with a regulated or government owned utility,
but one chapter is concerned with a vision (in the mid-eighties) of total deregulation.
A very broad concept of spot price is presented. The spot price associated with the kth
customer during the hour t is viewed as the sum of the following components:
k(t) = F (t) + [Generation Marginal Fuel]
M (t) + [Generation Marginal Maintenance]
QS (t) + [Generation Quality of Supply]
R (t) + [Generation Revenue Reconciliation]
L,k (t) + [Network Marginal Losses]
QS,k (t) + [Network Quality of Supply]
R,k (t) [Network Revenue Reconciliation]
Most of these components are readily applicable in a deregulated market. F and M result
from generation bids, while the latter three components will be embedded into the network
tariffs3. QS and R are more problematic. QS can be handled in various ways, the most
common being through reserve requirements that indirectly guarantee a satisfactory (though
not necessarily optimal) level of security. Depending on the market organization, QS may
(like in the present UK solution) or may not (like in the Scandinavian solution) be embedded
in the spot price. The treatment of R is very problematic, and is closely connected with the
whole peak-load problem. Indeed, Schweppe et al. state: The world would be nicer if
revenue reconciliation could be ignored. They suggested three alternative solutions for the
revenue reconciliation problem:
• Modifying the spot price
• Surcharge or refund
• Revolving fund
3This is by no means trivial, but not the theme of this thesis.
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The spot price can be modified in several ways to ensure revenue reconciliation ex ante or
ex post. This approach distorts spot prices, and does not give the correct short-term price
signals to the market. The same is true for the surcharge/refund solution, at least when it is
directly linked to energy usage4,5. Schweppe et al. recommend the use of the revolving fund
solution, which means that it is accepted that revenues in some years exceed and in other
years are less than costs. The advantage of this method is, naturally, that it does not distort
spot prices, and allows for short-term efficiency. It is not clear from the argumentation how
long-term revenue reconciliation can be guaranteed. The problem of the method in the context
of [3.16] was that regulatory authorities did not allow it at that time. In a deregulated
environment, excess revenues should be of no concern. At least in a well-functioning market,
they should attract investment and be reduced to a natural level over time. Revenue deficiency
though, is problematic when prices are inflexible.
Many authors in the technical sphere, have followed in the footsteps of Schweppe et al.
The principle desirability of spot pricing as a means to social efficiency is not challenged.
However, many have pursued ideas towards practical realization, revenue reconciliation and
security concerns. The latter topic is typically within the engineering sphere: while
economists are primarily concerned with economic efficiency, engineers are more engaged by
the question of how to price security, with minimum efficiency loss.
Ideally, perfect spot pricing would involve more or less continuous (e.g. every second)
metering of all consumers. The amounts of information exchange required with this ideal
scheme are so enormous, that this is hardly feasible. A next step hourly or half-hourly
metering, which still involves considerable amounts of information exchange and costs. With
respect to practical realization, Baldick et al. [3.17] have proposed a scheme that catches
some of the benefits of hourly spot pricing, without the same need for information exchange.
They consider tariffs that i) are set in advance of participation, ii) are updated periodically,
e.g. weekly, iii) consist of time sequences of prices to follow anticipated demand behaviour
and iv) are long-lived relative to power systems time constants. Thus, these tariffs are
somewhere between traditional time-of-use tariffs and spot prices. Still, the scheme requires
considerable metering efforts  (for example weekly), which are not compatible with
traditional ways of meter reading. The authors do not explicitly assess the security problem.
Their contribution is that they recognize that it is not possible to know the consumers utility
functions. They estimate these as part of their cyclical tariff updating process. Assuming
quadratic utility functions (i.e. linear marginal willingness-to-pay functions), they prove local
convergence to welfare optimality under some conditions of which the validity is not obvious.
4 Schweppe et al. do not discuss the possibility of a non-linear tariff, consisting of a fixed amount in
addition to the spot price.
5 A possibility that is both efficient and satisfies the revenue reconciliation constraint is Auman-Shapley
pricing, e.g. [3.21]. It will not be discussed further here, because it is a concept for a regulated
environment or the regulated parts (e.g. the transmission network) of an otherwise deregulated
environment.
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Interestingly in the present context, the authors conclude that the need for peaking plant may
be significantly reduced by using their pricing scheme.
The problem of revenue reconciliation is the subject of a paper by Kim and Baughman
[3.18]. They compare four different approaches for revenue reconciliation in a case study for
the Korea Electric Power Corporation: i) the adder method, where a constant term (possibly
negative) is added to the spot price, ii) the multiplier method, where all spot prices are
multiplied with the same factor, iii) the reliability sensitive adder, where the adder depends on
the Loss of Load Probability, similar to the England and Wales solution and iv) Ramsey
pricing, where prices for consumer segments with the lowest absolute price elasticity are
increased most to minimize efficiency losses. These authors do not contribute with new
pricing schemes, but with a test of reconciliation schemes on actual data. Their conclusions
confirm existing knowledge like large deviations from marginal costs with the adder and
multiplier models, largest price volatility with the LOLP method and greatest social surplus
with Ramsey pricing.
Pricing of system security is the subject of a paper by Kaye et al. [3.19]. They extend the
theory of Schweppe et al. by developing a framework for calculating the socially optimal
level of security, thus resolving the security/economy trade-off. This is principally the same
idea as used in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Kaye et al. define contingency offerings, defined as
the additional power each participant (generator or consumer) could supply in the event of a
contingency by increasing output or reducing demand respectively. A central dispatch is
performed with the objective to achieve the socially optimal solution. It is shown that there is
a price that can be set for contingency offerings and a forecast for actual contingent usage that
encourages each participant to make a socially optimal contingent offering. The proposed
approach has the characteristics that i) decision making is decentralized, ii) supply- and
demand-side are treated equally, iii) utilities, other producers and consumers cooperate in
system operation, iv) security-economy trade-off is incorporated and v) information
technology is used to assist power system operation.
Pérez-Arriaga and Meseguer cover many of the issues in one single comprehensive model
[3.20]. The paper looks at the pricing problem from the global perspective of generation
expansion and operation. The model includes two new features: i) the viewpoint of
competitive generation markets, where generators decisions are based on nonregulated
market prices and ii) consideration of the effect of real operation and planning constraints,
including security of supply in the short and long term. A major contribution is that model
considers three time ranges for decision making: capacity expansion planning, operation
planning and dispatch. It is shown that social, generator and consumer benefit are all
maximized if prices equal marginal costs, including the effects of constraints on short and
long-term security. Resulting prices exist of three components: the system marginal energy
cost, the system marginal reserves cost and the system marginal cost of security of supply in
the long term. It is also shown that long and short-term marginal costs are equal if there is no
active reliability constraint, which is in the line of though of Williamson, cf. Section 3.1.1. It
means that the optimal price may be lower or higher than short-term marginal cost + capacity
(or reliability) cost, depending on presently available capacity. A practical implementation is
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suggested where the energy charge includes the first two components of the price, and an
annual charge the third.
There is no doubt that Spot pricing of electricity by Schweppe et al. has had a significant
impact on thinking about electricity pricing. There seems to be little disagreement about the
books principal conclusions, but the more about practical ways to implement them.
3.2 The generation system a nd quality of supply
In the traditional view, demand has been regarded at price-inelastic in the short-term. The cost
of load shedding has been estimated based on consumer surveys. The implicit result of this
line of thought is that consumers prefer maximum obtainable reliability, and that this must be
supplied by the generation system. Later in this chapter, this view will be challenged, but in
this section the generation system as the supplier of reliability will be discussed first.
3.2.1 Power system security
In Chapter 2, the concept of power system reliability was discussed. It was pointed out that
the very broad concept of reliability is subdivided in system adequacy and security. System
adequacy relates to the existence of sufficient facilities, and is associated with static
conditions, while system security has to do with the systems ability to respond to
disturbances. Most of the research within the field concerns system adequacy, and some of
these results are shortly referred in Chapter 2.
The concepts of adequacy and security are related: the level of adequacy constrains the
obtainable level of security. If system adequacy is insufficient, it may be impossible to obtain
the desired level of security, because the necessary generation capacity to obtain this level of
security is not available. In a nutshell, this is the quintessence of the peaking capacity problem
in restructured electricity markets.
The conventional way to maintain security at the generation level is through the use of
fixed reserve requirements, discussed in the next section. A more dynamic approach was
adopted by the Pennsylvania - New Jersey - Maryland (PJM) Interconnection [3.27]. In this
approach, the principles of adequacy assessment are used to calculate spinning reserve levels
that result in a constant level of security, independent of load level or load forecast
uncertainty. From a theoretical point of view, this is an attractive approach, under the
assumption that the value of lost load is equal in all hours. (If this were not the case, it would
be easy to correct the method.)
The PJM method is an interesting basis to assess situations where available capacity is
insufficient to apply agreed-upon reserve levels. By analyzing all outage situations (with a
probability over some threshold), and their resulting loss of load, it is in principle possible to
balance outage costs against the immediate cost of load shedding to provide sufficient
reserves.
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3.2.2 Reserve requirements
In a traditional planning environment, one way to assess system adequacy was the use of a
fixed reserve requirement. For several reasons, this is an unsatisfactory way to assess the
problem of system adequacy [3.25], and more advanced methods, using probabilistic criteria
are now mostly applied.
In principle, some of the objections against the use of fixed reserve requirements for
adequacy assessment, are also valid when security is addressed. However, in the latter case,
the use of fixed reserve requirements is dominating. (Some notable exceptions are [3.27] and
[3.28].) Some reasons for the difference in approach between adequacy and security
assessment are:
• Comprehensive calculations are necessary for probabilistic reliability assessment. This is
feasible in the off-line environment of adequacy calculations, but problematic in a real-time
situation.
• The cost of keeping excessive reserves under low-load conditions is not necessarily high. So
instead of varying reserve requirements depending on the load situation, the peak load
requirements are used continually.
• At present, many power systems are an integrated part of very large systems, with a huge
inertia, where during low load conditions reserve may be available almost for free.
Reserve requirements are normally divided in several categories. In the European tradition,
a common classification is between primary, secondary and tertiary reserves (cf. [3.29]
Appendix 3). In the US tradition, it is common to use the terms regulation and spinning,
supplemental and backup reserves. Though there are numerous differences in philosophy and
implementation between various systems, there are some general characteristics:
• Primary/spinning reserves are frequency controlled, and used to cover loss of the largest
unit. They will also take care of normal load fluctuations and minor load forecast deviations.
• The role of secondary/supplemental reserves is to move the frequency set point back to its
basis, after a deviation has occurred through the use of primary reserves. The indication for
the use of secondary reserves may be an Area Control Error or time deviation. Control is by
Automatic Generation Control in many systems, but can also be manual. Secondary reserves
may be spinning or non-spinning, depending on the system and plant characteristics.
• Tertiary reserves are used to replace secondary reserves when the usage of the latter has
made this necessary. The rules concerning tertiary reserves seem to be less stringent than for
primary and secondary reserves, cf. [3.29].
Given some classification of reserves (a finer subdivision than this may well be possible),
it is important to decide the optimal level of each category. In the US, regulation is the use of
generation () to maintain minute-to-minute generation/load balance within the control area
to meet NERC control-performance standards [3.30]. The size of the largest unit is the main
ingredient in the requirement for primary reserve. The amount of secondary reserves is less
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well defined. UCTE uses recommended values equal to the numeral value of 3PL,MAX, while
NORDEL leaves this to each country.
Thus, the generation system provides security to avoid loss of load by maintaining reserve
levels at least as high as the agreed upon requirements. From a theoretical point of view, these
requirements are not very satisfactory, but they are workable in practice, and probably the
potential savings by using better methods are small during normal operating situations. This
changes in situations where there is insufficient capacity to provide for demand and reserves.
In these cases the difficult question emerges if reserve requirements are hard constraints,
resulting in load shedding to provide reserves, or soft constraints, resulting in lower-than-
planned system security. To make a reasonable choice between these alternatives, it is
necessary to take a closer look at the demand side. This is done in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
3.2.3 The public good view
In a restructured market, it is not obvious how a necessary level of system security can be
maintained, and how the producers of system security should be compensated. In this
context it is interesting to look at the theory for public goods, cf. [3.22], Chapter 25. There are
two basic properties that characterize public goods:
• Nonexclusivity
• Nonrivalry
A good is nonexclusive if it is impossible, or very costly, to exclude individuals from
benefiting from the good. Examples are clean air or street lighting. A good is nonrival if
consumption of additional units of the good involves zero social marginal costs of production.
Examples are use of television channels or bridges (at least below their capacity ...).
Nonexclusivity is the dominating characteristic for public goods. In [3.22], a good is defined
as a public good if  once produced, no one can be excluded from benefiting from its
availability. Public goods usually also will be nonrival, but that need not always be the case.
In the conventional view, system security is nonexclusive: if the system has a certain level
of security, all consumers benefit from it. The nonrivalry property is irrelevant from the
consumer point of view: as long as security is assumed non-differentiable, no consumer can
choose to increase or decrease his consumption of it. From the generation point of view, it
may be argued that the nonrival property does not hold: e.g. the installation of a unit that is
larger than any of the existing units incurs increased costs to maintain the same security.
However, because of the nonexclusivity property, system security is a public good.
The well-known problem with public goods is that their production will be less than the
social optimum if left to the market, which is a consequence of their nonexclusivity. In such
cases, the good is often provided by public bodies, which cover their expenses through
general taxes or more dedicated charges. In the case of system security, this is obtained by
letting the System Operator procure the necessary services from generators, and divide the
costs over all users of the system, for example as a part of the transmission tariff. A difficult
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challenge in this case is to find the optimal level of security, because there is no price
mechanism that could result in equilibrium. This becomes especially cumbersome when lack
of generation capacity makes it impossible to provide the security level that the system
operator requires.
The public good view is another argument for the hypothesis that an energy-only
electricity spot market without additional mechanisms will not enough generation capacity in
the long run.
3.3 Consumer willingness to  pay for electricity
In a basic spot market setting, given enough competition, prices will settle down at marginal
cost. The discussion in Section 3.1.1 should make it clear that there has been controversy
about the correct marginal cost to be used in a traditionally regulated environment. While
some argue this should be LRMC, others advocate SRMC, while it is also claimed that these
are actually equal.
In a restructured system, the controversy seems to have been settled in favour of SRMC, at
least as far as generation, the theme of this thesis, is concerned. This is surely the case in the
Nordic and the Californian markets, where no other generation related price elements than the
generators bids are incorporated6. However, based on considerations of long-term system
security, other implementations have added several forms of non-market based price
elements. These may be seen as movements in the direction of b+ instead of b in the
terminology of Section 3.1.1.
In this section, focus will be on consumer willingness to pay for electricity, and its
implications for a short-term efficient spot market solution with the proper level of system
security.
Consumer utility is based on the concept of preference7. The preference relation is
usually assumed to have the three basic properties of completeness, transitivity and
continuity. Under these assumptions, it is possible to show formally that people are able to
rank commodity bundles in a desirability order, in such a way that more desirable bundles
offer more utility than less desirable bundles. It is also possible to attach numbers to this
utility, but an important point is that these numbers are not unique. They are defined only up
to an order-preserving (monotonic) transformation. This introduces difficulties if one would
attempt to use this concept to find an actual demand function based on utility, because any
strictly increasing transformation would yield an equally valid utility function, but a different
demand function. So following other presentations in the field, the starting point for the
analyses will be a willingness to pay or inverse demand function, giving price as a function
of volume.
6 The Californian market has advanced markets for ancillary services, but these are still short-term
markets, in principle based on short-run costs for production of energy and these services.
7 A basic introduction, satisfactory for the current context is given in [3.22]. A broader and more
theoretical discussion is found in [3.23].
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The basis assumptions in this section are:
• Consumers receive utility from using electricity
• Their willingness to pay is non-increasing, i.e.
where q is the willingness to pay and d is the power consumed
• The time horizon is one hour8, which naturally excludes investments
• System security is taken care of by fixed reserve requirement
• The objective is to maximize short-term welfare, while satisfying the constraints
The problem is to find an optimal solution in cases where demand is capacity constrained.
Mathematically, the problem may be stated as:
[ ]
0
0 0
( ) ( )MAX
p
p
W q x c x dx= − (3-1)
subject to:
0 0p d= (3-2)
RpPMAX ≥− (3-3)
0 0, 0p d ≥ (3-4)
where
W - social welfare
PMAX - maximum production
R - reserve requirement
p0 - generation
d0 - demand
q(.) - consumer willingness to pay
c(.) - marginal generation cost
This in principle simple, one-period one-generator problem serves to demonstrate various
approaches. The single generator may be thought of as representing a great number of
generators, sorted after increasing costs. The resulting increasing cost function c(.) will in this
case include the effects of unit commitment, given the situation at the start of the hour
considered. Reserves are represented very basically in this principle exposition.
                                                
8 Some systems operate with shorter commitment and/or dispatch periods. Here hour will be used,
but there is no principal difference for other period lengths.
0≤∂∂ d)d(q
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3.3.1 Elastic demand
With elastic demand q1(d), the problem becomes simple, Figure 3-3. The solution is given by
p0 = d0 = PMAX  R, with the price q1(d0)  c(p0). The difference q1(d0)  c(p0) is equal to the
dual value of the constraint (3-3). It represents a scarcity rent to the producers, which over
time should motivate to investment in new capacity.
Figure 3-3: Capacity constraint with elastic demand
This is the standard way to solve the problem in economic theory. However, the
assumptions are unrealistic: demand is not currently elastic in the very short run.
Consequently, due to technical and organizational limitations, demand will not be reduced in
the very short run, however high prices become. As a result if this, the system operator will
have the choice between reducing system security below agreed-upon standards, or resort to
load shedding (rationing).
3.3.2 Inelastic demand
Most consumers in restructured systems still buy their electricity from a supplier, who in turn
buys from a generator, possibly through one or more intermediaries9. Consumers normally
have a form for tariff, where the short-term price they pay is independent of the short run
                                                
9 In several cases (e.g. the Nordic and English), one or more pre-defined load-profiles are used for
settlement of consumers buying electricity from a supplier that has no direct access to their meter. In
Norway, some suppliers even offer contracts based on spot prices plus a markup. This creates a
somewhat odd situation for the consumer: in theory he pays the spot price, but once he has entered
into the contract, his actual hourly consumption hardly influences his costs at all. Consequently, he
has no motivation to reduce consumption when prices are high.
price
q1(d)
q1(d0)
c(p0)
scarcity
rent
c(p)
PMAX-R PMAXPu
p,d
reserve
requirement
URN:NBN:no-2136
Consumer willingness to pay for electricity 57
___________________________________________________________________________
marginal cost (including scarcity rents) of the system. In this way, their consumption becomes
de facto inelastic compared with short run marginal cost.
Inelastic demand is a somewhat troublesome notion when used in a welfare maximization
context. When demand is completely inelastic, the demand curve is vertical and maximization
of the sum of consumer and producer surplus makes no sense. It seems reasonable that there
is some limit to the inelasticity. For example, when prices become extremely high, suppliers
may do everything in their power to appeal to consumers to reduce their loads. However this
is accomplished, it is reasonable to use an upper price limit, called sh10, where the index sh
stands for shedding. The value could be set to the Value Of Lost Load, VOLL, roughly 4
$/kWh in the UK case. The resulting inverse demand function q2(d) is shown as a solid and
striped-dotted line in  Figure 3-4.
Another way to solve this problem is by observing changes in social welfare, compared
with some base case, which makes it unnecessary to adopt the arbitrary limit sh. This should
give the same result, but the former solution is more convenient in the current context.
Under these assumptions, it is obvious from  Figure 3-4 that the solution of (3-1) is p0 = d0
= PMAX-R, as before, while the price equals q2(d0) = sh.
 Figure 3-4: Capacity constraint with inelastic demand
Because all consumers are assumed to experience the same inconvenience of involuntary
rationing, random rationing will be the most rational way to obtain a market equilibrium.
Assuming the price is set administratively to sh, consumer surplus is zero, while producer
surplus is very high. A market price at this level may create political problems of acceptance,
                                                
10 When writing about power and economics there is a symbol problem: while p always will be
associated with price by an economist, the electrical engineer will automatically think of power. In this
thesis, the symbol p is used for power, while λ is used for prices.
price q2(d)q2(d0)
= λsh
c(p0)
c(p)
PMAX-R PMAXPu
p,d
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even if it has a short duration. A household buying 5 kW on the spot market for 10 hours with
this price, will get a bill of 200 $. A much worse situation may be faced by companies unable
to reduce their consumption or unaware of prices. On the other hand, the income created, 40
$/kW, may only be just enough to invest in gas turbines. Keeping prices lower for political
reasons will deter investments.
A milder version of inelasticity is obtained by dividing consumption in groups with
assumed similar values of lost load. In this case the groups with lowest values can be rationed
first. However, this presumes that it is possible to switch off consumers according to these
criteria.
3.3.3 Seemingly inelastic dema nd
The situations in the previous two sections are extreme. It is plausible to assume that there is
some short-term price elasticity, but that technological and organizational obstacles obscure
this. We assume that there is some short-term price elasticity, but that technological and
organizational obstacles obscure this. The situation is shown in Figure 3-5.
Figure 3-5: Capacity constraint with seemingly inelastic demand
When no capacity constraints are active, the market will settle at an unconstrained price u
and satisfy a demand of Pu. If the capacity constraint is active, demand must be reduced to PM
= PMAX - R. Because the real elasticity is invisible for the system operator, random rationing is
the only possible choice. A better solution would be to ration consumers according to their
willingness to pay. The welfare gain of this, net of the cost of implementation, is given by the
difference in total revenue plus consumer, because total generation is identical (PM) in both
cases. In Figure 3-5, total revenue plus consumer surplus with perfect rationing is represented
price
PM PMAXPu
p,d
λu
E
C
A
D
F
B
0
c(p)
q3(d)
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by the area 0ABPM, which is equal to 0CDPM, where CD is the average value of q3(d) over
0PM. With random rationing, this is equal to 0EFPM, where EF represents the average value of
q3(d) over 0Pu. Consequently, the gain is given by ECDF and can be expressed by:
 −=
uPM
dx)x(q
P
Pdx)x(qW
u
M
P
gain
0
3
0
3 (3-5)
where the first term represents the area 0CDPM, and the second the area 0EFPM. Alternatively,
the gain can be viewed as the difference between the lost surplus with random rationing and
perfect rationing respectively. The two equally large shaded, areas in Figure 3-5 represent
each of these views. It is easy to see that if q3(x) is constant, CD and EF coincide, and Wgain is
zero. In this case random rationing is as good as any other way, and cheapest to implement.
To further study the properties of this model, the piecewise linear demand function q4(d)
shown in  Figure 3-6 is assumed, where the shaded areas correspond to those in Figure 3-5
 Figure 3-6: Piecewise linear demand function
Up to P1 demand is inelastic, which is represented by perfect elasticity at λsh = VOLL, like
in 3.3.2. For higher values of p, a linear demand function is assumed. In this case, the
expression in (3-5) becomes:
price
q4(d)
q4(d0)
= λsh
c(p0)
c(p)
PM PMAXPu
p,d
P1
observed q4(d)
λu
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(3-6)
W1 - W2 represent the first term in (3-5), while W3 represents the last. For P1 = Pu, W2 = 0,
W1 = -W3, and Wgain becomes zero: this shows again that if demand is really inelastic, random
rationing is the best and only realistic alternative.
Given that P1 is uncertain, it is of interest to find out how the gain of perfect compared
with random rationing depends on P1. The value of P1 for which the maximum occurs is
found by derivation, after some manipulation resulting in:
1 ( )u u u MP P P P P= ± − (3-7)
The maximum11 welfare loss occurs for the minus sign (because otherwise a value greater
than PM would occur). Normally Pu - P1 is small compared with Pu, which means that the
maximum welfare gain will occur for relatively high values of P1. Probably, P1 is rather high
in reality, which means that random rationing (if capacity shortage occurs) yields relatively
high welfare losses.
To get an idea of the size of potential gains, some tentative numbers for the Norwegian
situation may be used:
Pu = 24000 MW
PM = 23000 MW
sh = 22000 NOK/MWh, cf. [3.24]
u = 250 NOK/MWH
With P1 = 20000 MW, hourly welfare gain from using the latent underlying price elasticity
instead of using random rationing would be 17.2 million NOK per hour. If such a situation
would occur 50 hours each year, annual welfare losses would amount to 860 million NOK.
Figure 3-7 shows how potential welfare gains depend on P1 in this case for some values of the
unconstrained demand Pu. The figure shows clearly that, if only a minor part of demand is
short-term elastic, large welfare gains can be made from exploiting this elasticity, compared
with random rationing.
                                                
11 It is straightforward to show that the second order conditions for a maximum are satisfied.
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Figure 3-7: Hourly welfare gains as a function of the value below which short-term demand
is inelastic, PMAX = 23000 MW
Practical implementation poses some challenging questions with respect to the division of
social welfare between consumers and producers. If demand elasticity is exploited in such a
way that a number of consumers actually bid in the spot or regulation market, normal demand
elasticity will be obtained, and the situation described in 3.3.1 emerges. If, however, this is
accomplished through agreements between the System Operator and elected consumers,
based on fixed annual payments, rationing may be available at a very low marginal cost.
Prices will stay relatively low (at least compared with shedding cost), and producers will not
receive any scarcity rent12. In other words, the method of implementation has significant
impact on the distribution of social surplus between consumers and producers, and
consequently on investment behaviour.
3.3.4 Demand used as reserve  capacity
So far, it has been assumed that a fixed amount of reserves has to be provided by the
generators. This means that available generation capacity is equal to PM  R. When
unconstrained demand, with given pricing structures, exceeds this value, it has to be
constrained in some way. If demand could be used to provide some of the reserves, total
welfare losses might be reduced, and prices could be lower.
With inelastic demand, as in 3.3.2, consumers short-term willingness to pay is equal to
VOLL, and welfare loss is equal to VOLL multiplied with disconnected load. So in case of a
capacity shortage of Pu  PM, short-term welfare loss is simply VOLL  (Pu  PM). If however a
                                                
12 Similar situations have happened in the Norwegian system in 1999, where Statnett chose to
disconnect a number of large boilers, with the result that spot prices stayed low. Some producers
criticized this.
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share  of demand can be used as reserve, and the probability of activation13 of this reserve is
, welfare loss could be reduced to (1  (1-))  VOLL  (Pu  PM). How great this reduction
would be, naturally depends on the values of  and . The value of  depends on
technological feasibility and consumers preferences for certain disconnection and
disconnection with probability  respectively. The value of  depends on system
characteristics and the position of demand side reserves in the reserve merit list.
If part of demand is elastic, like in 3.3.3, welfare gain by using demand as reserve capacity
is given by:
( ) [ ]
))PP((f
dx)x(c)x(q1W
MuR
)uP,uPMPmin(
MP
rgain
−α+
−γ−= 
α+
(3-8)
Here the last term fR(.) represents the generators cost of providing the same reserves. The
symbol Wrgain is used to distinguish from the gain calculated in 3.3.3.
When q(d) is specialized as in  Figure 3-6 and a constant generation cost equal to λu is
assumed, results may be calculated in a similar way as in (3-6). The formulas become
somewhat messy, and depend on the position of P1 compared with PM and Pu.
With the numbers from the previous section, and furthermore assuming  = 0.5 and  =
0.1, welfare gain from using demand as reserves is 2.7 million NOK per hour.
Figure 3-8 shows how these gains depend on demand elasticity, as defined in (3-6). The
picture is very different from Figure 3-7. For reserves, the largest gains will occur with low
demand elasticity. When using demand elasticity for actually switching off demand, the
largest gain (compared with random rationing) will be obtained for relatively high elasticity,
and stay at a high level even for very large demand elasticity (when P1 = 0).
                                                
13 In the sense of activated volume divided by available volume
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Figure 3-8: Hourly welfare gain of using demand for reserves as a function of the value
below which short-term demand is inelastic; PMAX=23000 MW, α=0.05, γ=0.1
Finally, shows the dependency of the welfare gain on the share α of demand being willing
to serve as reserve. The interesting point is that there is a considerable gain, even if only a
small part of demand is willing to stand as reserve.
Figure 3-9: Hourly welfare gain of using demand for reserves as a function of the value below
which short-term demand is inelastic; PMAX=23000 MW, Pu=24000 MW, γ=0.1.
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3.4 Willingness to pay for el ectricity and quality of supply
A basic assumption in Section 3.3 was that there exists some externally imposed reserve level
that must be satisfied during system operation. Although consumers could supply some of the
reserves in 3.3.4, the basic assumption of a given necessary reserve level was not abandoned.
The main role of reserves is to provide security against loss of load. Without reserves,
minor deviations from demand forecasts or plant failures would result in partial or total loss
of load, with huge welfare losses. Reserve levels have been determined historically, based on
various criteria like Loss Of Load Probability (LOLP).
Theoretically, the optimal level of reserves is such that the marginal cost of Expected
Energy Not Served  (EENS) equals the marginal cost of increasing system security. The
difficult part of this criterion is calculation of the operational value of EENS, which requires
evaluation of huge numbers of fault situations. A model that takes this approach is described
in Chapter 4. Here the view is taken that consumers are not interested in reserves per se. It is
assumed that consumers are interested in two products:
• electricity
• quality of supply
Several authors have reasoned along this line of thought. Carlton [3.10] develops a model
for a good with two characteristics, its price and the probability that it can be purchased.
Customers have preferences not only for the good itself, but also for the probability of
obtaining it. In the market equilibrium derived by Carlton, there is a positive probability of
not obtaining the good. The price of the good exceeds the cost of production, because the
revenues must compensate for the cost of unused capacity.
 Meyer [3.11] takes the view that quality of the supply, in the sense of the probability of
being served is an important property of the product when supply is not 100 % guaranteed,
and that this property affects utility.
Tschirhart [3.31] also recognizes the relation between demand and reliability, by defining a
demand function X(p,ρ), where p is the price of electricity and ρ is the obtained reliability. A
simple example of the form
0
( )( , ) A pX p ρρ
ρ
−
=
is used, where A and ρ0 are constants.
In a more recent publication, Ravid [3.32] develops a model where consumers receive
welfare from the consumption of electricity and from the consumption of reliability. Ravid
uses a simple additive model for consumer utility:
( ) ( )U U p k kα= +
where ( )U p is utility from consuming electricity, k the price of reliability and a(k) reliability.
The price for reliability appears to be such that the marginal cost associated with increased
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reliability in the market for electricity (i.e. changes in electricity prices or capacity level) will
be equal to the marginal associated welfare gain in the market for reliability.
This section will deal with an alternative quantification of quality of supply. A demand
model for the two products will be proposed, and its properties will be discussed.
3.4.1 Quantification of quality  of supply
The concept of  quality of supply14 is assumed limited to loss of load. This implies, that
properties like voltage and frequency are not taken into account: either they are assumed
within their defined quality levels, or consumers are assumed not to bother about these
aspects.
It is assumed that consumers are interested in (or receive utility from) electricity and
quality of supply. The latter may be quantified in several ways, e.g.:
• Loss Of Load Probability15 LOLP
• Expected Energy Not Served EENS
• Energy Demand minus EENS dw  EENS
• Energy Index of Reliability EIR = (dw  EENS)/dw = 1-LOLP
LOLP and EENS are quantities that consumers want as little as possible of, i.e. they are
economic bads. It is more convenient to use economic goods, i.e. goods that consumers do
want. Demand minus EENS is an economic good, but its value depends on absolute electricity
consumption. This means that a consumer with high demand experiences a higher quality of
supply than a consumer with low demand, given the same system EENS. By dividing this
value by demand, the Energy Index of Reliability EIR is obtained, which looks suitable to
represent quality of supply. It has one potential drawback with regard to further application of
demand theory: its value can never exceed 1. This means that demand for quality of supply in
isolation is not locally insatiable: there is some finite value, 1.0, above which it does not make
sense to demand more. Because of this, one might have doubts if Walras law px  Y (price
multiplied with demand is less or equal to income, where x=(electricity, quality of supply)16)
holds with equality. However, consumers may still receive more utility from receiving more
electricity, which means that in the vicinity of any point (p,x), there will still exist another
point (p,x) that consumers will prefer, even if quality is at its limit. If the difference between
electricity demand and EENS is divided by EENS instead of electricity consumption, the
resulting quantity also increases with decreasing EENS, and has no finite limit. But this
advantage does not seem to outweigh the slightly more messy mathematics.
As a conclusion to this discussion, quality of supply is defined as:
                                                
14 Further on quality will be used when this is unambiguous.
15 In this section, LOLP is used as probability index and not as a frequency, cf. Section 2.2.1
16 Cf. [3.23], page 41.
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w
w
d EENSqs EIR
d
−
= = (3-9)
where dw is demand for electricity with 100 % reliability, EENS is expected energy not
served.
3.4.2 A utility function for electricity and quality of supply
In the previous section, it has been argued that consumers receive utility from electricity and
quality of supply. The question now is what a utility function should look like. It is obvious
that the real utility function is hard to find. Its assessment should be based on hypothetical
comparisons for example between receiving dw kWh with 95 % reliability or 0.8  dw with 98
% reliability. No research has been done to this respect to the authors knowledge.
Presently, ambitions must be limited to finding functional relations that yield plausible
short run willingness to pay functions for electricity and quality, and that can shed light on
principle aspects. A conventional Cobb-Douglas function is used:
21
( , )w qsB d d dd qsw
ββ
= ⋅ (3-10)
     or:
1/ 1 2 / 1
1 1
( , )w qs w
qs
B d d d d
w w
β
β β
= ⋅ (3-11)
where B(.) is consumer utility, dw and dqs are consumed levels of electricity and quality, 1, 2
are coefficients and w1 is some arbitrary reference value
Figure 3-10 shows some iso-utility curves (3-11) for 1/2  = 1.0 (reasonable values for 1
and 2 will be discussed in the next section). The value for w1 is chosen such that a quality of
1.0 corresponds to an energy consumption of w1 for curve number 2. A consumer with these
preferences would receive the same utility from an energy consumption of w1 and a quality of
1.0 as from an energy consumption of 1.25w1 and a quality of 0.8. The figure also shows the
budget constraint which requires some discussion in this context. Many surveys of
willingness to pay to avoid load-shedding have been conducted internationally, cf. [3.24]. The
objective of these surveys is to find the Value Of Lost Load, VOLL. It is reasonable to assume
that this value indicates consumers willingness to pay for 100 % reliable supply of electricity
in the short run, provided quality does not cost anything. (Because of the fact that electricity
by most consumers in the industrialized world is conceived as close to 100 % reliable). Thus
the budget may be set equal to this value: it is the maximum part of his income the consumer
is prepared to spend on electricity. With this assumption, optimal utility is obtained for
dw/w1=0.5 and dqs=0.7 in
Figure 3-10.
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The slope of the budget constraint corresponds to the price ratio of electricity and quality.
If the price of the latter is 0, the optimal solution is to obtain a quality of 1.0 and energy equal
to w1, touching curve 4. The quantity variations have been exaggerated in this figure to show
the principal situation.
Figure 3-10: Iso-utility curves for electricity and quality of supply
If prices for electricity and quality are given, i.e. if the consumer is a price taker in a
competitive market, the consumer problem is to optimize his utility (3-10) or (3-11), subject
to the constraints:
Idd qsqsww =⋅+⋅ λλ (3-12)
qsd qs≤ (3-13)
wd w≤ (3-14)
0≥qsw d,d (3-15)
where w andqs are the electricity and quality prices, and I represents the budget.
The solution to the optimization problem is found by forming the Lagrangian, and solving
the first order Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, taking into account that dqs depends on dw
according to (3-9). The solution is:
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Naturally, (3-19) and (3-20) are only of academic interest. The results do not conform with
the normal properties of the Cobb-Douglas function that the proportion of income used on
each good is independent of the price ration (cf. [3.22], page 126). The reason for this is that
there is a mutual dependency between dw and dqs.
3.4.3 Characteristics of the tw o-good utility function
To get an idea of the implications of using the model from 3.4.2, it is useful to look at the
behaviour of the optimal values for dw and dqs as a function of prices for various values of 1
and 2.
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Figure 3-11: Iso-utility curves for different consumers, scaled to an energy consumption of
1.0 for a quality of 0.95.
Figure 3-11 shows iso-utility curves for different consumers, scaled such that their relative
electricity consumption is 1.0 for a quality of 0.9517. This could be a random rationing
situation, where 5 % of demand has to be rationed. A consumer with 2=1 values electricity
and quality equally, and will be willing to reduce his electricity consumption with 5 % to
obtain a quality of 1.0. However, a consumer with 2=0.051 values quality far less, and is
hardly willing to reduce consumption to obtain a quality of 1.0
Another way to illustrate the behaviour of the model is to look at optimal energy
consumption and quality of supply as a function of the price of quality. Energy is scaled as in
(3-11), while the price of quality is taken as a ratio  of the budget I. =0 means that quality
is available at no cost, while =1 means that the whole budget must be used on quality to
obtain a value of 1.
                                                
17 The curves appear to be straight lines over this short interval, but naturally have the
same shape as in
Figure 3-10.
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Figure 3-12: Relative optimal energy consumption
The figure shows that optimal electricity consumption falls as a function of  up to a
certain point (here (3-17) prevails), until maximum quality is no longer optimal, (3-16)
becomes valid and electricity consumption increases. The point where this happens is given
by the value of  where dqs in (3-16) is equal to 1:
2 1
2 11
β β
α β β= + (3-21)
 For consumers with small values of 2/1, i.e. with a low preference for quality, optimal
relative electricity consumption is close to 1.0 regardless the price of quality. Generally,
consumers prefer a high electricity consumption in this model as long as the price for quality
is low. When the price increases, some electricity consumption is given up to uphold enough
quality, but when the price becomes very high, it becomes unaffordable, and is given up for
electricity, because it makes no sense to buy only quality. Similarly, one can describe optimal
quality of supply as a function of . When quality is available at zero cost, naturally all
consumers prefer the maximum amount. This is the typical situation under low and medium
load operation, when the short-term cost of keeping reserves is very low. At a certain price of
quality, depending on 2/1, consumers give up to obtain maximum quality to be able to
obtain enough energy. For low values of 2/1 this occurs for relatively low prices, with a
sharp drop. For higher values of 2/1, the transistion is more moderate. This is shown in
Figure 3-13.
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Figure 3-13: Optimal consumption of quality of supply
Under normal operating conditions, the cost of quality is low, and if the price reflects the
cost, it seems natural that consumers prefer maximum quality. Under constrained operating
conditions, if the price of quality would reflect the long run cost of peaking capacity that is
used only a few hours annually, the price of quality may well be represented by values of 
between 0.5 and 1.0. In this case there will probably be large variations between consumers
preferences for electricity and quality. Flexibility in the market should be such that these
variations are exploited.
3.5 The demand side role in  restructured power systems
In the first section of this chapter, a review of electricity pricing theory has been given. It was
demonstrated that there has been disagreement about the correct way to price peak demand.
On one side stand the proponents of marginal cost pricing  on the other the defenders of an
additional mark-up to ensure the coverage of capital costs. The whole discussion is blurred by
the need to keep constant prices, which has technological, economic and socio-
psychological (people do not like price variations) reasons.
The ultimate reason to have peaking capacity available is to be able to supply electricity
with high reliability also during peak hours. Traditionally, engineering methods have been
employed to design the generation system in such a way that expected peak demand could be
covered. In an energy-only market, this is not possible.
In Section 3.3, a theoretical argument has been built around the role of consumers. It has
been shown that the kernel of the problem lies in the fact that there is a capacity limit, but that
consumers do not see it because they are not faced with short-term prices. If no other
measures are taken, it can become necessary to resort to random rationing, which is expensive
and unacceptable. It was demonstrated that if there is some short-term price elasticity, the
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problem can be solved by letting the demand side face short-term prices. A simplified
example for the Norwegian case illustrates that large savings can be obtained with this
approach, even if only a minor part of demand is elastic.
In this context it is appropriate to point out that profile-based settlement (presently used
in Scandinavia and England and Wales), which allows small consumers to buy electricity
from arbitrary suppliers without hourly metering, is detrimental with respect to conveying
price signals to consumers. This is especially the case when consumers, as in Norway, are
given the option to pay spot prices (albeit with a minor markup). With this form for
settlement, the consumer has no incitement to reduce consumption when prices are high,
because his own consumption has no impact on the profile. Profile-based settlement is
probably a necessary prerequisite to initiate true competition, but should be substituted by
metering in the future.
The last part of Section 3.3 prepares the ground for Section 3.4: in the framework so far
developed, the effect of letting consumers stand as reserves is analysed. This means they will
not have to reduce their consumption a priori, but may be switched of on short notice in real
time. In Section 3.4 the view is taken that consumers actually have preferences for two goods
that are closely related: electricity and quality of supply. A Cobb-Douglas demand function
for these goods is developed, and its properties are demonstrated under various assumptions.
It will not be an easy task to ask consumers through surveys what their preferences are for
electricity and quality of supply respectively. On the one hand the questions will be
hypothetical, and difficult to assess. On the other hand, most consumers in the Western world
will view electricity as (nearly) 100 % reliable, and have difficulties with imagining how to
handle lower reliability. But the model in Section 3.4 clearly shows that if consumers have
such preferences, it will be socially optimal to let them act according to those preferences. In
other words, markets must be designed in such a way that this is made possible. In the
following chapters these ideas will be pursued further from different viewpoints.
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Chapter 4: THE SHORT-TERM, CAPACITY CONSTRAINED
EQUILIBRIUM
The short-term operation of power systems is traditionally assessed using Unit Commitment
(UC) or dispatch programs with typical time horizons from several hours to one week.
Numerous papers have been published on these topics, proposing different solution methods
(e.g. Lagrange Relaxation, Mixed Integer Programming, Genetic Algorithms) and including
various special problem characteristics like ramping constraints, the inclusion of the
transmission network and emission constraints. A literature synopsis of unit commitment can
be found in [4.1].
In most of the work, system security is taken implicitly into account through a spinning
reserve requirement. The basic assumption is that the availability of reserves reduces the
probability of loss of load below an acceptable limit. With inelastic demand and a hard
reserve constraint, there is no solution if there is a capacity deficiency.
In Chapter 2, it has been argued that, for various reasons, reserve margins (in the system
adequacy sense) will decrease after power system restructuring. In Chapter 3, various demand
models were introduced. In this chapter, many of these items will be drawn together in a
simulation model that computes the optimal utilization of the generation system combined
with different load models during capacity constrained operation. The goal of this chapter is
to show that it may be necessary to change the traditional reserve requirements in order to
avoid load shedding to satisfy these requirements, and to introduce alternative solutions.
The approach in this chapter is from the system operator point of view. In a market setting,
it may be envisaged that bids from market agents substitute costs. In that case, the task of the
system operator will be to procure optimally the right amount of reserves from the market, in
view of their costs and expected cost savings. Some results are presented in Section 4.4.
4.1 A model for the short-te rm capacity constrained equilibrium
From the traditional/physical point of view, capacity constrained operation can be defined as
operation where it is impossible to serve the entire (inelastic) load while at the same time
satisfying the reserve constraints. However, with elastic demand and/or flexible reserve
requirements, the concept of capacity constrained operation needs a more concise
definition: operation is capacity constrained if:
• Demand is inelastic, and available capacity minus reserve requirements is less than demand,
or
• Demand is elastic, and the demand curve crosses the supply curve at its vertical part where
generation is at its maximum given satisfaction of the reserve constraints, cf. Figure 4-1.
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Figure 4-1: Constrained and unconstrained operation
With the demand models introduced in Chapter 3, constrained demand can be further
specialized as shown in Figure 4-2.
Figure 4-2: Operation with partly elastic demand. 1: unconstrained, 2: constrained, price will
reduce demand if elasticity is utilized, 3: constrained, rationing necessary due to
reserve requirements, 4: constrained, rationing necessary because demand
exceeds available capacity.
supply
Constrained
operation
Unconstrained
operation
demand
demand
price
p, d
p, dPMAXPM
VOLL
DMAX
1
3
4
2
reserve
requirement
URN:NBN:no-2136
A model for the short-term capacity constrained equilibrium 77
___________________________________________________________________________
The concept of capacity constrained operation can be compared with the definition of peak
load in [4.2], Table 1, note a: The term peak load is used for the case where the multiplier [of
the capacity constraint] is strictly positive.
The aim of the model is to calculate the optimum balance between reserves and generation
under capacity constrained conditions, under various assumptions regarding demand
flexibility. The approach is comparable with approach taken in [4.3], but focuses more on the
situation with a potential capacity deficiency. The time horizon of the analysis is one hour.
The objective is to find the minimum cost unit commitment and dispatch, where costs also
include the costs of preventive load shedding (to satisfy reserve requirements) and the
expected cost of loss of load due to generation outages. The base model includes load and
generation only, the transmission system is not considered. An extension to a multi-area
transport type transmission model is shown in Section 4.2.7.
Conceptually, the analysis consists of two parts: a static UC/dispatch analysis and a
dynamic outage analysis. In the first part, the minimum cost dispatch solution is found, while
the expected outage cost is calculated in the second part.
Two types of reserves are considered: primary and secondary. It is assumed that primary
reserve is frequency controlled and reacts very fast. Thus, as long as the amount of primary
reserve is at least as large as outaged generation, no loss of load will occur in the model. The
primary reserve contribution of each unit is limited, and a cost is incurred for its provision.
Secondary reserve is slower, limited by the units ramprates. If not enough primary reserve is
available, load has to be shed, and shedding lasts until enough secondary reserve has been
activated to restore the balance. To avoid load shedding in all cases, the sum of the primary
reserve contributions from all other units must be greater than the largest output from any
generator. Naturally, this is supposed always to be the case in large power systems. However,
it may be a problem in smaller systems, and it will also be a problem in a large system when
there is a capacity deficit.
It is assumed that load is recovered simultaneously with the increase of production by
generators that provide reserves. Demand is assumed constant in one hour after an outage, and
the loss of load is assumed limited to this hour. Put in another way: all outages are assumed to
occur at the beginning of the hour. The concept is illustrated in Figure 4-3. Before the outage,
generation equals demand at p0. When the outage occurs at t=0-, generation drops
momentarily, but is assumed to increase quickly due to the effect of primary control at t=0+.
From this point, secondary control increases output from available generators until at t=tr, no
more reserves are available, and generation is constant the remainder of the hour (t=T) Lost
load is equal to the shaded area in the figure.
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Figure 4-3: Illustration of lost load after generation outage
Generators are modelled with a linear cost function, i.e. a constant marginal cost. A
quadratic cost function can be approximated by several linear segments, at the cost of
increased computing times. For each generator, a maximum and minimum output is given, i.e.
the generator must operate between these limits or not operate at all. This introduces non-
convexity to the problem. Furthermore, for each generator a primary reserve cost, ramping
rate, start-up time, mean time to failure, start cost and initial status are given.
Several load segments may be defined. For each segment, minimum and maximum
demand and corresponding prices are given. Furthermore, the potential contribution to
primary and secondary reserve is defined, as well as the activation time for the secondary
reserve contribution. The value of lost load and the reduction of this value in the case of early
warning are given. Finally, the rationing strategy can be random or optimal, cf. the discussion
in Section 3.3.
4.2 Mathematical formulati on of the model
Before defining the symbols and the complete model, the modelling of elastic demand will be
described in Section 4.2.1
4.2.1 Modelling of elastic demand
Elastic demand is defined by minimum and maximum demand and corresponding prices.
A linear function is assumed between these extremes, cf. the left hand part of Figure 4-4.
time
power
p0
0+0- Ttr
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Figure 4-4: Elastic demand modelled as inelastic demand and a generator
To facilitate the handling of elastic demand, it can be modelled as inelastic demand DMAX,
combined with a generator. The output of the generator equals the difference between
DMAX and actual demand in demand for a given price. In the right hand part of Figure 4-4, the
leftmost function represents the generator, while the vertical line represents inelastic
demand. The piecewise linear function in the left hand panel is for any given price equal to
the horizontal difference between the two curves in the right hand panel.
The parameters of the generator can be calculated in the following way:
MINMAXMAXMIN DDPD,PD −== 0 (4-1)
p
DD
SSSk
MINMAX
D ⋅
−
−
+= 121 (4-2)
where p is the production of the demand generator and kD its marginal cost. To see this,
compute demand in the left hand panel at a price  between S1 and S2:
2
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MAX MIN
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D Dd D ( S )
S S
−
= + ⋅ − λ
−
In the right hand panel, for the same price , generation is such that price equals marginal
cost:
2 1
1
MAX MIN
S SS p
D D
−
+ ⋅ = λ
−
resulting in
1
2 1
MAX MIND Dp ( S )
S S
−
= λ − ⋅
−
Resulting demand is equal to DMAX - p, which is equal to the expression for d above.
Together with the constraints (4-1), inelastic demand DMAX together with the demand
generator will thus always result in the same net demand as the elastic demand in the right
hand panel of Figure 4-4. The linear marginal cost implies a quadratic cost function, which in
the model is represented by a piecewise linear function.
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4.2.2 Symbol definitions
Sets:
Mm - The set of outaged generators for outage case m
Other sets are not used explicitly in the model  description.  For  example  instead  of  i 
GEN in a summation, only i is used, and the set membership is implicit.
Indexes:
i - generator number (i=1..I)
j - demand segment number (j=1..J)
j1 - demand generator number (jl=1..JL)
k - commodity index, en: energy, prim: primary reserve, sec: secondary
reserve
m - outage case number (m=1..M)
t - time period in post-contingency evaluation (t=1..T)
Parameters:
A0i - Constant term in running-cost function of unit i ($)
A1ik - Coefficient of linear term in cost function of unit i ($/MW or $/MWh)
ADj1 - Linear coefficient in demand generator j1s cost function ($/MWh)
DMAXj - Maximum demand for segment j (MW)
DMINj - Minimum demand for segment j (MW)
DRESkj - Maximum contribution to commodity ken by demand segment j (MW)
INITi - Initial status (before dispatch) generator i (1: spinning, 0: non-spinning)
MPP - Number of minutes per period in post-outage analysis
PDMAXkj1 - Maximum production commodity k, demand generator j1 (MW)
PMAXki - Maximum production commodity k, generator i (MW)
PMINki - Minimum production commodity k, generator i (MW)
PMAX0ki - Maximum non-spinning production commodity k, generator i (MW)
PRm - Probability of outage case m
RRi - Ramping rate generator i (MW/min)
RVOLL - Reduced value of lost load (due to early warning) ($/MWh)
SCOSTi - Start-up cost generator i ($)1
TACT - Activation time demand reserves (min)
TSTARTi - Start-up time non-spinning reserves, generator i (min)
VOLL - Value of lost load ($/MWh)
1 SCOSTi may include the future impact of starting the unit in this hour. This will normally reduce the
actual start cost, cf. [4.4].
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Variables:
pki - Pre-contingency production commodity k, generator i (MW)
ui - Pre-contingency status generator i (1: spinning, 0: non-spinning)
si - Start-up status generator i (1: starting, 0: not starting)
shedj - Shedding of load segment j to provide reserves (MW)
ppomit - Post-contingency generation, outage case m, generator i, time step t
pdkj1 - Pre-contingency production of commodity k by demand generator j1
pdpomj1t - Post-contingency generation, outage case m, demand generator j1, time step t
pdreskj - Pre-contingency contribution of reserve from inelastic demand segment j
dredmjt - Post-contingency utilization of reserve from inelastic demand segment j in
outage case m, time step t
4.2.3 Mathematical formulati on
The mathematical formulation of the model is given below. Equation (4-3) gives the objective
to minimize over the variables ui, pki, si, pden,j1, shedj, ppomit, pdpomj1t, dredmjt.
1 , 1
1
1
1
MIN 0 1
/ 60
(
i i ki ki i i
i k
j en j j
j j
m j mit mj t m
m t j i j j
A u A p SCOST s
AD pd RVOLL shed VOLL MPP
PR DMAX ppo pdpo dred
 
⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + 
  
⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
⋅ − − −
 
 
     
(4-3)
The two first terms describe the operation cost and the direct cost of providing reserves.
The third term expresses the start-up cost. The sum ADj1 pden,j1 expresses the lost consumer
utility of reducing demand from maximum. Together, the first four terms represent social
surplus as the sum of consumer and producer surplus under normal conditions, when the cost
of disruptions are neglected. RVOLL shedj represents the cost of shedding load segment j to
be able to have sufficient reserves available. RVOLL, the reduced value of lost load is less
than VOLL, because shedding is warned beforehand when demand is shed to be able to
provide sufficient reserves.
In general, the cost of load interruption is given by VOLL(d(t)-p(t))dt, where d(t)
represents uninterrupted demand and p(t) generation, cf. Figure 4-3. The last term in
parentheses represents this cost. The term with DMAXj is constant, but when it is included, the
objective represents the expected cost directly. The three last terms represent the contribution
from generation, elastic demand and inelastic demand respectively (it is assumed that inelastic
demand can contribute to reserves, i.e. be switched off in the case of outages). It has to be
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multiplied with MPP/60 because t is an index, which multiplied with MPP gives a number of
minutes. Finally, it is multiplied with the outage probability2.
Constraints regarding normal operation:
  =++
j
j
i j
j,en
j
ji,en DMAXpdshedp
1
1 (4-4)
ki)u(PMAXuPMAXp ikiikiki ∀≤−⋅−⋅− 010 (4-5)
iPMAXp
k
i,enki ∀≤ (4-6)
iuPMINpp iii,primi,en ∀≥⋅−− 0 (4-7)
111 j,kPDMAXpd j,kj,k ∀≤ (4-8)
111 jPDMAXpd
k
j,enj,k ∀≤ (4-9)
iINITus iii ∀≥+− 0 (4-10)
j,"en"kDRESpdres kjkj ≠∀≤ (4-11)
Equation (4-4) gives the balance between generation and demand. (4-5) limits maximum
output of energy and reserves from both spinning and non-spinning units, while (4-6) limits
the sum of generation and reserve contributions. (4-7) ensures that running units at least
produce minimum generation, and at the same time limit primary reserve to the difference
between actual and minimum production3. (4-8)-(4-9 have a similar function for demand-
generators. (4-11) controls the variable si, indicating if a unit is started, incurring start-up
costs, while (4-10) limits the contribution to reserves from inelastic demand.
                                                
2 The loss of load probability LOLP is represented by the sum of those PRm for which
1
1
( )j mit mj t mjt
t i j j j
DMAX ppo pdpo dred− − −     is positive, i.e. those outages that result
in Loss of Load, cf. Section 4.2.9.
3 In this view, it is assumed that primary reserve is two-sided: it must be possible to use it both for
upward and downward regulation. Alternatively, two different services may be used. The Californian
market started with the former, but introduced both variants in the course of 1999.
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Constraints regarding post-contingency operation:
mtDMAXdred
pdpopposhed
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j
mjt
i j
tmjmit
j
j
∀≤
+++

 
1
1
(4-12)
00 ≠∀≤− t,mipppo
k
kimit (4-13)
01011 ≠∀≤− t,j,mpdpdpo
k
kjtmj (4-14)
00 ≠∀≤− 
≠
t,mjpdresdred
"en"k
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mippppo i,primi,enmi ∀≤−− 00 (4-16)
10110 j,mpdpdpdpo j,primj,enmj ∀≤−− (4-17)
mi,enmi Mi,mpppo ∉∀≥− 00 (4-18)
1 0 1 0 1mj , en , jpdpo pd mj− ≥ ∀ (4-19)
0mit mppo m,i M ,t= ∀ ∈ (4-20)
1 1 0 1mj t mj ,pdpo pdpo mj ,t TACT / MPP= ∀ < (4-21)
MPP/TACTmjtdredmjt <∀= 0 (4-22)
MPP/TSTARTit,miuPMAXppo ii,enmit <∀≤⋅− 0 (4-23)
MPP/TSTARTit,mitMPPRRppoppo imimit <∀≤⋅⋅−− 00 (4-24)
MPP/TSTARTit,mi))u(TSTARTt(MPPRR
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iii
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001 >∀≥− − t,mippoppo t,mimit (4-26)
010111 >∀≥− − t,mjpdpopdpo t,mjtmj (4-27)
001 >∀≥− − t,mjdreddred t,mjmjt (4-28)
pki, si, shedj, ppomit, pdk,j1, pdpom,j1,t, dredmit  0, ui {0,1}
i,j,k,m,j1,t
Equation (4-12) is the equivalent of the balance equation, but in this case generation can be
lower than maximum demand, which equals desired consumption under undisturbed
operation. (4-13) limits post-outage generation ppomit to the sum of pre-outage generation and
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reserve availability from each generator. (4-14) and (4-15) do the same for elastic and
inelastic demand, respectively. (4-16) and (4-17) limit the initial contribution to primary
reserve at t=0+ from each generator respectively demand generator. (4-18) and (4-19) are not
strictly necessary from a cost- or energy-not-served calculation point of view, but they avoid
unrealistic solutions if surplus primary reserve is available for a particular outage. (4-20) sets
the output of outaged generators to zero. (4-21) and (4-22) limit demand side contribution to
zero before its activation time. (4-23) limits the output of non-spinning units to zero before
they can be started up, while it is redundant for spinning units. (4-24) limits the output of
spinning units according to their ramprates before their start-up time4, while (4-25) does the
same for all units after their startup time. Finally, (4-26)-(4-28) avoid output reduction after
all load has been recovered. Again, this it not necessary from a optimization point of view,
but avoids unrealistic solutions.
4.2.4 Price calculation
The primary objective of the model presented here is to investigate how alternative ways to
control system security influence obtained security and costs. However, it is also of interest to
calculate marginal cost, which to some extent can be seen as an indication of the system price.
Only to some extent, because the validity of the dual value of the balance equation (4-4) is
limited. In a linear model, the calculated dual values are only valid within certain ranges of
variations of the right hand side of the constraints. In a mixed linear integer model, the dual
values are in addition only valid for the actual integer solution of the problem. Moreover,
when the dual value of (4-4) is used as price, there is no guarantee that all units recover their
startup and noload cost5. If an algorithm like this should be used as a practical pricing model,
it would be necessary to take certain measures to handle these difficulties. With these
limitations, the dual value of (4-4) gives an indication of the energy price, and makes it
possible to compare the influence of various assumptions on this price.
Because total demand is included in the objective function (4-3), 60T VOLL MPP⋅ ⋅  has to
be added to the dual value of (4-4). Moreover, the right hand side of (4-12) has to be
substituted with the left hand side of (4-4) to ensure that demand appears only once in the
right hand side.
The price reflects the increase in total cost caused by a marginal increase in demand. This
price increase has two components: the increase in generation cost and the increase in the cost
of energy not served or a security cost. The latter is equivalent to the England and Wales
capacity charge, but instead of being added after calculation of the marginal price, it is an
integrated part of the price calculation.
                                                
4 Start-up time is irrelevant for spinning generators, but if (4-24) had been valid for all time steps, the
equations after TSTARTi would have been redundant due to (4-25).
5 A model that does take these costs into account is introduced in Chapter 5.
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4.2.5 Reserve requirements
The formulation of the model in Section 4.2.3 implies cost minimization, i.e. resulting system
security depends primarily on generation costs, outage probabilities and consequences and the
value of lost load. Normally, system security is handled by imposing certain requirements. In
the model, this can be accommodated by adding appropriate constraints:
 ≥≥
i
secisec,
i
primi,prim Rp,Rp (4-29)
or Rp
"en"k i
ki ≥ 
≠
(4-30)
The former constrains both types of reserves to minimum values, a normal practice in
power systems. However, it is inefficient, and should rather be formulated as:
prim,i prim prim,i sec,i prim sec
i i
p R , ( p p ) R R≥ + ≥ + 
(4-30) only constrains the sum of reserves, leaving it to the optimization to divide between
primary and secondary reserves.
4.2.6 Load uncertainty
Load uncertainty can be modelled with the techniques described in [4.5]. The load is
described by its expected value and standard deviation, and a normal distribution is assumed.
The normal distribution is then approximated by a number of discrete steps.
It is assumed that unit commitment is decided before the load uncertainty is revealed, i.e.
the variables ui and si are independent of the uncertainty state h. The other variables receive
the extra index h to indicate the uncertainty state, e.g. phki. Naturally, the model becomes very
large if the number of states is large. If load uncertainty is small, it should not be necessary to
use many states. If it is large, the number of states should be balanced against the number of
outage cases, i.e. a number of cases with obviously small impacts could be left out of the
calculations.
4.2.7 Multi-area modelling
The model described so far is a single-area model. It is assumed that tie line constraints have
no vital impact on the solution, because focus is on generation capacity. However, in real
systems, transmission constraints often have impact on unit commitment, dispatch and reserve
allocation.
A simple transport-model version of inter-area tie lines can be included in the model. In
this case, the following additional model attributes must be defined:
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Sets:
AREA - The set of areas
LINES - The set of lines
PAa - The set of generators in area a
DAa - The set of demand segments in area a
Indexes:
a - Area index
Parameters:
LINECAPab - Line capacity for line from area a to area b (MW)
Variables:
plab - Flow on line from area a to area b (MW)
plpomabt - Post-contingency flow from a to b for outage case m, period t (MW)
Constraints:
The balance equation (4-4) becomes:
aDMAX
plplpdshedp
a
a aa
DAj
j
PAi ba
ba
ab
ab
DAj
j,en
DAj
ji,en
∀
=+−++

 
∈
∈ ∈∈ 1
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(4-31)
A similar change is made to the inequality (4-12). Moreover, the following bounds are
added:
abLINECAPpl
abLINECAPpl
abab
abab
∀−≥
∀≤
(4-32)
and analogous for plpoba.
4.2.8 The possibility of system collapse
A central assumption in the model is that lost load can be retrieved during the activation of
secondary reserves. This assumption limits the damage of outages, and reduces reserve
requirements. However, during heavy load conditions, outage of a large generator may not
just necessitate limited shedding of demand, but may jeopardize system security to the extent
that the probability of system collapse becomes unacceptably high. If this possibility is taken
into account, it seems plausible that higher reserve levels are required.
A similar approach is taken in [4.6], where the cost of system collapse is included in the
objective function that is to be minimized. Kaye et al. differentiate between survivable
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contingencies and system collapse. The former can be recovered by using participants
contingency offerings, while the latter entail a Kout multiplied with the probability of
collapse.
To explore this effect in the present context, a potential probability of system collapse
MCOLPROi was attached to each single outage. In the test calculations, tentative values were
used. Realistic estimates could be based on combinations of simulations and expert
judgement.
The actual probability of system collapse, given the outage of unit i is given as:
m,en
mi
i,primm,en
m
m PMAX
pp
MCOLPRO
colpro

≠
−
⋅≥
100
(4-33)
Thus, if available primary reserves exceed the capacity of unit m, the rightmost expression
is less than zero, and the outage does not contribute to the probability of system collapse
(because colprom will be zero in the optimum because of the general non-negativity
requirement). If, on the other hand the capacity exceeds available primary reserves, the
contribution of the outage to the probability of system collapse depends on the ratio between
primary reserves and the units capacity. Figure 4-5 shows the probability of system collapse
as a function of the pre-contingency output pm of generator m for two different generator
sizes.
Figure 4-5: Probability of system collapse as a function of pre-contingency generation pm
For multiple outages, (4-33) is replaced by:
Probability of system
collapse (%)
pmΣpprim PMAX1en,r PMAX2en,r
MCOLPROm
PR1
PR2
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Furthermore, it is assumed that a system collapse has the effect that all demand is shed for
exactly one hour, i.e. the following term is added to the objective function (4-3):
 ⋅⋅⋅
j
j
m
mm DMAXcolproPRVOLL .
Naturally, this is a very simplified version of reality. Its main function is to explore the
results of increased consideration to system security or increased risk aversion.
4.2.9 Constraints on EENS, LOLP and the probability of system collapse
As an alternative to either cost minimization taking into account outage costs or reserve
requirements, it is possible to constrain the value of either Expected Energy not Served,
EENS, the Loss of Load Probability, LOLP or the Probability of System Collapse (POSC)
directly.
For (relative) EENS this can is obtained by adding the inequality (4-35):
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The left-hand side of the inequality represents EENS, while the right hand side is equal to
the maximum allowed value of EENS multiplied with pre-contingency demand.
For POSC the constraint can be represented by:
MAXSYSCOLcolproPR
m
mm ≤⋅ (4-36)
For LOLP, the procedure is slightly more complicated. Outage of a unit contributes to
LOLP if the units generation before the outage exceeds available primary reserves. To model
this, a binary variable lolpcasem is defined, which must satisfy the constraint:
m
PMAX
pp
lolpcase
m,en
mi
i.primm,en
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−
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
≠ (4-37)
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If primary reserves exceed the generation of unit m, the numerator of the right hand side is
negative, and lolpcasem becomes zero. In the opposite case, the right hand side becomes
positive, but will never exceed 1, thus the binary variable lolpcasem becomes one. The
following inequality limits LOLP to its maximum allowed value:
 ≤⋅
m
mm MAXLOLPlolpcasePR (4-38)
4.2.10 Model solution
The described model is linear, but contains the binary variables ui and si (and if LOLP is
constrained, lolpcasem). This suggests the use of a mixed integer linear program (e.g. [4.7]).
The use of a branch and bound procedure can be expected to be reasonably effective, because
focus is on situations where capacity is constrained, which means that many of the available
units will have to be committed to obtain a feasible solution. The number of nodes in the
binary tree will therefore not become extremely high.
The model was solved with the modelling language AMPL [4.8] using CPLEX [4.9] as a
solver6.
4.3 Simulations with fixed reserve requirements
In the calculations in this section and Section 4.4, available capacity exceeds demand, but is
in a number of cases insufficient to cover traditional reserve requirements. Each simulation is
run with a time horizon of one hour. All outages with a probability greater than 10-4 are
assessed as part of the optimization, cf. the mathematical description in the previous
paragraph. Each outage is assumed to occur at the beginning of the hour. The objective of the
simulations is to minimize total costs, including expected outages costs.
Reserve requirements corresponding to a loss of load probability less than 10-3 were
calculated using the PJM method, cf. Appendix II. Without load uncertainty, the resulting
reserve for the IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS-96) was 402 MW7. In this chapter, results
are presented for a fixed reserve of 400 MW. This is implemented in the model by adding the
constraint:
6 It is possible to structure the problem as a Benders decomposition, with the commitment/dispatch
problem as the master problem and the contingency analysis as subproblems. Instead of one large
problem, this will create two small problems, which can be solved quickly. This approach was tested,
but the number of iterations was so high that computing time by far exceeded the single-problem
approach. Partly this was due to the interaction between AMPL and CPLEX, which introduces some
extra overhead in the iteration process. The approach might be viable for very large problems, with
use of CPLEX from e.g. a C program, but it is doubtful if it will be more effective.
7 With a standard deviation in the load forecast of 2 %, the required reserve margin for this system is
438 MW, and with 4 % 525 MW. For more details, cf. Appendix A.4.2, [4.10] and [4.11]
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The division between primary and secondary reserves is a result of the model optimization.
4.3.1 Inelastic demand
Simulations were run for the case with inelastic demand to evaluate the models behaviour
and as a reference for the subsequent analyses. The main purpose of these calculations is to
explore the characteristics of the model under varying assumptions. The following cases were
considered:
Table 4-1: Simulation cases
case description
base case cf. Appendix II
noprimcost the direct cost of primary reserves (A1prim) is zero
nostartcost start-up costs are zero, e.g. because all units are running initially
nosecondary secondary reserves cannot be used to reduce loss of load
syscollapse probability of system collapse is attatched to each outage case
prim 50% primary reserve contribution from each unit is reduced from 5 to 2.5 %
prim +100% primary reserve contribution from each unit is increased from 5 to 10 %
sec 50% secondary reserve contribution from each unit is reduced from 20 to 10
%, none from units 1-9
coldres units 1-9 can contribute to secondary reserve without being committed
resp 10 min response time of secondary reserve is reduced from 20 to 10 minutes
voll 6000 value of loss of load is increased from 3000 $/MWh to 6000 $/MWh
It might be argued that the way secondary reserve is used to relieve load shedding
illustrated in Figure 4-3 is unrealistic. The motivation for the cases noprimcost, nostartcost,
nosecondary and syscollapse is to evaluate the optimal amount of primary reserve under
various assumptions.
Only single outages were considered. It appeared that the inclusion of outages with a
probability greater than 10-6 (instead of 10-4, an additional 119 cases) did not change optimal
commitment and dispatch. Increased expected energy not served was less than 2 %, but had a
considerable effect on computation time, which was not considered worth while. Results are
shown in the table below:
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Table 4-2: Simulation results, fixed reserve 400 MW, inelastic demand 2850 MW
case primary /
secondary
reserve
(MW)
preven-
tive
shedding
(MW)
expected energy not
served
(GWh / relative)
generation
cost
($)
load
interrup-
tion cost
($)
total cost
($)
base 59/341 0.0 0.1807 (6.310-5) 33621 542 34163
noprimcost 108/291 0.0 0.1199 (4.210-5) 33258 360 33618
nostartcost 59/341 0.0 0.1604 (5.610-5) 30104 481 30585
nosecondary 162/ - 0.0 0.5771 (2.010-4) 34740 1731 36471
syscollaps 163/ 237 0.0 0.0788 (2.810-4) 34740 2615 37355
prim 50% 44/356 0.0 0.2089 (7.310-5) 33776 627 34403
prim +100% 177/223 0.0 0.0721 (2.510-5) 32979 216 33195
sec 50% 123/277 0.0 0.0893 (3.110-5) 35606 268 35874
coldres 50/350 0.0 0.2007 (7.010-5) 30561 602 31163
resp 10 min 123/276 0.0 0.0882 (3.110-5) 34884 265 35149
voll 6000 100/300 0.0 0.1272 (4.510-5) 33862 763 34625
It appears that there is a positive probability of loss of load for all cases. This is because
there is not enough primary reserve available in the system to compensate for the loss of the
largest units. When the direct cost of primary reserve is zero (noprimcost), optimal primary
reserve is almost doubled, resulting in 30 % reduction in EENS. Still, the level of primary
reserve is not limited by the units ability to provide it because of the related opportunity cost:
for example, the hydro units do not provide primary reserve because this will increase total
fuel costs. Zero start-up costs (nostartcost) do not change the optimal level of primary
reserve. However, in this case units 1-5 are started up, resulting in faster secondary reserves
and a reduction in EENS. The cases nosecondary and syscollaps both result in a much higher
level of primary reserve, though still slightly under the maximum amount of 170 MW.
Naturally both generation and EENS costs are higher in these cases.
A 50 % reduction in the units ability to provide primary reserves naturally increases EENS
and total costs, with the opposite result for a 100 % increase. A reduction in the ability to
provide secondary reserves, reduces EENS due to the increase in primary reserves (because of
the requirement of 400 MW total reserves). An interesting observation is that the use of the
smaller units 1-9 as non-spinning secondary reserves results in large decrease in generation
cost. In this case, none of these units is dispatched, reducing start-up- and zero-load costs.
However, EENS increases. Decreasing the response time of secondary reserve or increasing
VOLL reduces EENS and increases generation costs.
 Figure 4-6 shows the calculated prices for the various cases. For most cases the price is
21.8 $/MWh, of which 21.6 $/MWh represents the marginal generation cost (which is equal
to the variable cost of the marginal plant) and 0.2 $/MWh the security cost. When secondary
reserves cannot be used to reduce loss of load, or when the probability of system collapse is
taken into account, the generation component rises to 27.3 $MWh, because an increase in
generation involves a redispatch from cheaper to more expensive units. However, due to
redispatch, security increases with increasing demand, resulting in a negative security cost.
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When the primary reserve contribution from each unit is increased to 10 %, a marginal
demand increase does not influence security, and the security cost is zero. Finally, an increase
in VOLL results in a corresponding increase in the security cost.
 Figure 4-6: Simulated prices, inelastic demand 2850 MW
 Figure 4-6 also shows the simulated reserve prices. In most cases they lie between 7 and
10 $/MW, representing the cost of increasing generation on a more expensive unit and
decreasing on a less expensive unit to obtain more reserves. In the cases where there is less
secondary reserve available, it is necessary to use zero marginal cost hydro units to provide
secondary reserves. An increase in the reserve requirement then results in reducing output on
a hydro unit, while increasing an expensive thermal unit.
The following table shows the corresponding results for a 10 % load increase to 3135 MW.
Table 4-3: Simulation results, fixed reserve 400 MW, inelastic demand 3135 MW
case primary /
secondary
reserve
(MW)
preven-
tive
shedding
(MW)
expected energy not
served
(GWh / relative)
generation
cost
($)
load
interrup-
tion cost
($)
total cost
($)
base 59/341 130.0 0.1637 (5.210-5) 41870 273491 315361
prim 50% 29/371 130.0 0.2103 (6.710-5) 41942 273631 315573
prim +100% 177/223 130.0 0.0706 (2.310-5) 41366 273212 314578
sec 50% 130/270 130.0 0.0847 (2.710-5) 44999 273254 318253
coldres 49/351 130.0 0.2094 (7.010-5) 35472 273629 309101
resp 10 min 86/314 130.0 0.1226 (3.910-5) 42506 273368 315874
voll 6000 80/320 130.0 0.1393 (4.410-5) 41989 546835 588824
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In this case, there is a capacity deficiency. With inelastic load and fixed reserve
requirements, the only way to solve this is by preventive load shedding to satisfy the reserve
requirements. The results are similar to those in the previous table. Actually, the relative
EENS is slightly lower in this case, due to the fact that in this case all units are dispatched,
which gives a faster overall rate of output increase after an outage. The exception is the case
with non-spinning reserves, where units 1-9 provide reserves only, resulting in a low
generation cost but a high EENS. The load interruption cost includes the cost of preventive
shedding.
In this case, the price equals the reduced value of lost load RVOLL = 2100 $/MWh,
because an increase in demand will automatically increase preventive shedding
correspondingly. Reserve prices are close to 2100 $/MW, because an increase in the reserve
requirement will increase preventive shedding. At the same time, the expected cost of energy
not served is slightly reduced in case of outages.
4.3.2 Elastic demand
It is now assumed that demand is inelastic for normal prices, but elastic when prices
increase due to a capacity shortage. The demand model of Figure 4-4 is used with S1 = 50
$/MWh S2 = RVOLL = 2100 $/MWh and demand DMAX equal to 3135 MW. Simulations were
done for several levels of the elasticity limit DMIN, (P1 in the context of Section 3.3). If the
optimal commitment/dispatch solutions independent of DMIN, the calculation method of
Section 3.3.4 can be used directly, but it is not possible to know this beforehand.
In this case, the commitment/dispatch solution appears to be independent of DMIN, i.e.
equal to the base case solution in Table 4-3, with the exception of the load interruption cost
and total cost. Based on the theory in 3.3, the following costs were calculated:
Table 4-4: Cost of preventive shedding with perfect rationing as a function of elasticity limit
DMIN in IEEE-RTS
elasticity limit 0 627 1254 1881 2508 3005 3135
shedding cost 14451 16439 19752 26378 46257 198250 273000
These calculations were verified with simulations that showed almost the same results,
with small deviations due to the discretization of elastic demand.
4.3.3 Seemingly inelastic dema nd
If demand is elastic, like in the previous section, but this elasticity is invisible for the reasons
discussed in Section 3.3, random instead of perfect rationing has to be used. The resulting
costs are shown in Table 4-5.
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Table 4-5: Cost of preventive shedding with random rationing as a function of elasticity limit
in IEEE-RTS
elasticity limit 0 627 1254 1881 2508 3005 3135
shedding cost 198250 213200 228150 243100 258050 269900 273000
The results of these calculations are shown in the next figure, which is similar to the
corresponding figure in Section 3.3.
Figure 4-7: Cost of optimal and random preventive shedding as a function of the elasticity
limit
4.3.4 Demand side reserves
As discussed in Section 3.4, an alternative to preventive shedding to obtain a specific reserve
level is to use demand as reserves. It is assumed that the variable cost of this is zero, but that
contributing consumers are paid for being available as reserve. It is assumed that demand only
can contribute to secondary reserves, and with the exception of the last simulation, an
activation time of 10 minutes is used. Table 4-6 summarizes the results for these simulations.
As a reference, the base case results from Table 4-3 are also shown.
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Table 4-6: Simulation results, fixed reserve 400 MW, demand side reserves
demand side
secondary
reserve (MW)
generation
primary /
secondary
reserve
(MW)
preven-
tive
shedding
(MW)
expected energy not
served
(GWh / relative)
generation
cost
($)
load
interrup-
tion cost
($)
total cost
($)
0 (base case) 59/341 130.0 0.1637 (5.210-5) 41870 273491 315361
50 50/300 80.0 0.1851 (5.910-5) 42396 168556 210952
100 44/256 30.0 0.2056 (6.610-5) 42989 63616 106605
150 41/209 0.0 0.2210 (7.010-5) 42608 662 43270
100 / 30 min 44/256 30.0 0.2857 (9.110-5) 42989 63857 106846
The opportunity to use demand side reserves leads to considerable cost reductions, net of
the cost of installing necessary technology to make such a solution feasible. Because demand
only contributes with secondary reserves, which take some time to activate, EENS increases
compared with the base case solution. Generation costs are also higher, because production is
higher than in the base case. In the cases where preventive load shedding is necessary, the
price is 2100 $/MWh, like in Section 90. The only exception is the case with 150 MW
demand side reserves, in which case the price is 22.0 $ MWh.
4.4 Simulations with optimal reserve requirements
In the previous section, fixed reserve requirements were imposed, which were produced in an
optimal manner with respect to a number of outage situations. In this section, reserve amounts
are a result of the optimization process, under various assumptions. Especially interesting are
the results in Sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.4, where constraints are imposed directly on EENS and
LOLP respectively.
4.4.1 Cost minimization without additional requirements
In this section, optimal reserve amounts are the result of the cost optimization. Outages are
taken into account through their impact on expected cost of loss of load. The results are
shown in the next table:
 Table 4-7: Simulation results, optimal reserve
case primary /
secondary
reserve
(MW)
preven-
tive
shedding
(MW)
expected energy not
served
(GWh / relative)
generation
cost
($)
load
interrup-
tion cost
($)
total cost
($)
2850 MW 34/164 0.0 0.5220 (1.810-4) 28323 1566 29889
3135 MW 44/85 0.0 0.7583 (2.410-4) 37730 2275 40005
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Compared with Table 4-2 and Table 4-3, the reserve level has been considerably reduced,
resulting in an increase in EENS. However, this is more than compensated by reduced
generation costs, and in the 3135 MW case, the reduction in the cost of preventive shedding.
The main reason for the difference in generation cost between these simulations and the
corresponding simulations with fixed reserves is that none of the 12 and 20 MW oil units is
started up. Their start-up respectively standby cost is too high to compensate for their
contribution to the reduction of EENS. This contribution is very limited, because of their low
ability to provide primary reserve (5 % or 0.6 and 1.0 MW respectively). Prices (energy +
security component) are 21.6 + 1.0 = 22.6 and 21.6 + 15.5 = 37.1 $/MWh for the 2850 and
3135 MW demand cases respectively, illustrating the increase in the cost of security when
demand rises.
Because preventive load shedding is unprofitable under these assumptions, elasticity of
demand as defined in Section 4.3.2 does not change these results, as long as the lower price
limit S1 is above the highest marginal generation cost
4.4.2 The cost of system collapse
As pointed out in Section 4.3.1, the results may be too optimistic if the probability of system
collapse is not taken into account. Results are shown in Table 4-8 for the cost function
described in Section 4.2.8.
Table 4-8: Simulation results, consideration to the probability of system collapse
case primary /
secondary
reserve
(MW)
preven-
tive
shedding
(MW)
expected energy not
served
(GWh / relative)
generation
cost
($)
load
interrup-
tion cost
($)
total cost
($)
2850 MW 153/61 0.0 0.3377 (1.210-4) 30328 3832 34161
3135 MW 130/0 0.0 0.6653 (2.110-4) 39251 6200 45451
3135-2 hour 165/5 0.0 0.4422 (1.410-4) 41632 7402 49034
3135-4 hour 165/5 0.0 0.4422 (1.410-4) 41632 13477 55109
3135-coldres 130/140 0.0 0.3145 (1.010-4) 39251 5147 44398
The first two rows give the results for the 2850 and 3135 MW cases, where a blackout time
of 1 hour is assumed. The next two rows show effect of increasing the blackout time to 2 and
4 hours respectively. In the first two cases, still none of the 12 and 20 MW units is started up.
In the last two cases, two of the 20 MW units are used.
The last row shows the result of allowing secondary reserve contribution from the non-
spinning units 1-9. In this case, it is optimal to utilize these reserves completely, which is
logical because it involves no cost. It gives a considerable reduction in EENS from outages
not resulting in system collapse.
 Figure 4-8 shows the simulated prices for these cases. For the 2850 MW case, the result is
straightforward  the possibility of system collapse results in a considerable price increase.
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For the 3135 MW case with a 1-hour blackout duration and the case where cold reserves can
contribute, the generation component is actually negative. This is because output is increased
on the nuclear units, which have a marginal cost of zero, while primary reserves are reduced,
reducing total generation cost. The lower security cost for the case where cold reserves can
contribute is caused by the fact that the optimal secondary reserve is much higher in this case.
The results for the 2- and 4-hour blackout duration are more intuitive, but it seems strange
that the price is lower for the 2-hour case than for the 1-hour case. The reason is that the 2-
and 4-hour cases have other commitment solutions than the 1-hour case. This illustrates the
difficulties with using this kind of algorithms for pricing: there is no monotonous relationship
between demand and price. Generally, it is clear that including the possibility of system
collapse increases the price considerably.
 Figure 4-8: Simulated prices, including the probability of system collapse
4.4.3 Constraint on Expected Energy Not Served
The purpose of reserves is to be able to withstand the effects of load and generator (and
transmission) outages with a minimum of loss of load. Instead of specifying a reserve level, a
more direct way to limit the effects of outages is to constrain EENS directly as described in
Section 4.2.9. The next table shows the results for various levels of EENS, including energy
prices.
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Table 4-9: Simulation results, DMAX=3135 MW, constraint on EENS
EENS energy
price
($/MWh)
primary /
secondary
reserve
(MW)
preven-
tive
shedding
(MW)
expected energy not
served
(GWh / relative)
generation
cost
($)
load
interrup-
tion cost
($)
total cost
($)
5.210-5 2100 170/142 42.3 0.1608 (5.210-5) 46151 89359 135510
7.510-5 2100 162/107 0.0 0.2351 (7.510-5) 45689 705 46394
1.010-4 106.5 133/100 0.0 0.3135 (1.010-4) 43225 941 44166
2.510-5 70.6 170/204 104.5 0.0758 (2.510-5) 45005 219673 264678
The EENS level in the first row is equal to EENS for the base case in Table 4-3, referred to
the desired load level (i.e. without preventive shedding). It appears that the same level of
security, as measured in 1.0-EENS, can be obtained with a much lower level of reserves and
consequently, preventive load shedding. The LOLP level for the fixed reserve and EENS-
constrained cases are 0.0145 and 0.0058 respectively. Table 4-9 shows that the constraint on
EENS has a major impact on price.
4.4.4 Constraint on Loss Of Load Probability
As an alternative to EENS, the Loss Of Load Probability LOLP can be constrained. Results
for four LOLP levels are shown in Table 4-10.
Table 4-10: Simulation results, DMAX=3135 MW, constraint on LOLP
LOLP energy
price
($/MWh)
primary /
secondary
reserve
(MW)
preven-
tive
shedding
(MW)
expected energy not
served
(GWh / relative)
generation
cost
($)
load
interrup-
tion cost
($)
total cost
($)
0.014554 37.1 50/ 79 0.0 0.7468 (2.410-4) 37806 2240 40046
0.003 54.7 169/88 0.0 0.2701 (8.610-5) 45579 811 46390
0.002 2100 165/112 174.5 0.1909 (6.510-5) 44383 367023 411406
0.001 2100 165/192 409.0 0.0598 (2.210-5) 443838 859080 903463
The value 0.014554 was chosen because this is the resulting value for the 400 MW fixed
reserve case in Table 4-3. It appears that this LOLP level can be obtained with a much lower
reserve level. This results in huge savings, because in this case it is not necessary to do any
preventive load shedding. In addition, generation cost is considerably lower, but EENS is
more than four times as high. This is because the lower reserve level results in a greater
impact of each outage.
8 This value is equal to the corresponding value for the 0.002 LOLP level because the marginal cost of
the nuclear units, whose generation is reduced in this case, is assumed to be equal to 0.
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The lowest obtainable LOLP level without load shedding is 0.002688, caused by loss of
load for the outage of one of the three largest units. To reach a lower level, it is necessary that
outage of only two or one of the largest units results in loss of load. Because the maximum
level or primary reserves is 170.5 MW, only two respectively one unit can generate more than
170.5 MW. This is impossible without using preventive load shedding. The results are
illustrated in Figure 4-9 with a logarithmic scale for total cost. The sharp increase in total cost
occurs when it is necessary to resort to preventive load shedding to obtain the desired LOLP
level.
Figure 4-9: Relative EENS and generation cost as a function of LOLP constraint
4.4.5 Constraint on the Probability of System Collapse
A final possibility is to add constraints on the Probability of System Collapse POSC, as
described in 4.2.8 and 4.2.9:
Table 4-11: Simulation results, constraint on POSC
POSC energy
price
($/MWh)
primary /
secondary
reserve
(MW)
preven-
tive
shedding
(MW)
expected energy not
served
(GWh / relative)
generation
cost
($)
load
interrup-
tion cost
($)
total cost
($)
0.000447 52.1 130/0 0.0 0.6653 (2.110-4) 39251 6200 45451
0.000377 51.9 148/2 0.0 0.5335 (1.710-4) 40452 5142 45594
0.0003 55.6 167/42 0.0 0.3295 (6.510-5) 43295 3810 47105
0.0002 2100 170/160 142.6 0.1035 (3.510-5) 48520 301634 350154
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The first row corresponds to the 3135 MW case in Table 4-8. If POSC is to be reduced, this
can be done by including more units and moving generation from large, cheap units over to
smaller and more expensive units, increasing costs. The last row gives a similar result to the
base case in Table 4-3, with slightly higher preventive shedding and correspondingly reduced
EENS. Generation costs are considerably higher, due to the redistribution of generation to
reduce POSC.
Figure 4-10 shows EENS and LOLP  as a function of POSC. Even for low POSC values,
LOLP may be relatively high. Comparison between this and the two previous sections shows
clearly that very different values result for different criteria, depending on which indicators
for system security are used. A fixed reserve criterion addresses these criteria indirectly, and
may turn out expensive and still not obtain the optimal results, depending on the preferred
target values.
Figure 4-10: LOLP and EENS  as a function of POSC
4.5 Conclusions regarding short-term constrained operation
In this chapter, a simulation model for short-term capacity constrained operation was
developed. Simulation results under various assumptions were shown. With fixed reserve
requirements to ensure system security, it can be necessary to resort to preventive load
shedding to maintain these reserve levels, resulting in high social costs. Moreover,
involuntary load shedding as a means to relieve capacity shortage is socially unacceptable,
and will probably result in claims for market redesign.
As an alternative to the use of fixed reserves, system operators should develop a more
dynamic approach to the maintenance of system security. A possible way to achieve this is by
directly targeting measures of reliability like LOLP or EENS. It was shown through
simulations that the same level of LOLP or EENS could be attained with lower reserve levels.
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The essential instruments are typically to increase primary reserve and reduce secondary
reserve, and to decrease generation on the largest units to reduce the impact of their outages.
Market solutions must be developed to attain this, e.g. by establishing a market for primary
reserves. It can be argued that the model is simple, but the basic ideas are valid in the real
world, though more sophisticated tools need to be developed to assess the impact of outages
in an operational context.
If system security is maintained by directly targeting LOLP or EENS levels, cost reductions
can be obtained, and preventive load shedding can be reduced. However, the level of
reliability is still exogenous. It is determined by for example the regulator or other authorities,
based on assumed average values of lost load, and not by the market, based on consumers
preferences and costs. So even if prescribed reliability can be obtained more effectively, the
problem of finding a market based level of reliability is not solved.
With a number of simulations on the IEEE RTS, it was again shown that the costs could be
considerably reduced by utilizing demand elasticity to reduce demand. A step in the direction
of market-based reliability is to let consumers contribute to the provision of reserves. A
market based procedure for obtaining demand-side reserves, based on a combination of fixed
annual and activation based compensation, would induce consumers to reveal their
preferences with respect to reliability. The challenge is to create the necessary infrastructure
to make this a feasible solution.
An important issue is the possibility of system blackout, the nightmare of every system
operator and indeed, society. If the probability of blackout is too high, a particular system
status may be unacceptable, although this does not show in the economic evaluations. This
means that the value of loss of load used in the simulations does not reflect the excessive cost
of system blackout in modern society. This can be taken into account in simulations by using
extremely high costs for system blackouts, or using a constraint on the risk for such an event.
The problem of estimating the risk of system collapse remains. Simulations were run with
tentative system collapse probabilities, resulting in higher optimal reserve levels. In the
simulations referred in this chapter, it was also shown how prices are influenced by the way
the security requirement is met. If a fixed reserve requirement is used, it can be necessary to
shed load to satisfy the reserve requirement, and the price will essentially equal the value of
lost load, if this is done without agreements with consumers. If the security requirement is
met by directly targeting the loss of load probability or expected energy not served, prices will
be much lower, as long as it is possible to meet the requirements without shedding load. Thus,
the level of security and the selected strategy to obtain it have a profound impact on prices.
In a restructured power system without central responsibility for system adequacy, the
system operator, responsible for system security, must be prepared to face occasional capacity
shortage. The key solution to this problem is to let market forces work on the demand side. To
be able to operate at lower security levels with an acceptable risk of blackout, it is necessary
to establish flexible load shedding routines. With these in place, it is possible to minimize the
amount of load shedding during outages, and recover load as soon as generation capacity
becomes available again.
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APPENDIX A.4: THE IEEE RELIABILITY TEST SYSTEM
A4.1 System data
Computations in Chapter 5 have been done on the IEEE Reliability Test System (IEEE RTS),
documented in [4.10] and [4.11]. Most cases use a single area model, represented by the IEEE
RTS-79. For data not given in RTS-79, values from RTS-96 were used. The data used in this
thesis are referenced in the tables below.
Table A4-1: IEEE-RTS basic data
Unit
Group
Number
of units
Unit
Numbers
Unit Type Max
output
(MW)
Min
output
(MW)
MTTF
(Hour)
Max
prim.
reserve
(MW)
Max
sec.
reserve
(MW)
U12 5 1-5 Oil/Steam 12 2 2940 0 2
U20 4 6-9 Oil/CT 20 16 450 1 4
U50 6 10-15 Hydro 50 10 1980 2 10
U76 4 16-19 Coal/Steam 76 15 1960 3 15
U100 3 20-22 Oil/Steam 100 25 1200 5 20
U155 4 23-26 Coal/Steam 155 54 960 7 31
U197 3 27-29 Oil/Steam 197 69 950 9 39
U350 1 30 Coal/Steam 350 140 1150 17 70
U400 2 31-32 Nuclear 400 100 1100 20 80
Table A4-2: IEEE-RTS cost- and dynamic data
Unit
Group
A0
($)
A1en
(c/kWh)
A1prim
(c/kW)
SCOST
($/start)
RR (%/
min)
TSTART
(min)
INIT
U12 26.00 2.63 1.0 525 8.3 5 0
U20 169.89 5.00 1.0 73 15.0 10 0
U50 0.00 0.00 0.1 0 100.0 10 1
U76 111.02 1.36 1.0 2378 2.6 10 1
U100 223.84 2.16 1.0 1585 7.0 10 0
U155 168.17 1.11 1.0 846 1.9 20 1
U197 273.31 2.16 1.0 2802 1.5 30 1
U350 190.38 1.15 1.0 6460 1.1 60 1
U400 0.00 0.00 1.0 n.a. 5.0 60 1
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The cost parameters A0 and A1en were calculated on the basis of the net plant heat rate in
BTU/kWh and fuel prices in cent/gallon (36 and 56 for #6 and #2 oil)9 and 26.16 $/short ton
coal10. The piecewise linear heat rate was approximated by a linear function and converted to
c/kWh. A1prim was chosen such that resulting cost of primary reserve was approximately 2-3
% of total running cost. Start cost was based on given data for hot start in MBTU and
converted to $. Start-up time was chosen tentatively.
In some calculations, the possibility of system collapse was taken into account, given by a
tentative probability for system collapse given a unit outage. For these cases, the following
values were used:
Table A4-3: Tentative probabilities of system collapse
Unit
Group
Pr(collapse)
(%)
U12 0
U20 0
U50 2
U76 3
U100 5
U155 5
U197 8
U350 15
U400 20
A4.2 Computation of reserve requirements
A reference reserve requirement has to be established for IEEE-RTS. For this purpose, the
PJM-method [4.12], [4.13] was used. The method uses the same principles as in traditional
adequacy calculations, but instead of the units annual forced outage rate FOR, their Outage
Replacement Rate ORR for the period considered (e.g. 1 hour) is used. Given a two-state
generator model, the probability of finding a unit on outage at time T, given that it was
operating at t=0, is:
T)(e)down(P µ+λ−
µ+λ
λ
−
µ+λ
λ
= (A4-1)
where  and  are the units expected failure and repair rates.
9 September 1999 values according to US Energy Information Administration
10 US average of coal delivered to electric utilities in 1997, source: EnergyOnLine, Electricity Statistics.
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For the short period considered, the repair time is neglected (=0), resulting in:
ORR
MTTF
TTe)down(P T ==λ≈−= λ−1 (A4-2)
where MTTF is the units mean time to failure. In the computations, a period of one hour is
used, resulting in ORR=1/MTTF.
The systems individual outage probabilities were calculated using the following simple
algorithm:
 ∏ ∏
∏
∈ ∈ ∉
∈
−⋅=
−−=
Oi Oi Oi
iii
Gi
i
)ORR(ORR)cPr(
)ORR()Pr(
1
110
(A4-3)
where Pr(.) are the individual outage probabilities, G the set of all generators, O the set of
outaged generators and ci the capacity of unit i. Single, double and triple outages are
considered. After computing all probabilities, the results were sorted, truncated and
accumulated. This method gives the exact probabilities, and is feasible for small systems.
Otherwise, the recursive algorithm referred in [4.12] must be used with discrete outage levels
and steps of for example 20 MW.
The results for IEEE-RTS are shown in Figure A4-11. With a requirement of probability of
loss of load of less than 0.001, a reserve level of 400 MW is required if there is no load
uncertainty. Using the technique described in [4.13], reserve requirements with load
uncertainty are given in Table A4-4.
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Figure A4-11: Cumulative outage probability based on ORR for IEEE RTS.
Table A4-4: Reserve requirements to obtain a cumulative outage probability <0.001
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Chapter 5: INTEGRATED PRICING OF ENERGY AND
ANCILLARY SERVICES
The most important special property of a power market is the necessity to maintain a
continuous balance between supply and demand, caused by the impossibility to store
electricity economically. Because of this, it is necessary to maintain certain levels of reserves
that differ with respect to their time and frequency responses. In the previous chapter, a
distinction was made between primary and secondary reserves and their use in a post-
contingency situation. Focus was on optimal provision of necessary reserves, moving to
optimal provision of reliability, characterized by various criteria. However, much research
will be necessary before the principles in the previous chapter can be readily applied in
existing large-scale power systems. In the near future, reliability will in most cases be taken
care of by defining required levels of reserves.
In restructured systems, reserves are explicitly provided through ancillary services1. These
can be defined as activities that pertain to the provision of all electric services necessary for
efficient and reliable generation, transmission and delivery of active power with a sufficiently
stable frequency and voltage [5.1]. The availability of sufficient generation capacity is
essential with respect to reliable generation and frequency issues. Thus, there is a link
between generation capacity on the one side, and the provision of ancillary services on the
other.
In this context, a reasonable hypothesis is that the opportunity to earn revenues in ancillary
services markets would increase the profitability of generation investments, and thus reduce
the peaking capacity problem. To investigate this possibility, a model for the simulation of a
market for energy and ancillary services is used in this chapter.
In Section 5.1, an integrated market model for energy and ancillary services is described.
In Section 5.2 the mathematical formulation of the model is given, while Sections 5.3 and 5.4
describe the solution procedure. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 describe the results from simulations on
a test system, while Section 5.7 draws some conclusions.
5.1 An integrated market for energy and ancillary services
5.1.1 Existing solutions and the proposed model
In the Nordic market (e.g. [5.2]), hourly energy prices for a 24-hour period are determined by
the Power Exchange (PX), based on price versus quantity bids for supply and demand.
National System Operators operate separate regulating markets to acquire secondary reserves.
1 In traditional systems, these services were provided more implicitly through the constraints imposed
on the Unit Commitment and dispatch solutions.
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As far as the provision of other ancillary services is compensated, it is based on negotiated
terms in the Norwegian market
The Californian solution for the 24-hour day-ahead market is similar to the Nordic. In
addition, short-term markets for four ancillary services are recognized: regulation reserve,
spinning reserve, non-spinning reserve and replacement reserve [5.3]. Separate markets exist
for each of these.
In contrast, the UK Pool2 performs a unit commitment (UC) and dispatch based on bids
from all generators. The bids consist of a number of parameters for each unit, which serve as
a proxy for the real data. Ancillary services are compensated, and partly provided through
explicit markets.
Numerous papers have proposed various market structures. Some examples are given: Hao
et al. [5.6] present a procedure for calculation of customer payment minimizing prices for
energy. Aganagic et al. [5.7] include spot pricing of reserve generation and transmission
capacities as well as demand side bidding. Richter and Sheblé [5.8] propose a market
structure with ENSERVCOs and ANSILCOs, providing energy and ancillary services
respectively. Hirst and Kirby [5.9] use a semi-static approach in a comprehensive study of
prices for ancillary services. Bakirtzis describes a model for joint energy and reserve dispatch
[5.10].
5.1.2 Mutual exclusivity
The examples given, and not at in the least the market solution in California, illustrate a
fundamental problem confronting the designer of short-term markets for ancillary services:
energy and (reserve type) ancillary services are mutually exclusive products. This means that
a generator has to choose to which degree it wants to produce energy or one or more reserve
services  it cannot produce (the maximum of) both simultaneously. For example, a generator
with a capacity of 100 MW cannot at the same time produce 100 MW of electricity and 20
MW of reserves, because the production of reserves implies the ability to increase the
generation of electricity. This mutual exclusivity poses substantial challenges both for the
formulation of bids and for clearing the market. In California, markets are cleared
sequentially in a quality-of-service order: regulation first, followed by spin, non-spin and
finally, replacement [5.5]. In this sequential market-clearing process, capacity that is won in a
previous auction is subtracted out from the capacity that is bid into the subsequent markets.
For example, if a participant bids 100 MW of a generating unit into regulation and 200 MW
into spin and wins 50 MW in regulation at the regulation bid price, then 200 MW  50 MW =
150 MW is actually bid into the spin market at the spin bid price.  If 80 MW is won in the
regulation market, then only 120 MW is actually bid into the spin market at the spin price.  If
100 MW is bid into regulation and 50 MW is bid into spin, even if none of the 100 MW of bid
into regulation is taken in the regulation market, only 50 MW is bid into the spin market.
2 The Pool is scheduled to be replaced with a new market mechanism in the autumn of 2000, cf.
Section 2.5.
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The fact that energy and the various reserve services are mutually exclusive from the
generators point of view is an argument for an integrated clearing of these markets, cf. also
[5.11]. Here a market structure somewhat between the UK and Californian solutions is
proposed. It is based on central dispatch by an independent Market Operator (MO)3, but with
explicit short-term pricing of ancillary services. The solution has the following motivation:
• It provides a way to estimate prices for ancillary services, necessary to asses the question
posed in the introduction to this chapter.
• It represents an alternative market design. No final best solution has emerged so far, and
the study of alternatives provides new insights and may suggest better market designs.
However, present developments seem to be away from UK pool type solutions.
• Computed prices for an integrated ideal market for energy and ancillary services serve as
benchmarks for other market solutions.
• It may serve as a tool for multi-plant owners in a market like the Californian, to optimize
their own production of energy and ancillary services.
5.1.3 Ancillary services
The following ancillary services are defined:
• Primary control to provide primary reserve, with a response time of seconds. This is used
to control short-term load fluctuations and to some degree uncertainty, and naturally
provided by spinning units.
• Secondary control, with a response time varying from seconds to minutes, and full
activation within 10-15 minutes. This is used in the first place to cope with outages in
generation or transmission but also for greater deviations from the load forecast. It is often
but not everywhere provided by spinning units.
• Tertiary control, which has a response time of 30-60 minutes, and is used to restore
secondary reserve. Depending on system characteristics and requirements, it is provided
by spinning or non-spinning units.
Other types of ancillary services can be readily defined, provided they can be characterized
by response time and spinning requirement.
5.1.4 Market operation
The following assumptions are made:
3 In real systems there is often a division of tasks between a Market Operator and (Independent)
System Operator or (I)SO. In the current context, this distinction is not relevant, and the market is
assumed operated by one entity, called the Market Operator or MO.
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• There are a number of agents, each owning exactly one generator or representing a
demand segment. This represents perfect competition, where no market participants own a
significant share of generation, and all are price takers.
• Consumers pay separately for energy on the one hand and transmission/distribution on the
other hand, as is becoming common in deregulated power markets. In the demand
function for energy, the effect of the transmission/distribution tariffs is taken into account.
• Energy is purchased by many consumers, while ancillary services are purchased as a
public good by the MO only. The costs are compensated e.g. as part of the
transmission/distribution tariffs.
• The transmission grid is ignored in the calculation of the market equilibrium. To what
degree this is a realistic assumption depends on the market structure. If the market uses a
principle of one system price, the MO buys power on the high-price side and sells on
the low-price side of a transmission constraint, and the major part of the market does not
see the constraint. In this case the assumption is realistic.
• As a consequence of the previous assumption, voltage control / reactive power is assumed
to be acquired on other, presumably long-term markets.
• The necessary level of ancillary services is assumed exogenous. Theoretically, the optimal
level would be obtained where the marginal cost of an ancillary service is equal to its
marginal benefit, given by the expected marginal reduction in outage costs, cf. Chapter 4.
In practice, this expected marginal reduction is difficult to calculate, and standards based
on traditional criteria are agreed and imposed by e.g. the MO.
• Ancillary services may be provided by consumers. Traditionally reserves were always
provided by generators, but in restructured market it is plausible to assume that some
consumers may be willing to reduce demand on short notice, if they are given satisfactory
compensation. For example warm water boilers with sufficient volume may be switched
off during a few critical peak hours without loss of comfort. In this context, demand
reduction is equivalent to an increase in generation.
A pool-based market structure is envisaged, which is cleared sequentially, hour for hour.
Starting with the first hour, all agents prepare their bids. Intertemporal dependencies are
considered by each individual agent, using a price forecast for the remaining price period, in
the same way as in [5.13].
In this market structure, the MO receives all the bids for the current hour, and computes the
market solution: prices and volumes for each agent for energy and the three ancillary services.
From this market solution, each agent knows his commitment state, and can proceed with
preparing his bid for the next hour.
In this way, all hours for one twenty-four hour period are cleared. It is appropriate to
question the quality of the solution in terms of optimality: the introduction of competition
ideally should not affect operating efficiency adversely. It is obvious that the agents price
forecasts play an essential role. If the forecast was close to the final prices, the agents
commitment decisions will have been taken on the correct basis, and they will be optimal ex
post. If, however, the forecast was wrong, the decisions would be sub-optimal ex post, and the
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market solution will not be cost-minimizing. To approach the cost-minimizing solution, it
may be necessary to allow for several iterations in the whole process. The results from a
previous iteration may then be used by the agents as a price forecast. Naturally, the number of
iterations will be limited if used in a real market. As agents gain experience with the market,
their initial price forecasts may normally be good enough.
5.1.5 Market prices for energy  and ancillary services
Prices and volumes are calculated in a centrally run optimization process as described in the
previous section. The parameters for the optimization are given by way of the market
participants bids.
Prices should be such that volumes and prices are consistent with market participants self-
dispatch decisions  i.e. given these prices, market participants would have chosen the same
production of energy and ancillary services as the outcome of the optimization program.
The basic challenge occurs because of startup costs and the operation-dependent constant
term in the cost function. Because of these, the marginal cost of the marginal (price-setting)
unit is often lower than the average cost of this unit. To make production profitable for this
unit, it is necessary to raise the price above its marginal cost. However, if this is done, other
units will increase their production, and total generation will exceed demand. Thus in many
cases it is not possible to find a price that is such that generation equals demand. To solve this
problem, an additional balancing product is introduced, defined as the difference between
total generation and demand. This is illustrated in Figure 5-1. The left panel shows the
classical solution, where price λen,t equals marginal cost for generator i. The generator has a
minimum generation constraint of PMINen,it. Because of the startup and operation-dependent
constant terms, the cost of generating PMINen,it is considerably higher than the marginal-cost
curve would suggest, and is represented by the hatched rectangle. With a price λen,t and a
production pen,it the part of this rectangle exceeding λen,t is greater than the light shaded
triangle. Consequently the generator would decide not to produce at all.
The right hand side of Figure 5-1. shows the situation where the price is λen,t and generator
i would choose to produce px,it. However, it may happen that total generation exceeds demand
in this case because the price had to be increased to commit sufficiently many generators, cf.
Section 5.3.2. From this situation, all generators are given the opportunity to reduce their
output by balancing. After balancing, generator i produces pen,it for which it receives the price
λen,t. Generator i does not increase generation, because it also produces a balance
production (in reality a reduction in output) of sit at a price νt. The combined generation of
pen,it and sit constitutes the optimal solution for each unit.
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Figure 5-1: Marginal cost, balancing production sit and its price νt.
At the equilibrium, total production costs are given by the hatched area. Revenues from
energy sales are given by the product pen,it ⋅ λen,t, and from balancing by sit ⋅ νt. The additional
income in the right hand panel compared with the left hand panel is represented by the dark
shaded area. In this case revenues exceed costs, and the generator will produce at the
equilibrium point pen,it, where marginal costs equals the difference λen,t - νt. It can be seen that
this is optimal for the generator with given prices λen,t and νt because an increase dP in
generation would change revenues with dP ⋅ (λen,t - νt  MC+), where MC+ is slightly higher
than MC because of the increase in production. This is negative, because in the optimum MC
= λen,t - νt. Similarly a decrease dP in generation would change revenues with dP ⋅ (-λen,t + νt
+ MC−), where MC− is slightly less than MC, and again this is negative. The size of the
additional revenue is greatly exaggerated in Figure 5-1 for clarity purposes. In the example in
Section 5.5.2, the additional revenue is 9 % of total generator revenues in the hour with
highest prices, on average 1 % for all hours. These costs are assumed covered as a part of the
transmission tariffs.
5.2 Mathematical formulati on
5.2.1 Symbol definitions
In principle, the same symbols are used as in the model described in the previous chapter.
However, the time horizon of the present problem is different, so it must be kept in mind that
the time variable t represents different units in the respective models (typically, it will be one
hour in the present model). Furthermore,
pen,it
λ'en,t
PMINen,it px,it
sit
pen,it
λen,t
PMINen,it
νt
price/
MC
productionproduction
price/
MC
MC
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Sets:
P - the set of commodities: {en,prim,sec,tert}, where en is an abbreviation for
energy (MWh/hour), prim for primary control, sec for secondary control and tert
for tertiary control (all MW)
Indexes:
t - time period, t ∈ {1,.,T}
i - generation unit (agent), i ∈ {1, ., I}
j - demand segment (agent), j ∈ {1, ., J}
k - commodity, k ∈ P
Constants:
T - number of time periods
I - number of generation units (suppliers)
J - number of demand segments (consumers)
PMAXki - maximum value of commodity k produced by unit i if running
PMINki - minimum value of commodity k produced by unit i if running
PMAX0ki- maximum value of commodity k produced by unit i if not running
CLi - additional startup cost for unit i after infinite down time (cf. equation (5-1))
CHi - hot startup cost for unit i (i.e. startup cost after a theoretical zero down time)
TCi - cooling time constant unit i
A0it - constant term in running-cost function of unit i, period t
A1kit - coefficient of linear term in cost function of unit i, period t
A2it - coefficient of quadratic term in running-cost function of unit i, period t
TUPi - minimum up time unit i after start
TDOWNi- minimum down time unit i after stop
Rkt - Requirement (demand) for commodity k in period t
TLENt - Length of time period t in basic time units
IDIFFit - Future benefit for unit i of running in period t compared with not running in
period t
DMAXjt - maximum demand of segment j in period t
DMINjt - minimum demand of segment j in period t
The index t for the constants A0, A1, A2 indicates their dependence on the length of the time
step.
Variables:
uit - commitment status of unit i in period t, uit ∈ {0,1}. 1 indicates the unit is running
pkit - production of commodity k by unit i in period t
pit - vector of all pkit, k  P
sit - balancing production of unit i in period t
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cit(.) - running cost of unit i in time period t
djt - customer js demand for energy in period t
toffit - number of basic time units unit i has been off at the start of period t
tonit - number of basic time units unit i has been on at the start of period t
λkt - price for commodity k in period t (in the market clearing problem)
λt - vector of all λkt, k  P
The basic time unit may be chosen arbitrarily. A natural choice is the length of the shortest
time step used.
5.2.2 Generator model
A quadratic cost function is assumed for the generators. A cost is accrued for the provision of
ancillary services. For example as pointed out in [5.14], the provision of frequency regulation
leads to reduced fuel efficiency. This has, somewhat simplified, been modelled as a constant
specific cost. In general, the cost will be zero for ancillary services with longer time frames.
The maximum values for reserve contributions by a single generator PMAXki, is limited by
constraints on its ramping rates and, in the case of primary reserve, also the unit droop and the
frequency deviation. Thus the model equations for generator i are:
( )
2
,
( 1)
1
/1 1
it it it kit kit it en it
it ii i i t it
K
c u A1 p A2 pA0
k
toff TCCH CL e u u
−
= + +
=
 −  + + − ⋅ − ⋅  
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(5-1)
(1 )
kit ki it
ki it
p PMAX u
PMAX 0 u k
≤ ⋅ +
⋅ − ∀ (5-2)
,kit en ip PMAX
k P
≤
∈
(5-3)
, , , 0en it prim it en i itp p PMIN u− − ⋅ ≥ (5-4)
( )( 1) 1 ( 1)it i t t i tton ton TLEN u− − −= + ⋅ (5-5)
( )( 1) 1 ( 1)(1 )it i t t i ttoff toff TLEN u− − −= + ⋅ − (5-6)
( 1)it i t it iu u ton TUP−≥ − (5-7)
( 1)it i t it iu u toff TDOWN−≤ + (5-8)
0kitp k≥ ∀ (5-9)
{0,1}itu ∈ (5-10)
The obvious ∀t has been omitted in these equations. Fuel and startup costs are defined in
(5-1) in the usual way and the cost for ancillary services are added. Equation (5-2) expresses
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that the maximum values of energy and the various ancillary services depend on the
commitment state of the unit. Naturally PMAX0en,it and PMAX0prim,it are 0, while the values
for the other reserves may be greater than 0, if the particular ancillary service does not require
the providing units to be spinning. (5-3) expresses that the sum of active generation and
ancillary services never can exceed the generators capacity. (5-4) avoids the provision of
primary reserve by units running at minimum power. Alternatively, separate products could
be defined for downward and upward regulation, as has been done in California. In this case,
(5-4) would apply to downward regulation only, while this would not be included in the sum
of (5-3). (5-5)-(5-8) define up- and downtimes, and restrict these to their minimum values,
while (5-9) is the general requirement that generation and reserves are positive.
5.2.3 Demand model
Traditionally demand has been considered inelastic in the short run. This is still a reasonable
assumption for a considerable part of demand, but in deregulated markets an increasing part
of demand is becoming elastic. In view of the other parts of this thesis, it is natural to
investigate the effect of flexible demand on the ancillary services markets. Therefore, the
same model as in Chapter 4.2 is used.
5.2.4 Bid formulation
Given a price forecast, the agents problem is to prepare a bid for one hour and for four
commodities: energy and three ancillary services. The commodities are strongly inter-related,
and in addition, inter-temporal constraints must be taken into account. This suggests that it
will be difficult to prepare explicit price-quantity bids that consider the mutual dependencies.
Thus, the bid is formulated as an optimization problem, and the task of the MO will be to
solve this problem on behalf of all agents.
In order to construct his bid for hour t, each agent has to calculate the future consequences
of being committed in period t. This decoupling in time is based on the model described in
[5.13], and shortly outlined here. A traditional UC dynamic programming (DP) procedure is
used, with the objective:
[ ] ( 1)( ) ( , , , )MAX
, 1
it k ki i i i i i
ii
T
pw u p c u u toff
p u t k P
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
ττ
λ
τ
−
 
= −  
 = + ∈  (5-11)
subject to (5-1) - (5-9). In this formulation, only compensation for having reserves available is
assumed. Strictly, a term representing compensation for activated reserves should be added. If
the probability of activating the reserve is small, and the costs are moderate, the contribution
from this term may be neglected in the optimization problem.
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λkτ represent the price forecasts for energy and ancillary services in period τ. (5-11) is
solved using a backward DP procedure, where the optimal production in each period is solved
with a quadratic programming routine.
By solving (5-11) for uit=0 and uit=1 respectively, the agent can calculate the future benefit
of his commitment decision in period t, IDIFFit = w(1)  w(0) and prepare his bid for this
period. The bid is the solution of the maximization of the agents profit function:
[ ]( ) ( )MAX
,
kt kit it it itt
itit
z p c IDIFF u
p u k P
λ λ= − ⋅ + ⋅
∈ (5-12)
subject to (5-1) - (5-9).
The solution of (5-12) is a multi-valued price-volume relation from шK→шK, where K is
the number of commodities. The bid is submitted to the MO as a statement of the
optimization problem with its constraints. This form of bid will be too complicated for many
market agents, but simpler forms of bids, like the usual price-volume relations, may be
regarded as subsets of this more general form.
5.3 Single hour market clear ing
The MO receives bids for energy and ancillary services from all market agents in the general
form of (5-12) with its constraints. Because demand is inelastic (cf. the modelling of elastic
demand in the previous chapter), the profit maximization problem to solve for the MO can be
converted into the cost minimization problem (5-13):
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and where I equals I increased with the number of generators representing elastic demand.
This formulation of (5-15) assumes that each form of reserve only can be used for its own
purpose. However, as has been discussed in California and New England, higher quality
services can be used to satisfy lower quality requirements, e.g. primary reserve may be used
as secondary reserve etc. This rational buyer concept (or cascading markets) can be
modelled by a reformulation of (5-15):
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5.3.1 Branch and Bound (BB)  solution
A branch and bound procedure can solve (5-13) - (5-15) with constraints (5-1) - (5-9) directly.
A general-purpose QP solver was used to solve the quadratic problem, while a dedicated
branch and bound procedure was user written. In this case, the dual values from the
constraints (5-14) and (5-15) are interpreted as prices. However, with these prices generators
do not necessarily cover their costs, because neither startup costs nor the constant terms A0it
are taken into account in the dual values, cf. Willams [5.16]. If the problem is not too large, it
is possible to find the optimal production schedule, but feasible market prices are not obtained
by this procedure.
5.3.2 Lagrange Relaxation (LR ) solution
To be feasible in a market environment, the solution to (5-13) - (5-15) with constraints
(5-1) - (5-9) should give prices that satisfy each market agent. A feasible market solution
implies prices that would yield the same outcome if each agent would self-dispatch, given
these prices and his expectations of prices for future periods. It is easy to find simple
examples where this is not possible (also cf. [5.15]), so two additional assumptions must be
made:
1. When agents are economically indifferent with respect to certain production levels, it is
accepted that the MO decides on the final levels4.
2. An additional balancing production is introduced as a means to obtain equality between
total generation and demand (cf. Section 5.1.5).
The problem defined by (5-13) - (5-15) bears strong resemblance to the traditional UC
problem. This suggests the use of Lagrange Relaxation. The dual LR formulation is:
                                                
4 This is not a special requirement for the market concept described here. As shown by Madrigal and
Quintana in [5.17], there are possibilities for multiple optimal solutions even in simple uniform first-
price auctions.
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subject to (5-1) - (5-9) ∀i, where (5-14)-(5-15) have been relaxed.
The solution of (5-16) is obtained, basically using a subgradient procedure. As pointed out
in the literature, it is generally hard to find good primal feasible solutions from the optimal
dual solution. Procedures where primal feasible solutions are generated during the iteration
procedure are used in most references (cf. [5.18], [5.19]). On this background, the following
algorithm was designed:
1. Set initial price forecast λkt ∀k,t.
2. Solve (5-11) twice for each agent with his current price forecast to find the IDIFFits.
3. Solve (5-12) for all agents. Verify satisfaction of the global constraints (5-14) - (5-15). If
total generation is greater than or equal to demand and reserve requirements can be
satisfied (if necessary by rescheduling of committed units), go to 4. If total generation is
less than demand, go to 5.
4. There is a generation surplus with given prices. Solve the primal problem (5-13) with
given uit, resulting in new multipliers kt as the dual values of (5-14)-(5-15). Update the
multipliers according to:
( )1next oldkt kt ktα αλ λ λ= ⋅ + − (5-17)
where 0  α  1. Go to 6.
5. Not enough units are committed to satisfy the power balance. Use subgradient-updating:
1
kt kit
next old
kt kt
kt
R p
i
a b ITER Rλ λ
−
= + ⋅
+ ⋅
(5-18)
where ITER is the iteration number.
6. If improvement in the primal objective has occurred in the last N iterations, go to 2.
Otherwise, finish.
5.4 Multiple bidding rounds
The process described in the previous sections describes the market clearing process within a
single hour. To be able to construct his bid for one hour, the generator must:
• know its commitment status at the previous hour
• use a price forecast for a number of future hours
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Because of the first requirement, a sequential bidding process is proposed, where one hour
is cleared before the bidding process for the next is started. If the original price forecasts are
reasonably correct, the resulting commitment and dispatch will come close to the least cost
solution. However, if the forecast deviates substantially from the final prices, the solution will
be suboptimal. A bidding process with multiple bidding rounds can be simulated by
employing an outer loop upon the market clearing process described in 5.3, where prices from
the last round are used to adjust the forecast used in the next round. An obvious adjustment is
simple linear weighting of the price forecast with the prices from the last round, analogous to
(5-17).
In a real market, the number of bidding rounds will naturally be limited. However, in a
simulated market, it is possible to run many rounds to search for the global optimum.
5.5 Results from test calcula tions
5.5.1 Model verification
To verify the model described in this chapter, a comparison was made with the 10-unit model
used in [5.12] and [5.13]. Details of the model, together with additional data used in the
subsequent sections are given in Appendix A.5 at the end of this chapter. To enable a
comparison of the results, the requirements for primary and tertiary reserves (cf. (5-15)) are
set equal to zero. To make direct comparison possible, the values PMAXki were set equal to
PMAXen,i for all k. In model terms this means that (5-2) becomes non-binding for k  en.
In the first comparison the BB algorithm was used to solve the problem (5-13)-(5-15). As
discussed before, this does not give feasible market prices, but it guarantees the optimal
(minimal cost) solution of (5-13)-(5-15), i.e. within each hour. The resulting cost is USD
47262, better than any other solution referred in Table 6.1 in [5.12], indicating the present
method is able to find good solutions to the UC problem. The resulting commitment schedule
is given in Table 5-1. The differences with the results in [5.12] are underlined.
Table 5-1: Unit commitment plan test system, Branch and Bound
hour
unit
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Subsequently, a simulation was run where the LR algorithm described in Section 5.3 was
used instead of BB. Total cost for this solution was USD 47293. The resulting commitment
plan is shown in Table 5-2, which only shows the units with a different commitment than the
previous solution. The differences with Table 5-1 are underlined.
Table 5-2: Unit commitment plan test system, LR algorithm (differences with Table 5-1)
hour
unit
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Total costs are 0.07 % higher than for the BB solution, but among the best referred in
Table 6.1 in [5.12]. The next two tables show unit profits for the respective methods. The
numbers in these tables do not include expected future income IDIFFit defined in Section
5.2.4.
Table 5-3: Unit profit (USD), Branch and Bound
hour
unit
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 15 10 12 12 11 13 17 13 11 10 12 12 10 9 9 7 6 10 8 7 6 9 13 25
2 6 -1 2 2 1 4 9 4 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 6 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 10 2 6 5 4 8 15 8 4 2 6 5 3 1 0 -2 -4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 -66 11 17 15 14 19 30 19 14 11 17 15 12 10 8 5 2 12 6 4 2 10 18 47
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -147
7 20 -4 8 5 2 13 34 13 2 -5 8 4 -3 -7 -10 -17 -23 -2 -14 -18 -22 -6 10 75
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 27 14 21 19 17 23 34 23 17 14 21 19 15 13 11 8 4 15 9 7 5 13 22 55
10 55 40 48 45 43 51 64 51 43 39 48 45 40 37 35 30 25 40 32 29 26 38 49 88
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Table 5-4: Unit profit (USD), LR algorithm
hour
unit
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 15 10 9 7 6 8 10 9 10 10 11 10 12 9 9 8 7 8 8 6 -3 2 6 55
2 6 -1 -3 -5 -6 -4 -1 -2 -1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 6 -2 -4 -7 -8 -6 -2 -3 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 10 2 0 -2 -4 -1 2 1 3 3 4 3 6 1 1 -1 -1 0 0 -3 -16 -9 -3 90
5 -66 11 8 5 2 6 11 10 12 12 13 13 16 10 9 7 5 9 8 5 -14 -5 3 123
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 20 -4 -10 -17 -22 -14 -3 -6 -2 -1 0 -1 6 -7 -9 -10 -11 -9 -12 -21 -60 -37 -20 349
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 27 14 11 7 5 9 15 13 15 16 16 16 19 13 12 12 12 11 11 6 -15 -4 6 226
10 55 40 35 30 26 32 40 38 40 41 42 41 45 37 36 33 30 34 31 26 -5 13 27 189
With the BB method in Table 5-3, there is no constraint on profit. The effect of this is
easiest to see on Unit 6 in hour 24  clearly the unit does not earn its startup costs, and would
not be willing to run, if it was given a choice.
In Table 5-4, profits including expected future income should be positive. Negative profits
can occur for three reasons:
• Unit must run because of minimum up time
• Expected future surplus exceeds the accumulated deficit, e.g. Unit 9 in hours 21 and 22
• Final prices differ from expected prices
The last reason is related to the multiple bidding rounds. Expected prices in one round are
based on the results from the previous two rounds. It is well known that iterative procedures
like the current one tend to end up in an unstable behaviour between two or a few solutions.
These solutions will often have different prices. Thus the price forecast the least cost solution
is based upon may be too high, resulting in an ex post wrong commitment decision. This is
obviously the case for Unit 7 in the example above. A further illustration of the solutions is
given in Figure 5-2.
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Figure 5-2: Prices and marginal costs
The grey line shows the results for the BB solution. The reason that prices are higher than
for the LR solution in most hours is that the BB process finds cheaper solutions with fewer
units committed, resulting in higher marginal costs. The dotted and solid black lines show the
resulting and expected prices for the LR solution. It is clear that expected prices for the
bidding round with minimum cost were higher than final prices, resulting in negative profits
for some units in some hours. The difference between the two algorithms is most clear in hour
24, where the resulting price from the BB solution is clearly too low to satisfy the positive
profit requirement for Unit 6.
Finally, total revenue for the generators is USD 49259 and USD 49323 for the BB and LR
algorithms respectively, showing that the latter method increases generator income, in this
case caused by revenues from reserve sales. The difference would have been greater if the LR
method would have found the same solution as the BB method, resulting in higher marginal
costs and higher prices in hours 3-9 and 21-23.
The fact that the LR algorithm results in higher prices and generator revenues is generally
valid, because in this algorithm also startup and operation dependent constant costs are
compensated.
5.5.2 Multiple ancillary servic es
A new simulation was performed with the model with basically the same data as in Section
5.5.1, but with the following requirements to primary and tertiary reserves:
primary reserves  30 MW
tertiary reserves   150 MW
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Moreover, the contribution to reserves from each unit were now limited by their ramping
rates and by absolute values as given in Appendix A.5. This makes the problem more
realistic, but also more difficult to solve.
Table 5-5 shows the resulting unit commitment plan, where differences with Table 5-2, the
system with one simple reserve requirement, are underlined. In hours 1-8 and 10-16 it is
necessary to have more units on line to satisfy the reserve requirements in this case. Units 2
and 3 contribute to tertiary reserves also when they are not spinning.
Table 5-5: Unit commitment plan test system, multiple ancillary services
hour
unit
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 5-3 shows resulting prices for energy and ancillary services.
Figure 5-3: Simulated prices, multiple ancillary services
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The energy price follows a similar pattern as in Figure 5-2. The price of primary reserve is
often equal to its cost, but exceeds the cost in a number of hours because of the opportunity
cost effect. The cost of secondary reserves is positive in most hours, while the cost of tertiary
reserves is zero for all hours in this case. The price of balancing production is positive in the
hours where price is not equal to marginal cost
This example shows that it is possible to solve the UC and dispatch problem for the
multiple ancillary services case. Figure 5-3 also shows that price exceeds marginal cost in a
number of hours, and that the balancing production mechanism makes it possible to obtain a
market-based solution in these hours.
5.5.3 Demand side participation
To investigate the effect of demand side participation, 200 MW of demand was defined as
inelastic but able to act as secondary or tertiary reserve in the hours 1-9 and 24 at zero
marginal cost. In practice, this could be obtained by offering fixed annual payments. Table
5-6 shows the resulting commitment schedule, where differences with Table 5-5 are
underlined.
Because of the load participation, the expensive Unit 8 has to run only for one hour, while
it is not necessary to start Unit 6 in the last hour. Instead, it is necessary to keep Unit 2
running for all hours. Total simulated cost is USD 47662 and consumer payment USD 50130,
respectively USD 300 and USD 1372 lower than without consumer participation. Thus, the
result is a net loss of USD 1072 for the generators. The profit for consumers naturally
depends on the fixed compensation for being available as reserve and the lost utility of being
used as reserve.
Table 5-6: Unit commitment plan test system, demand side participation
hour
unit
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 5-4 shows resulting prices for this case. Energy prices are on average slightly lower,
but not much. The greatest difference occurs in hour 24, because it is unnecessary to start Unit
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6. As a result, the balancing price is also zero in that hour. Because of the demand side
delivery of secondary reserve, its price is zero in the hours 4-9. There is no effect on tertiary
reserves, because its price was zero already. However, for cases with higher load, also the
price of tertiary reserve is non-zero, and is influenced by demand side participation.
Figure 5-4: Simulated prices with demand side participation
5.6 Ancillary service market s and unit profits
The motivation for analyzing ancillary service markets in the context of this thesis was to find
out if such markets increase the profitability of generation capacity. Obviously, generators
earn some additional revenues from these services, compared with a situation where they are
obliged to deliver them without compensation. However, the commitment decision is subject
to a positive profit (because otherwise the maximum of (5-12) is zero with uit=0). In cases
where this is the binding constraint (which is often the case in the test cases in the previous
sections), the energy price has to be higher when there is no payment for ancillary services.
So one might suspect that payment for ancillary services in a competitive market lowers the
energy price, partly offsetting the increase in generator revenues. To investigate this
hypothesis somewhat further, a comparison was made between two cases:
• Case a: includes ancillary service markets like before
• Case b: ancillary services are divided among generators with the same algorithm as before,
but generators receive no revenues from them. This can be the situation if for example
generators are given some kind of fixed compensation, independent of their actual
operation.
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
hour
pr
ic
e 
($
/M
W
h 
an
d 
$/
M
W
)
energy            
prim. res         
sec. res          
tert. res.        
balancing         
URN:NBN:no-2136
Integrated Pricing of Energy and Ancillary Services 126
___________________________________________________________________________
These cases were run with 17.5 % higher load than the cases in the previous sections, to
emphasize high load conditions. Results are presented in the next table.
Table 5-7: generator profits (USD) with and without compensation for ancillary services
with
compensation
without
compensation
energy 60166 60660
primary reserves 449 0
secondary reserves 1019 0
tertiary reserves 159 0
balancing 860 726
sum 62653 61386
cost 56853 56853
generator profits 5800 4523
The results show that the suspected effect occurs. Without compensation for ancillary
services, energy prices are higher than with compensation, but no so much as to completely
offset the loss of revenue from ancillary services. The detailed hourly results show that energy
prices are higher in almost all hours where the positive revenue constraint is binding, but the
differences are very small.
Consequently, compensation for ancillary services does increase generator income, but the
effect is reduced by somewhat lower energy prices.
5.7 Conclusions on ancillary  services markets
In this chapter, a potential solution for an integrated market for energy and ancillary services
has been proposed. A model for such a market has been developed, and some test calculations
have been done on a 10-unit system.
The unique property of the model is that it recognizes opportunity costs and their influence
on prices in a non-convex model. Realistic market prices can be obtained. In principle, the
model could be implemented in a real market. However, there are a number of drawbacks:
• The market-clearing algorithm described in Section 5.3 is time consuming. Measures
should be taken to improve its performance if it should be used in a real market.
• The type of algorithm used in this model may often give apparently inconsistent results,
understandable only for people familiar with the algorithm.
• The model is based on a pool type of market. In such markets, the market operator is
concerned with a lot of technical detail, and the whole clearing procedure is opaque for
most market participants. This is an impediment for other participants than the traditional
generators, and forms an entry barrier.
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• In England and Wales, there have been considerable market power problems. The pool
structure itself may have been one cause of these problems (although there is no general
agreement on this, as discussed other places in this thesis), partly because of the previous
point.
The motivation for developing this model in the context of this thesis was to analyse if a
market model where generators are explicitly paid for ancillary services increases revenues
from investments in capacity. It has been shown in an example that such markets increase
generator revenues, but if the market is competitive, this is partly offset by a decrease in the
energy price. Together with the remaining uncertainty of the revenues, it is doubtful if the
introduction of such markets will increase the willingness to invest in peaking capacity
sufficiently to guarantee system security according to traditional measures.
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APPENDIX A.5: TEST SYSTEM DATA
PMIN PMAX A0 A1en A2 A1prim CH CL TC TDOWN TUP up/down
at t=0
Unit1 15 60 15 1.400 0.0051 0.503 15 123 5 2 3 3
Unit2 20 80 25 1.500 0.0040 0.496 15 123 5 4 3 3
Unit3 30 100 40 1.350 0.0039 0.500 25 110 5 4 4 4
Unit4 25 120 32 1.400 0.0038 0.504 12 100 5 3 4 3
Unit5 50 150 29 1.540 0.0021 0.495 30 130 5 3 1 -3
Unit6 75 280 72 1.350 0.0026 0.510 30 146 6 3 6 -3
Unit7 250 520 105 1.395 0.0013 0.501 60 207 11 4 10 10
Unit8 50 150 100 1.329 0.0014 0.498 80 202 11 2 3 3
Unit9 120 320 49 1.264 0.0029 0.497 50 137 7 5 7 7
Unit10 75 200 82 1.214 0.0015 0.502 70 157 9 6 6 6
PMAXprim PMAXsec PMAXtert PMAX0sec PMAX0tert
Unit1 3 45 45 45 45
Unit2 4 60 60 60 60
Unit3 5 70 70 40 70
Unit4 6 95 95 40 95
Unit5 7.5 75 100 0 0
Unit6 14 30 60 0 0
Unit7 26 30 60 0 0
Unit8 7.5 30 60 0 0
Unit9 16 30 60 0 0
Unit10 10 30 60 0 0
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Chapter 6: CAPACITY SUBSCRIPTION
Section 3.1 of this thesis briefly discusses the literature on optimal pricing and investment in
regulated power systems. As the literature shows, the central problem of peak load supply is
the combination of uncertainty with ex ante fixed prices. Many authors conclude that in the
optimal solution, occasional rationing will be necessary under extreme conditions.
A central theme in the economic literature on this topic is how to obtain efficient rationing
in the optimal-welfare sense. An interesting scheme, called Self-Rationing, was introduced by
Panzar and Sibley in 1978 [6.2]. The scheme works as follows: each consumer subscribes to a
particular level of capacity before the state of nature is revealed. States of nature are
modelled through the stochastic temperature variable t, where a high temperature implies high
demand1. The consumer pays a capacity charge for the amount he subscribes to, and a usage
charge for actual consumption. If his usage exceeds subscribed capacity, a fuse2 curtails
further consumption. Consumers differ according to their willingness to pay for power or, put
alternatively, quality of supply, cf. Section 3.4.3. Those with a high willingness to pay for
quality of supply would purchase larger fuse sizes than those with a low willingness to pay. In
a regulated environment, the task of the utility is to find the optimal usage ($/kWh) and fuse
($/kW) prices, and the optimal installed capacity. Panzar and Sibley derive optimal prices
equal to marginal costs of production and capacity respectively, and optimal installed capacity
equal to the sum of all fuse sizes. They finally show that their scheme is ex post optimal under
the assumption that the marginal willingness-to-pay function P(q,,t) where q is the quantity
consumed,  customer type and t temperature (i.e. the stochastic variable), is weakly separable
in q and , i.e. can be written as P(h(q,),t). The behavioral impact of this assumption is that
consumers are similar in the way in which temperature (uncertainty) changes affect their
preferences.
In [6.3], Schwarz and Taylor develop a multi-period version of the model, with imperfect
correlation of customer demands. They conclude that the energy price should equal marginal
cost, but that the fuse price should be less than the marginal capacity cost and installed
capacity less than the sum of the fuse sizes. The rationale behind this result is that demand is
not perfectly correlated, resulting in maximum demand being less than the sum of the fuse
sizes. Furthermore, they state that a single demand charge is generally suboptimal, resulting in
difficulties in designing a practical tariff.
1 Naturally, in a cold climate like the Norwegian, and with electrical heating, a low temperature would
imply high demand. In the formal model description a general stochastic variable u will be used
instead of t.
2 This is not a fuse in the usual sense: it will not blow, reducing demand to zero, but limit demand to
the fuse size. Here the term fuse will be used for this device.
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A remaining problem with both these analyses is that of untimely curtailments when idle
capacity exists, exemplified in [6.2] by the insomniac blowing his fuse at 4 a.m.)3. Woo
[6.5] recognizes this problem, and proposes a truly innovative solution, by letting the utility
activate the fuses only when a capacity shortage occurs. Although devised for a regulated
environment, this scheme is attractive and feasible in restructured systems for a number
reasons:
• Willingness to pay for fuses directly mirrors consumers preference for quality of supply as
discussed in Section 3.4. Consumers with a low preference for quality of supply will obtain
small fuses, resulting in considerable curtailment when there is a capacity shortage. On the
other hand, consumers with a high preference for quality of supply will obtain large fuses,
and will not be curtailed when there is a capacity shortage.
• Capacity installation can be based on consumers revealed preferences, instead of surveys
where consumers answer hypothetical questions.
• Quality of supply becomes a private good instead of a public good, and supply and demand
can be matched in an optimal way.
• Introduction of demand for fuses enables the creation of a capacity market, where demand
for fuses truly reflects demand for the real function of capacity, i.e. to ensure uninterrupted
supply during all states of nature. If demand is high, capacity prices will become high
when there is a shortage, and producers can invest in peaking capacity. On the other hand,
is demand is low, i.e. many consumers are satisfied with being curtailed during shortage
period, prices will stay low, and no new investments are made.
• Although definitely more complicated than an energy-only market, the transaction costs of
self-rationing as proposed by Woo are much lower than e.g. for full spot pricing.
• Once the technological infrastructure for the scheme are in place, network owners might
enter into agreements with their customers to employ the same mechanism to alleviate
network overloads. Naturally, customers would require compensation, because the
probability of being limited by the fuse increases. Agreements like this could be part of
advanced network tariffs.
Before supporting these claims, some comments on Woos paper are appropriate. Based on
ex ante social welfare optimization for the multi period case, Woo derives optimal prices
equal to marginal cost of energy and capacity respectively, and optimal capacity equal to the
sum of the fuse sizes. The decisive difference compared with Schwarz and Taylor is the
utilitys opportunity to control the fuses. Consequently, it will not activate fuses before
demand actually equals capacity. Consumers will anticipate this, and obtain fuses according
to their expected demand when system demand is at its maximum. Under the same weak
3 Basically the same criticism is given against demand charges in [6.4] (pp. 69-71), where it is stated
that Demand charges do not send good price signals. At 4 a.m. marginal costs are low, and it
economically it makes no sense that consumers reduce their demand to avoid the charge.
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separability assumption as Panzar and Sibley, Woo shows that the scheme also is optimal ex
post.
In spite of its innovative contribution, there are two reasons why inefficiencies remain in
Woos model, as pointed out by Doucet and Roland in [6.6]. Firstly, marginal willingness to
pay is generally different between consumers at the time of consumption. This means that
once limited by their fuses, some consumers will be willing to pay more for additional
consumption than others and they would become better off if mutual trade was possible in
some way4. Secondly, although the control of fuses reduces this effect, some consumers will
still be limited by their consumption while system demand is less than capacity. This can be
demonstrated by the simple two-consumer case from [6.6]:
 Figure 6-1: An illustration of self-rationing for a two-consumer case
In  Figure 6-1, consumer 1 with demand q1 reaches his fuse size A1 at a value of t well
below t , the temperature where total demand equals installed capacity Q. Up to this
temperature, he is allowed to increase his demand, but at t  the fuse is activated, and his
demand is reduced to his fuse size A1. Because consumer 2 with demand q2 has not yet
reached his fuse size A2, total demand drops with an amount equal to A2 -q2( t ). In Woos
scheme, this situation is avoided through the property of weak separability, which entails that
all consumers reach t  at the same instant. As Doucet and Roland point out, in that case the
possibility to control the fuses is superfluous. However, the assumption of weak separability
is unrealistic and consequently too strong.
4 This point is assessed by Doucet et al. in another paper [6.7]. The scheme proposed there however,
depends on a price () that is contingent on the state of nature, i.e. it is in reality a spot price.
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In [6.6] it is shown that the inefficiencies in Woos model can be reduced by reducing the
use of fuses, i.e. shortening the interval of temperatures over which fuses constrain demand.
This can be obtained by increasing the price below t . A price above marginal cost will result
in a new inefficiency. Prices p0 below and p1 above t  and t  itself (which now becomes a
decision variable) should be chosen such as to minimize the total inefficiencies, or more
generally to maximize social welfare. Solving the resulting problem, Doucet and Roland find
an optimal price p0 above marginal cost. The optimal price p1 is equal to marginal cost
because above t , demand is rationed by fuses. The fuse price k is equal to marginal capacity
cost minus the shadow price µ of the constraint that the sum of the fuses should be less or
equal to installed capacity.
The scheme of Doucet and Roland reduces, but does not eliminate the problem of too
much load relief. Furthermore, it will not work in a competitive market, because in this case it
will not be possible for a utility or a regulator to fix the price above marginal cost below t . In
the next sections, a model for a competitive market will be derived, and possibilities for
practical implementation will be discussed. To minimize efficiency losses, two different
strategies to avoid excess load relief are explored:
• random allocation
• optimal allocation according to willingness to pay
Furthermore, the term Capacity Subscription will be used instead of Self-Rationing, because it
is more appropriate in a restructured environment: consumers choose to purchase something
they want (capacity) not something they do not want (rationing).
6.1 Random allocation of ex cess capacity
6.1.1 The consumer problem
Initially, the case of random allocation will be described. A formal discussion of the
concept of utility in the current context is given in [6.2] or alternatively in [6.8], and will not
be repeated here. A sticky market price p is assumed within the period N, i.e. it is assumed
that the price reflects market conditions over a period of some duration, but can not vary
continually like an ideal spot price would5. A consumer buys a fuse size A at a per unit price k
in order to maximize his expected surplus:
5 If a spot price would be feasible, there would be no rationing problem.
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Here ( , , )n nP q u θ is consumer θ s marginal willingness to pay for a quantum q at time  n
and state of nature nu . Pn is assumed decreasing in q and increasing in u and θ. The stochastic
variable u may have values between uL and uH, and has a density function f(u), with a
cumulative F(u)6. nu  is the value of nu where total demand is equal to installed capacity:
( , , )H
L n n
q p u dG Qθθ θ =
where G is the cumulative consumer distribution function. ( ( ), , , )n nc A p u θ⋅  is given by:
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The function A is written as ( , , , )eA p k Pr θ  since ePr  is taken as a parameter by the
consumer and A( )⋅ is defined as the optimal choice of fuse by the consumer. It is natural that
the consumer receives information about the probability of (non) curtailment from e.g. the
system operator.
In (6-1), the first line represents the consumer surplus for values of n nu u< , i.e. before
fuses are activated. The second line represents the surplus for values of n nu u≥ , after
activation of the fuses. The third line represents the benefit of randomly allocated demand.
With random allocation of excessively fuse-limited demand, the probability for consumer
θ of being able to satisfy his excess demand ( , , ) ( , , )n nq p u A p kθ θ− is equal to unused fuse
capacity divided by total desired demand over fuse size:
                                                
6 Woo and Doucet et al. use the temperature variable t to describe uncertainty, and assume that
demand increases with temperature. Here a more general approach is taken.
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The numerator designates subscribed capacity not used at nu , while the denominator
equals desired demand minus fuses sizes for those customers where demand is limited by
their fuses. Provided all excess load relief is allocated, the effective system demand at
un nu is:
H
L
A( )dG S
θ
θ
⋅ = (6-3)
The optimal subscribed capacity chosen by the consumer satisfies the first order condition:
0
1 0H
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(6-4)
This equation states that the expected marginal consumer benefit in the optimum should
equal the marginal cost of acquiring an additional unit of fuse capacity. The expected
marginal benefit is reduced by the possibility of being randomly allotted excessively relieved
load when desired demand exceeds fuse size.
Using the Envelope Theorem, the derivatives of (6-1) with respect to p and k are given in
Appendix A6.1.
6.1.2 The producer problem
A constant marginal cost of generation b and capacity cost  are assumed. Furthermore, full
allocation of empty capacity at un nu  implies that demand equals available capacity in these
states. Thus producer surplus is, like in [6.5]:
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The following constraints apply:
0 n HQ S n N , u u u≥ ≤ ≤ < ≤ (6-6)
6.1.3 Welfare-optimal solution  with random allocation of excess capacity
The purpose of this section is to find optimal prices and installed capacity from a single-
owner point of view. The question will then be if this solution is feasible in a deregulated
market.
Based on the previous two sections, we can set up the Lagrangian for the problem:
0
H H
L n
N u
unu
ES( )dG E ( Q S )dFdn
θ
θ
= θ + π + α −  L (6-7)
Here the unα are the Lagrange multipliers of the constraints (6-6). The derivatives of (6-7)
are given in Appendix A6.1.
Solutions with p or Q equal to zero are of no practical interest, if they should exist. A
solution with k equal to zero does not make sense either, for then consumers would procure
fuses that were large enough for any conceivable demand, and there would be no self-
rationing. Thus an inner solutions is sought, satisfying the KKT-conditions:
0
p
∂
=
∂
L , 0
k
∂
=
∂
L , 0
Q
∂
=
∂
L .
The resulting prices can in principle be calculated, but become somewhat cumbersome to
express. Generally, in the optimal state, prices are not equal to marginal cost, and the ex ante
optimal solution will not be obtained in a market environment. Neither will the solution be
optimal ex post, because the random allocation mechanism naturally leaves consumers with
different willingness to pay, cf. [6.5], page 76.
6.2 Optimal allocation of excess capacity
An alternative to random allocation of excessive load relief is optimal allocation through
prices, i.e. the idle capacity resulting from fuse activation at un = nu is allocated to the
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consumers with highest willingness to pay. In practice, it is necessary for consumers to be
continually informed about prices (when un > nu ), and metering equipment must be in place
for continuous or at least hourly metering. Once this equipment is in place, one might ask why
spot pricing should not be used. There are several good reasons for this:
• Continuous spot pricing (8760, 17520 or even more periods per year) for all consumers
necessitates the handling of enormous amounts of data. This is because although the spot
price always equals b in the model, it will vary continuously in the real world. Spot pricing
only when there is a capacity shortage reduces this amount to just a few percents. Because
of this, cheaper solutions can be applied, both locally at the consumers place, centrally
and with respect to communication.
• Consumers may not be interested in spot pricing, but may value the option of being able to
buy electricity in excess of their ex ante obtained fuse size when a real shortage situation
occurs.
• This form for contingent spot pricing may also solve the transaction cost problem of spot
pricing. The cost of installing the additional equipment to buy power on spot conditions
during capacity shortage could be borne by those consumers who value this option most.
Under these assumptions, ES(θ) and Eπ become:
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where 0p is the optimal price when n nu u< and ( )n np u the spot price otherwise.
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The Lagrangian formally has the same definition as in (6-7), and the derivatives are again
given in Appendix A.6.1.
The set of equations describing the KKT conditions can by inspection be shown to satisfy:
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In this case 0p and k are equal to marginal costs. pn(un) equals marginal cost plus (because
n nq p∂ ∂ < 0) the amount necessary to limit demand to capacity.
Because optimal prices equal marginal costs, capacity subscription with optimal allocation
of excess load relief can in principle result in an optimal solution in a deregulated market
structure.
6.3 Implementation issues
The derivations so far do not regard necessary capacity for reserves and losses. The impact of
reserve requirements can be viewed in different ways. One viewpoint is that once suppliers
have sold a certain amount of capacity, it is their responsibility to have that amount available
during peak load conditions. Because the availability of their generators is less than 100 %,
they cannot sell capacity equalling their installed capacity. They have to sell a lower amount
and in addition should obtain the right to buy capacity from other in case of outages and/or
insure the risk of having to pay penalty payments due to failure to supply. Another viewpoint
is that a power system can not operate without some level of available reserves. Because of
the reserve requirement, it is not sufficient that available capacity equals demand. Instead,
available capacity should equal demand plus the reserve requirement, i.e. instead of (6-6):
1 0 n HQ S ( r ) n N , u u u≥ ⋅ + ≤ ≤ < ≤ (6-12)
where r is the relative reserve requirement. This also influences the definition of nu , which
becomes the value of nu where total demand plus reserve requirements is equal to installed
capacity:
(1 ) ( , , )H
L n n
r q p u dG Qθθ θ+ ⋅ =
The result of this is that (1+r)·S substitutes S in the equations. Essentially optimal capacity
Q in (6-10) equals (1+r)·S. Moreover the optimal price of capacity k in (6-10) also increases
with the factor 1+r. With a constant price ȕ for capacity this result is intuitively correct: if a
reserve requirement is imposed on the suppliers, their costs will increase with the same factor
as the reserve requirement. If the market is competitive, this cost increase should be reflected
in the market price.
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The latter viewpoint, to impose a reserve requirement on the sellers of capacity, is probably
most suitable for primary reserves because of the short time frame. This is related to the
question if capacity is to be perceived as being a (half)hourly average or a momentary value.
The former viewpoint can be applicable to reserves with a longer time frame.
Losses are a special form of demand that must be treated separately in this context. It
would be natural to think of losses as a demand by the System Operator (to be recovered by
transmission tariffs), for which the System Operator could buy the necessary capacity.
However, it is of course not possible to limit losses to some maximum level, for which the
System Operator should have bought fuses. One solution would be to treat losses in a
similar way as reserves, as shown above. In this case, a requirement would be imposed on
suppliers to supply subscripted capacity plus an estimated loss percentage. The System
Operator would have to make e.g. annual estimates of losses during peak demand.
Another issue is the distribution of capacity across the transmission network. Ideally, self-
rationing would guarantee sufficient capacity to be available, provided generators have not
oversold. However, if capacity is locked in behind a transmission bottleneck, it will not be
available to the consumer. This could for example be solved with a price area mechanism,
similar to the system used in the present Norwegian spot market.
These issues are not pursued further in the present context, but must be given due
consideration in the case of practical implementation
6.4 The use of capacity subscription in restructured power systems
Capacity subscription in a restructured power system enables the creation of a true capacity
market, where capacity during system-peak conditions is bought and sold. The essential
feature of the solution is a centrally controlled fuse device, enabling the system operator to
limit demand to subscribed capacity when generation capacity is insufficient to serve
unconstrained demand. Based on their preferences for uninterrupted supply and the price of
capacity, consumers buy their preferred amount of capacity, while generators can sell their
available capacity. The interesting feature of this solution is, that it guarantees that there
always will be enough generating capacity, under the assumption that generators do not
oversell, against which necessary measures can be taken.
Because not all consumers will reach their subscribed capacity at the instant when the
limits are activated, there will be some idle capacity after activation, representing an
economic inefficiency. Two methods have been analysed to avoid this inefficiency: random
allocation and optimal (price based) allocation of idle capacity. With random allocation,
optimal prices are generally not equal to marginal prices, with the result that a competitive
market will not find this optimum. With price based allocation, optimal prices are equal to
marginal costs for energy and capacity, and the solution is feasible in a competitive market.
Price based allocation of idle capacity requires (half)hourly metering. It can be left to the
market participants to obtain metering devices: consumers that put a high value on the
possibility of being able to buy electricity in excess of their subscribed capacity during
system-peaks, will invest in such devices, while others wont.  Typically, this will be more
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interesting for large consumers than for smaller ones. In addition to this feature, the capacity
subscription scheme requires only a moderately expensive infrastructure: the fuse device
and the communication opportunity that allows the system operator to control the device. It
can be left to the market to develop solutions to control demand efficiently at the consumers
place. If capacity prices are high, there will be a motivation to develop devices that control
demand with minimal loss of comfort, allowing consumers to buy smaller fuses. On the
other hand, if there is excess capacity, prices will be low, and consumers will prefer to
subscribe on higher levels of capacity.
Mainly from a theoretical point of view, this chapter has shown that the capacity
subscription scheme can solve the peak-capacity problem in restructured power systems. The
promising results invite to further research in the direction of practical implementation.
6.5 References
[6.1] Michael A. Crew, Chitrus S. Fernando, Paul R. Kleindorfer, The Theory of Peak-
Load Pricing: A Survey, Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1995, pp.
215-248.
[6.2] J.C. Panzar, D.S. Sibley, Public Utility Pricing under Risk: the case of self-
rationing, The American Economic Review, Vol. 68, No. 5, 1978, pp. 888-895.
[6.3] Peter M. Schwarz, Thomas N. Taylor, Public Utility Pricing under Risk: the Case of
Self-Rationing: Comments and Extension, The American Economic Review, Vol. 77,
No. 4, 1987, pp. 734-739.
[6.4] Fred C. Schweppe, Michael C. Caramanis, Richard D. Tabors, Roger E. Bohn, Spot
Pricing of Electricity, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988.
[6.5] Chi-Keung Woo, Efficient Electricity Pricing with Self-Rationing, Journal of
Regulatory Economics, Vol. 2, 1990, pp. 69-81.
[6.6] Joseph A. Doucet, Michel Roland, Efficient Self-Rationing of Electricity Revisited,
Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 5, 1993, pp. 91-100.
[6.7] Joseph A. Doucet, Kyung Jo Min, Michel Roland, Todd Straus, Electricity rationing
through a two-stage mechanism, Energy Economics, Vol. 18, pp. 247-263, 1996.
[6.8] Seong-Uh Lee, Welfare-optimal Pricing and Capacity Selection Under An Ex Ante
Maximum Demand Charge, Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 5, 1993, pp. 317-
335.
URN:NBN:no-2136
APPENDIX A.6: DERIVATIONS AND EXAMPLE 141
___________________________________________________________________________
APPENDIX A.6: DERIVATIONS AND EXAMPLE
A6.1 Derivations
Derivatives of Pre
The derivative of Pre (6-2) with respect to p is:
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where the arguments of I, A and q have been omitted for readability. I and (1-I) are positive,
A
p
∂
∂
 can be shown to negative (cf. [6.8]), 0q
p
∂
<
∂
 by assumption. This leaves an ambiguity
with respect to the sign of the first integral. However, it is plausible to assume that the fuse
sizes sensitivity on p, which is a kind of second-order effect, is less than the actual
consumptions sensitivity on p, and with this assumption the first integral is positive. qn ≥ A
when I=1, and consequently the first term of Ω1 > 0. When (1-I) > 0 and n nu u>  (because
the derivative is taken within an integral from nu  to uH, cf.(6-1)), A ≥ qn, and consequently
the second term of Ω1 < 0 and thus Ω1 > 0. Because also Ω2 > 0, 0e
Pr
p
∂
>
∂
. The intuitive
explanation of this is that a higher price p reduces demand, thus increasing the probability of
randomly receiving power when n nu u> .
The derivative of Pre (6-2) with respect to k is:
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This expression is < 0, because 0A
k
∂
<
∂
, qn ≥ A when I=1 and A ≥ qn when I=0.
Derivatives of expected consumer surplus, random allocation
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The first term represents the effect on surplus due to planned (i.e. non-randomly
allocated) consumption. The second term gives the direct effect of a price change on
randomly allocated consumption, while the third gives the effect of the price change through
the probability of being allocated excessively limited capacity. The last term represents the
effect of a price change on surplus through its effect on the instant nu of the stochastic
variable un where fuses are activated.
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The first term again represents the direct effect of a price change on planned
consumption, and second the effect of a change in k on the probability of being allocated
excessively limited capacity. The last term represents the effect of a change in k on surplus
through its effect on the instant nu of the stochastic variable un where fuses are activated.
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Derivation of L, random allocation
With random allocation (ES(θ) given by (6-1) and Eπ by (6-5)), the derivatives of (6-7)
with respect to p, k and Q are given by:
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Derivation of L, optimal allocation
With optimal allocation (ES(θ) given by (6-8) and Eπ by (6-9)), the derivatives of (6-7)
become:
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and
Q
∂
∂
L  like in (A6-7).
A6.2 Capacity Subscription and Market Operation - A Simple Example
The interaction between market operation and capacity subscription will be illustrated by
a simple example. The market organisation is similar to the Nordic market, with a 24-hour
ahead (spot) market, and an additional regulating power market. In the example, there are
two generators, each having bilateral contracts. There are no other participants in the market.
Reserve requirements are neglected, and generator availability is assumed to be 100 %. The
relevant characteristics of the generators are given in the following table.
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generator /
demand
installed
capacity (MW)
bilateral
demand (MW)
subscribed
capacity (MW)
G1 / D1 100 90 100
G2 / D2 100 120 100
1. Capacity shortage is not foreseen before spot market clearing
At this stage, it is up to the Market Operator (probably assisted by the System Operator)
to forecast the necessity of fuse activation. This situation may occur because the forecasts
made by the generators on the one hand, and the Market or System Operator on the other
hand may not be identical.
For the particular hour, G1 sells 0 MW at a price of 20 and 10 MW at a price of 30.
a) G2 buys 20 MW at a price of 30 or lower and 0 MW at a higher price.
This means G2 gambles on either fuse activation or being able to buy the deficiency
cheaper on the regulating power market. The figure below shows the market clears with a
price of 30. G1 sells 10 MW and G2 buys 10 MW.
Figure A6-2: Market cross determination, case 1.a
At some instance after spot market clearing, the System Operator decides fuse activation
is necessary. Initially, demand is limited to 90+100 = 190 MW. If the random allocation
procedure is used, 10 of the 20 MW rationed D2 will be allocated again. D2 becomes
effectively 110 MW, and there is no need for regulation. If price based allocation is used, D2
is again rationed to 100 MW. Because of this, G2 has a surplus of 10 MW to sell on the
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regulating power market, which can be bought by D2. In the figure, it is indicated how the
activation of the fuses in reality moves the bid curve of G2 inward.
b) G2 buys 20 MW at any price
There is no market cross, as shown in the next figure. The Market Operator will conclude
that it is necessary to activate fuses, and a new round of spot market clearing is carried out.
Figure A6-3: Market cross determination, case 1.b
2. Capacity shortage is foreseen before spot market clearing
This can occur either after 1.b or because the demand forecasts by the System or Market
operator indicate this situation anyway. G1 estimates his local demand to 90 MW, like
before. With random allocation, G2 cannot be certain of his final demand. In this case the
bidding behaviour may be like in 1.a. With price based allocation, G2 knows that D2 will
not exceed 100 MW. It is now up to D2 to place bids on buying back his rationed demand.
Depending on the market organization, this may be done in the spot or regulating power
market.
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Chapter 7: AVOIDING A CAPACITY DEFICIENCY  A POLICY
ANALYSIS
The discussions in Chapter 2 have shown that if left to itself, a market where generators
revenues are based on marginal cost only, is probable not to provide the generation capacity
to supply peak-demand of short duration with acceptable security. As a result, a capacity
deficiency resulting in a certain amount of random rationing can be expected. This is
expensive and socially unacceptable. The problem has been acknowledged in several market
designs, and a number of policies have been implemented to handle this problem. In this
chapter, six different policies or models will be analysed. Five of these are actually in use in
various systems, while the sixth is the capacity subscription model from the previous chapter.
In this chapter, first a number of criteria for comparison between policies will be described.
Next, the five implemented policies will be described and briefly discussed. In Section 7.3,
the various policies will be discussed and compared based on the criteria, and a conclusion
will be drawn.
7.1 Criteria for policy analysis
When comparing alternative strategies to attain societal objectives, Harvey Averch [7.1] uses
ten criteria or factors. The main strategies compared are markets and bureaus, a generic
description of regulated monopolies. These criteria are highly relevant for comparing various
solutions for the peak-load capacity problem. In the following, the criteria will be briefly
described, closely following [7.1], at the same time defining their relevance with respect to
the current problem.
Static efficiency
Static efficiency refers to the welfare-optimal match of consumption and supply, according
to classical economics obtained when marginal cost equals marginal willingness to pay. This
is the typical welfare-analysis criterion, that is given much weight in economic analysis. But
as stated in [7.1],  decision makers have little patience with considerations of efficiency,
and these are never given as much weight in actual decisions as economists believe they
should have.
Dynamic efficiency
Firms obtain static efficiency by optimally employing existing technologies and inventing
new process technologies. They also push their current production possibility frontiers
continuously outward or invent new frontiers by introducing new products. While static
efficiency is about optimality under given conditions, dynamic efficiency is about innovation
with the objective to perform better in the future. According to [7.1], p.18  economic
history and econometrics both suggest that the welfare gains from being dynamically efficient
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are much greater that those from being statically efficient. In relation to electricity generation
capacity, statically efficient strategies will provide sufficient capacity based on current
technology, while dynamically efficient strategies will give incentives to develop innovative
solutions that are cheaper and/or result in higher customer satisfaction.
In the process leading to the National Electricity Market in Australia, one of the objectives
was to encourage greater demand participation and to ensure competitive pressures to create a
more efficient electricity industry, factors that can be summed up as dynamic efficiency. The
issue of allocative (static) efficiency did not feature high in the discussions [7.13].
Invisibility
With invisible strategies, each market actor pursues his or her own objectives without
worrying about anyone elses. Perfectly competitive markets provide overall production and
consumption efficiency without anyone having to worry about attaining them. In principle,
this should also keep costs at a low level, but examples from the introduction of electricity
markets in California and the UK (retail access) suggest that this is not always the case.
Invisible strategies also allow for a high degree of free choice, normally considered superior
to strategies that involve direct command and coercion.
Robustness
The future is uncertain, which means that strategies will have to operate in environments
for which they were not designed. Robust strategies operate reasonably well in such
situations. Thus, a robust policy for peaking capacity will work reasonably well for example
when demand appears to deviate from forecasts.
Timeliness
An important aspect is the ability of a strategy to be employed at the right time. For
example in power systems with a current capacity shortage, it is necessary that a strategy can
be effectuated immediately. On the other hand, in systems with a current surplus, there is
more time to design long-term optimal policies.
Stakeholder equity
As stated in [7.1], Gains and losses in efficiency are difficult to see, but policy winners
and losers are highly visible. Consequently it is important for any chosen strategy that
stakeholder equity is taken into account. It is well known that (statically) efficient market
solutions by no means have to be equitable. An example is when prices in pure electricity spot
markets become so high that weaker groups in society are adversely affected in an
unacceptable way.
Corrigibility
As mentioned under robustness, unforeseen developments will always occur. In addition,
policies will produce some unintended and possibly harmful results. Thus, it is important that
a policy is corrigible.
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Acceptability
Strategies that perform well on most criteria may still be politically or otherwise
unacceptable in society. A relevant example is the introduction or increase of green taxes,
designed to reduce the consumption of environmentally harmful products like energy. There
are many good arguments for the introduction of such taxes, but it is often difficult to obtain
enough political acceptability. Acceptability is related to stakeholder equity and simplicity. It
is easier to introduce a policy that makes no stakeholders significantly worse off, and that is
simple to understand for the parties involved.
Simplicity
Policies that are simple and understandable are clearly preferable above complicated
strategies ceteris paribus. Too complicated policies will not work even when they are optimal
from a theoretical point of view, because the market will not understand them. This is
especially true for mass consumption products like electricity. Simple rules encourage
participation, whereas complex rules are a barrier to entry. A resulting drawback of too
complicated policies is that incumbents have a considerable advantage over new entrants
based on their experience. Thus too much complexity creates a barrier to entry.
Cost
The cost of implementation is an important aspect of each policy. It must be taken into
account when static efficiency is assessed. But even if a program is statically efficient when
transactions costs are taken into account, it may still fail to satisfy a cost criterion if initial
investment costs are very high, or if costs and benefits are unevenly distributed between
stakeholders.
In the specific case of peaking capacity in an electricity market, the following criterion is
also of great importance:
System security
The policys ability to obtain an acceptable level of system security.
7.2 Policy description
In this section, the major policies that are presently implemented in various systems are
described. A discussion of each policy in relation to the criteria in the previous section is
given in Section 7.3.
In [7.2], Jaffe and Felder argue that the benefit (increased system security) of marginal
generation capacity (used for reserves only during a small number of peak demand hours),
accrue largely to parties other than the owner of the capacity. This creates an externality,
which according to economic theory will result in underprovision in a competitive market.
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The authors discuss how to internalize this externality. They distinguish between strategies
that fix a capacity price, and let the market find the amount, and strategies that fix the amount,
and let the market find a price. They argue that one method is not inherently better than the
other, but that the results depend especially on the forms of the marginal benefit and cost
functions around the optimum. Setting the quantity at its conceived optimal level will lead to
smaller errors than price setting, if the marginal benefit is declining rapidly at its intersection
with marginal cost. In this case there is a kind of threshold, above which the marginal benefit
of capacity is low, and below which it is high. The optimum must then be near this threshold.
If on the other hand, the marginal benefit function is very flat in the vicinity of its intersection
with marginal cost, the correct optimal level of capacity depends a lot on the marginal cost
function. In such cases it would be better to fix the price. It is not evident that the marginal
benefit function shows any of these characteristics, so there is no reason to prefer any policy a
priori on these grounds.
7.2.1 Capacity Obligations
The objective of the capacity obligation policy is to ensure that the capacity levels necessary
to maintain system reliability continue to be available after restructuring.  This is a fixed
capacity strategy. Similar capacity obligations existed in the traditional market structure,
based on explicit reliability requirements, e.g.:
"Each Area's resources will be planned in such a manner that, (...) the probability of
disconnecting non-interruptible customers due to resource deficiencies, on the average,
will be no more than once in ten years." [7.6].
As such, this policy comes closest to traditional methods.
A forecast for some planning period (e.g. year, month, day-ahead) is determined to
establish the level of capacity resources that will provide an acceptable level of reliability
consistent with agreed upon standards. Based on this forecast, a requirement is established to
ensure a sufficient amount of capacity to meet the forecast load plus reserves to provide for
unit unavailability, forecasting uncertainty and planned maintenance. Specific obligations are
determined for Load Serving Entities according to some relevant criteria. As an example,
the PJM Interconnection uses the following formula for the Accounted-For Obligation for
each billing month during a planning period [7.3]:
Accounted-For Obligation = [(FSP  DF)  ALM]  FPR/100
where:
FSP - the summation of the weather-adjusted actual coincident summer peak for the
previous summer of the end-users for which the Party was responsible on that billing
day
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DF - the Diversity Factor for the Zone (a factor calculated to share the benefits of load
diversity between parties)
ALM - the active load management credits of the Party
FPR - the Forecast Pool Requirement, i.e. the amount, stated in percent, equal to one
hundred plus the percent reserve margin for the PJM Control Area.
Similar formulas are used for the other time scales. Other examples are New England [7.4]
and the New York [7.5]. A more advanced method for calculating participants obligations is
proposed in [7.7].
To comply with its capacity obligation, a participant or Load Serving Entity can either
employ its own resources (including approved forms of load management) or buy capacity
credits from other participants. Buying and selling of capacity credits between participants
can in principal take place in bilateral or centrally organized markets. The PJM
Interconnection operates Daily and Monthly Capacity Credit Markets for this purpose. The
Capacity Credit Markets permit some participants to offer to sell and other participants to bid
to buy credits to use generation capacity to meet their generation and capacity obligations.
Other examples are the monthly market for Installed Capacity and the daily market for
Operable Capacity in New England, which operated until March and June 2000 respectively.
The combination of setting a capacity obligation and creating a capacity market creates an
identifiable commercial product associated with generation adequacy [7.9]. Because market
prices may be very volatile (cf. Figure 7-1), these markets do not necessarily reduce the
uncertainty for capacity investments. The reliability level is determined centrally, so there is
no interaction between this level and the level actually desired by consumers.
Figure 7-1: Quantities and prices in the montly capacity market in New Englang (source: ISO
New England)
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7.2.2 Fixed Capacity Payment
In a market with fixed capacity payments, an ex ante determined additional payment is made
to all generation that is available during peaking hours. The objective of such payments is to
distribute the income that generators would have in the small number of hours with very high
prices throughout all the periods of operation. In the Jaffe and Felder framework, this is a
fixed price strategy.
There are two principal motivations for this approach [7.9]: partly stabilization of
generators incomes, especially for peaking units and direct promotion of an extra level of
generation adequacy by stimulating investments and discouraging early retirement. The fixed
payments may be combined with a price cap because high prices should not be necessary
when generators are partly remunerated for their investments. If the market is functioning
well (no use of market power) and the capacity payment is appropriate, the price cap should
normally not be necessary.
The main challenges for this method are to find the appropriate level of total remuneration,
and its division between generators and possibly consumers that are willing to contribute with
load shedding. In principle, total remuneration should compensate generators for costs that
they do not recover from the pool. This is not an easy criterion to use in practice, because it is
not possible to know future market prices, so it is not possible to forecast with certainty the
level of cost recovery. Moreover, it is not evident how much of their cost generators actually
should recover. If imprudent investments are made, these should obviously not be recovered,
but it is not evident how to establish the level of investment costs that should reasonably be
recovered. Given that the total level of remuneration is established, it should be distributed to
participants according to their contribution to system reliability. One way is to use an
equivalent capacity for each unit [7.10], equal to the capacity of a generator with
availability 1.0 with the same contribution to reliability.
Fixed capacity payments are presently used in Spain, Argentina, Colombia and Chile. In
Spain, the Garantía de Potencia or power guarantee was introduced as a central element in
the deregulation process [7.11]. In 1998, the level of the payment was based on 70 % of the
annual investment cost in a new combined cycle power station. Thus, a unit with these
investment costs would recover 70 % of it investment costs if it were available during all the
4500 hours the payment is made. Payment is based on past availability and not on future
guarantee. Some modifications were made in 1999, generally reducing the level of the
payments somewhat. Consumers pay for the power guarantee through an uplift on the spot
price.
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7.2.3 Dynamic Capacity Payment
A system with dynamic capacity payments has been in operation in the Pool of England and
Wales since 19901. In this Pool, generators bid prices at which they will provide electricity
throughout the following day. In addition, generators make availability declarations for each
unit for each half-hour. The day-ahead prices and availability declarations are input to a unit
commitment type optimization program to determine the minimum cost commitment and
dispatch solution, where costs are based on the generators bids. The System Marginal Price
SMP for each half-hour of the following day is the price bid of the marginal generator.
The basic idea behind the dynamic capacity payment method is that the expected marginal
cost of disruption should be reflected in the ex ante pool price. This is obtained by adding a
capacity charge CC to the System Marginal Price SMP, which depends on the actual
probability of loss of load, LOLP. The Pool Purchase Price PPP is calculated according to:
PPP SMP CC SMP LOLP (VOLL SMP )= + = + ⋅ −
where VOLL is the Value of Lost Load, set by the Director General of the Office of Electricity
Regulation (OFFER2), originally at GBP 2 per kWh and subsequently increased with the
Retail Price Index. LOLP is calculated by NGC, based on the principles outlined in Section
2.2. Generators are paid for available capacity according to
max bid priceLOLP (VOLL ( SMP, ))⋅ − , which is equal to CC for dispatched generators, and
slightly less for others, depending on their bid price (which normally is higher than SMP,
otherwise they would have been committed). Under normal, low load conditions LOLP will
be very small, and CC is zero, cf. the discussion in Section 4.3.1. When system security is
reduced due to reduced availability of capacity, LOLP increases, and CC increases. Under
specific circumstances, CC can be the dominating ingredient of PPP. On an annual basis, the
share of the capacity charge has varied considerably, but was between 10 and 20 % of the
Pool Selling Price between 1995 and 1997.
The Pool Selling Price PSP is equal to PPP plus an Uplift, which compensates generators
for reserve, plant available but not used and startup costs and ancillary services. Uplift is zero
during low load (Table B) periods, and is the only element of the spot price that is
calculated ex post.
1 A major restructuring of the England and Wales (in this connection often called UK) market takes
place in the autumn of 2000, where both the Pool and the capacity payment will be abolished, cf. [7.8].
The description here refers to the original solution.
2 In 1999, OFFER was combined with Ofgas, the Office of Gas Supply to form OFGEM, the Office of
Gas and Electricity Markets.
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 Figure 7-2: Illustration of Capacity Obligation and Fixed and Dynamic Capacity Payment
 Figure 7-2 illustrates the concepts discussed so far. Each of the three panels shows two
demand curves for high and low demand respectively. As in Chapter 3, b represents marginal
generation cost and β annualized investment cost. PMAX is available capacity, PM available
capacity minus reserves and f is a factor between 0 and 1.
With a capacity obligation, it is assumed that a capacity shortage will not occur, which
means that available capacity PM always exceeds demand. In this case, the price can always
equal marginal generation cost. Generators are paid for fixed costs in the capacity market. In
the fixed capacity payment method, some share of the investment cost β is added to marginal
cost to remunerate capacity costs. The price should be set high enough to limit demand to
available capacity, or viewed from the supply side, to guarantee sufficient capacity
investment. In the dynamic capacity payment method, the price depends on actual reliability.
Thus prices will be lower under low load conditions for the dynamic rather than for the fixed
capacity method, and higher under high load conditions.
7.2.4 Energy-Only
In an energy-only market, there are no explicit provisions to ensure (long-term) generation
adequacy. Prices are determined purely through the interaction of supply and demand, with
minimal interference. Like in other electricity markets, provisions to guarantee short-term
security are necessary in the form of ancillary service markets, but generation capacity per se
receives no separate remuneration in the spot market.
While the other models spread the cost of supply in the peak-demand periods over many
hours, in the energy-only model prices are only affected by this cost in the hours where
marginal peaking capacity is price-setting.
If peak demand is supplied by some specific generation technology with low investment
but high marginal cost, this unit can only generate a positive profit if price is above its
marginal cost for a number of hours. This technology would have to set price at a level that
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covers it fixed costs during these hours3. If the market is in doubt if such prices can occur,
investment will not take place. If demand is inelastic, involuntary load shedding will be the
result.
The energy-only market requires least governance and reliance on non-market procedures,
and consequently the possibilities for distortions are fewer than in other market structures.
Energy-only markets are operating in Norway and California4.
7.2.5 Proxy market prices
Other things being equal, it is natural to assume that the probability of capacity shortage is
greatest in energy-only markets. Thus, especially in such markets it is imperative to design
mechanisms to handle capacity shortages. One mechanism is to determine an administrative
proxy market price to be used when the market does not clear. This may be viewed as an
extension of the energy-only market, but it is treated as a separate policy, especially because
of the extension proposed in [7.12], and explained below.
The proxy market price may be viewed in two ways: as a surrogate default bid,
representing the price at which customers will be indifferent to having their loads curtailed, or
as a price cap on the market price [7.14]. A purely surrogate-bid view focuses on ensuring
that the price is set to a financially appropriate value (i.e. the best estimate of the value of lost
load for the consumers concerned) during involuntary load shedding.  There would be no
consideration of whether load shedding could have been avoided by raising the price, or
whether risk management considerations required it to be reduced. In a purely price-cap
perspective, focus is on minimizing the need for intervention to achieve a desired level of
reliability consistent with maintaining tolerable levels of economic risk for market
participants. A too low price would result in too frequent market intervention, while a too
high price might make it impossible to hedge risk, rendering the market inviable.
The surrogate-bid paradigm would be relevant if it was concluded that the market would
not be capable of consistently clearing without intervention. It would help ensure a financially
appropriate price was applied when the inevitable intervention occurred. If on the other hand,
it was expected that the market would eventually be able to clear consistently and efficiently,
provided it was given sufficient price freedom, the price cap paradigm becomes the more
appropriate approach.
Administrative prices are used for handling capacity shortage in Sweden and in the
National Electricity Market in Australia5. Sweden uses a price of SEK 3000 (USD 360) per
3 With annual gas turbine costs of, say USD 40/kW and an expected annual number of 10 hours
where the gas turbine is price setting, the price would have to be equal to USD 4/kWh, the order of
magnitude of the Value of Lost Load in many systems.
4 The Californian market has a price cap of USD 250/MWh, and consequently strictly belongs in the
next section. However, the price cap in California is of a more general character, not primarily
designed as a last resort to use when the market does not clear. The Norwegian market does not
have any formally stated price caps.
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MWh6 in the regulating power market when there is a risk of shortage, and SEK 9000/MWh
when consumers are actually disconnected. The National Energy Market in Australia
presently uses a price of AUD 5000 (USD 3200) per MWh, but an escalation to AUD
20000/MWh by April 2002 has been proposed.
When a situation where a (day-ahead or real-time) market does not clear arises, there must
be one or several market participants that do not have the contractual or physical resources to
meet their obligations. They will bid in the market for their deficiency, and if there are
insufficient supply offers, the market will not clear. For example, a trader may have a supply
contract with a capacity limit, but an obligation to sell to general demand without such a limit
(a common situation in the Norwegian market). Ideally, customers of this trader should be
disconnected, and there would be a settlement between the trader and his customers that
would not affect the other market participants. However, in a deregulated market, there will
often be no direct connection between supplier and consumer. Combined with the fact that
these relations are changing constantly, it is impossible to only disconnect consumers buying
from the supplier causing the deficit. Thus, if load shedding is necessary, random consumers
will be affected. The market participants causing the imbalance may be affected, but this is by
no means guaranteed, depending on where and how load shedding is performed. The agents
with a contractual deficit should be obliged to buy this deficit on the (day-ahead or real-time)
market at the prevailing (administrative) price to expose them to the proper risk. Thus, as
suggested in [7.12], the correct volume of disconnected demand should be estimated, and the
responsible suppliers should pay the proxy market price to make up for their imbalance7. This
is not an easy task, because demand that has been disconnected cannot be measured, but
reasonable procedures to estimate demand can be established in the market rules. Ideally, the
amount paid by the responsible suppliers should be used to compensate the consumers
involved. With the appropriate level of the proxy price, this procedure should create the
necessary incentives for all parties to ensure a positive balance also during extreme demand
conditions.
Thus, a proxy market price is determined. This price balances the considerations between
being economically representative in case of load shedding on the one hand and avoiding
unacceptable financial risk for market participants on the other hand. When the market does
not clear, the proxy price becomes the effective market price. All market participants that sell
power on the relevant market receive this price. Participants that buy power pay this price. An
estimate is made of the amount of load shedding, which is included in the balance for each
market participant8.
5 The National Electricity Market in Australia also has a reliability safety net that gives the System
Operator additional powers if system security is threatened.
6 USD exchange rates in this Section reflect the December 1999 level.
7 The resulting demand function is similar to the inelastic demand function introduced in Section 3.3.3.
8 A complication occurs because of the need for reserves. All participants can have a non-negative
energy balance, but there may be no capacity available for reserves. One way to solve this problem is
to use an option-like market for reserves, similar to  the one introduced in Norway in 2000. With this
solution, the System Operator buys the right to use capacity for reserve purposes when this is deemed
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7.3 Policy discussion
We are now in a position to compare the various policies from the previous section with
respect to the criteria in Section 7.1. To facilitate the comparison, this is done on a criterion
basis.
7.3.1 Static efficiency
Static efficiency is about maximizing welfare in the economic sense, expressed by the
society view expression:
0
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n m nm
n
p ,Q ,q
q
n n m mn u
m m
W
( P ( q',u, )dq' C ( q',u,m ) )dq' dFdGdn Qθ
=
θ − − β     (7-1)
The same symbol definitions apply as in Chapter 6. n is the time variable, θ the consumer
type, u the stochastic variable and qn(p,un,θ) demand of consumer θ in period n. Pn(⋅) and
Cn(⋅) are consumer marginal willingness to pay and marginal cost of generation respectively.
Qm and m are the amount of installed capacity and the annual fixed cost of technology m, and
qnm is the generation in period n by technology m. pn is the price in period n. A general multi-
period multi-technology model is described in [7.15], but will not be pursued further here.
In the capacity obligation model, Qm is chosen based on a load forecast and reliability
requirements. Most of the literature referred in Section 3.2 concludes that in such cases
optimal prices in peak load periods must be in excess of marginal cost. However, if the
market is competitive, prices will be driven down to marginal costs. The shadow price of the
reliability constraint will never be positive, because the whole point of the model is to avoid
this situation. Capacity costs are remunerated in the capacity market. Given the continued use
of traditional methods, there is a significant chance that the traditional methods will continue
to result in too high a level of total capacity.
In the fixed capacity payment model, an addition to marginal cost f is used under peak
load, where 0 < f  1, which in principle is in accordance with the theory for a regulated
system. However, in a deregulated system it is left to the market to determine Qm, which may
necessary, e.g. on a seasonal basis. When extreme demand is expected, the System Operator will
notify the market that the option will be exercised, and the sellers of these options, cannot use this
capacity in the energy market. Thus, the proxy price mechanism will be active in the energy market,
while there are sufficient reserves available. The analysis in Chapter 4 shows that it may be better to
reduce the reserve requirements in such cases.
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result in values under or over the optimal level if the fixed charge is not adapted or too late
adapted to changing conditions.
In the dynamic capacity payment model, a variable addition to marginal cost cc(u) is used,
which depends on the current status of the system. Although this resulting price is not a
market determined price, it still contains a theoretically correct element regarding capacity
shortage, if it is assumed that the calculation of LOLP is sound and that VOLL mirrors
consumers real losses of being disconnected. cc(u) depends both on demand and generation
availability, and will generally depend on the margin between installed capacity and peak
demand. This model is thus statically more efficient than the capacity obligation and fixed
payment models.
The static efficiency of the energy-only model depends very much on the real elasticity of
demand. If demand is elastic under all circumstances, the model actually represents a spot
market, which is statically efficient9. If, on the other hand, demand is not very elastic in the
short run, and only random rationing can be used to maintain system security, the model is not
very efficient.
The proxy market price model addresses this point. In this case, prices in the case of
market failure due to capacity shortage are clearly defined, and the market players can
anticipate these prices. In the sense of the problem statement (7-1), the problem is infeasible if
a capacity shortage occurs, and is made feasible by introducing a proxy market price. To be
statically efficient, the proxy price must reflect the real willingness to pay of the marginal
disconnected consumer. It is clear that this is not possible, because this price will be situation
dependent. Finally, rationed demand must be estimated, resulting in another source of
inefficiency. Thus, this model is statically less efficient.
The capacity subscription model with optimal allocation of excess capacity has been
shown statically efficient in Chapter 6. With random allocation, this strategy is not efficient.
However, the degree of inefficiency is probably less in the latter two models than in the
capacity obligation and payment models, because inefficiency only occurs when there is
actually a shortage, normally a small number of hours.
7.3.2 Dynamic efficiency
In the capacity obligation model, suppliers have an incentive to introduce demand side
participation, as long as this gives them a credit in view of their obligation (which it does
explicitly e.g. in the PJM model). This is especially so because it will be very expensive to
satisfy the obligation by investing in peak load capacity with a very short load factor.
In the fixed capacity payment model, there is little incentive to introduce innovative
solutions. Suppliers are paid for available capacity anyway. In both these models, it may be
difficult to define the demand side contribution exactly, which is important because this has a
direct impact on the parties economic result. This may reduce the degree of demand side
9 Network effects, that potentially can have a negative effect on the spot market efficiency, are not
taken into account in this argument.
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participation. In neither of these models, the demand side is directly motivated to take
innovative solutions into use, this is only done indirectly when approached by suppliers.
The dynamic capacity payment model may occasionally (depending on available capacity)
result in high spot prices. If many consumers directly pay spot prices, they have an incentive
to reduce demand in such periods. However, the model has no special properties to make
consumers buy on the spot market. Consequently, neither of these three models has a strong
dynamic efficiency with respect to involving the demand side.
In the energy-only model, consumers may be involuntary rationed. To avoid the negative
effects of this, consumers with a high value of lost load may invest in backup power supply
solutions. This may create some innovative development in this field, but it is difficult to see
that this will be a great effect. However, in systems with an energy-only market, there will be
a necessity to take measures to avoid involuntary rationing. If one wants to preserve the
energy-only system, the proxy market price model is a logical next step. This model motivates
all parties with a balance obligation to search for cost-effective solutions to ensure balance
during peak-load conditions to avoid buying at the high administrative market price.
The capacity subscription model offers the greatest opportunity for innovative solutions, if
implemented with this objective. This can be realized in the following way:
• A basic, simple and relatively cheap fuse device and communication solution is
implemented for all consumers. The fuse, once activated, operates as a conventional fuse:
it blows, reducing demand to zero. The consumer must manually reduce demand below
his fuse size, before he can switch on the fuse again. The communication solution is also
very simple: it only has to support a signal activating or deactivating the fuse.
• Consumers who find this basic solution unattractive can, as an alternative to buying more
fuse capacity invest in a number of technological solutions that keep demand below fuse
size in the way that best suits their preferences.
Thus, the capacity subscription model creates a demand for innovative solutions from the
consumer side, in contrast to the other models.
7.3.3 Invisibility
Invisibility implies that market actors make their own, free choices, while market externalities
are internalized in the market structure. Ideally, there are no externalities left  they have all
been internalized.
The capacity obligation model is very visible: instead of leaving it to the market agents
to decide how much to invest in generation capacity, a rigid control of their forecasted
balance coerces each agent to have a positive balance.
The capacity payment models, the energy-only model and the proxy market price model
are all invisible. This is typical for models relying on prices instead of volume control.
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Also the capacity subscription model is invisible in this context: a market structure is
defined, and it is up to the market agents to act within this structure. There is no control of
volumes.
7.3.4 Robustness
From an engineering point of view, the capacity obligation model is probably most robust. It
is more or less a continuation of methods from the past, which have proven to result in high
levels of reliability. In this sense, the robustness of all other policies is more uncertain,
because there is there is no long experience with any of them10. Clearly, when it comes to
engineering robustness, control policies are more certain to satisfy their objectives than
price-based solutions.
From an economic point of view, a robust solution will perform satisfactory in economic
terms, even if conditions ex post turn out to be different from the ex ante anticipations. From
this point of view, price-based policies are more robust, especially if prices can react on
changing conditions. So in economic terms, the capacity obligation model is the least robust,
followed by the fixed capacity payment model. The dynamic capacity model is more robust,
because the capacity payment varies according to the circumstances. The energy-only model
is robust if demand is sufficiently elastic. If not, it may not be very robust when available
capacity becomes a binding constraint. The proxy market price model attempts to promote
demand elasticity by using very high prices if there is a shortage. If this solution is to be
robust, the proxy price must be adapted to the actual circumstances, which can be difficult.
The capacity subscription model is robust in economic terms: capacity (fuse) prices will
adjust to ensure balance between supply and demand capacity.
7.3.5 Timeliness
The criterion of timeliness is important when a capacity shortage is actually threatening in the
short term, like Sweden.
The energy-only market is the easiest and quickest to implement  actually it will be the
point of departure in many cases. Proxy market prices can also be implemented quickly,
although some time is needed to build the structure and the systems to ration demand as
effectively as possible11, to estimate rationed demand ex post, to measure or estimate each
market players net obligations during a shortage etc.
10 The dynamic capacity payment model has been used in England and Wales for 10 years, and there
has been no capacity shortage. As discussed earlier, it is unclear if this is because or in spite of this
model. The energy-only model has been in operation in Norway for 9 years, but because of the huge
capacity surplus when the market was restructured, the Norwegian experience offers no evidence if an
energy-only model is sustainable in the long run.
11 Although random rationing is used, efforts should be made to ration as little demand as possible,
while keeping system security at a satisfactory level. This is not a trivial task.
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The capacity obligation and payment models need more overhead in the form of
organization and software, and take some more time to implement. For the former model,
additional time is required to allow the market participants to make appropriate arrangements,
depending on the pre-restructuring situation.
The capacity subscription model requires most time to be implemented because all
consumers must be involved to make the policy effective. This can be a long-term objective,
while other policies are used in the short term.
7.3.6 Stakeholder equity
Before discussing stakeholder equity, it is necessary to define the relevant stakeholders, in
this case:
• Small and medium-sized consumers
• Large industrial consumers
• Power producers
• System Operator
The difference between small and medium-sized consumers on the one hand and large
industrial consumers on the other is that for the former electricity normally will constitute
only a small share of their budget, while it is a substantial part for the latter group.
Consequently, large industrial consumers have other conditions and a more explicit policy
with regard to electricity purchases. The primary interest of the System Operator is to be able
to operate the system within the reliability standards that have been defined. Although there
are many more actors in the power market (e.g. distributors, traders, brokers), these are
probably neutral as to what capacity model is chosen.
The next table summarizes these stakeholders position with respect to the various policies.
This is a very rough description, because the real effect will depend on the actual situation
(surplus or deficit) and implementation details.
small/medium
consumers
large
consumers
producers System
Operator
capacity
obligation
- - + +
fixed capacity
payment
- - + o
dynamic capacity
payment
o o o o
energy-only o/- o/- o -
proxy market
price
+ + o +
capacity
subscription
o + + o
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The capacity obligation model is attractive for producers, because it guarantees payment
for capacity, even though this is market-based, which should result in low prices if there is
excess capacity and the market is competitive. For consumers, it is negative, because it adds
an extra cost element, which should not be necessary. It maintains the old situation where
consumers preferences are decided on behalf of them, instead of letting consumers reveal
their preferences. The system operator can build on the long experience that this model
provides sufficient reliability.
The fixed capacity payment model is less attractive for consumers, depending on tariff and
metering details. If the cost is transferred to consumers as part of a pure energy kind of tariff,
this is an expensive solution for consumers, especially consumers with a high load factor. A
form of demand charge at least gives consumers an opportunity to affect their capacity costs,
but demand charges do not give very good price signals, as discussed earlier. For producers
this is an attractive option, because it covers a substantial share of their investment in peaking
capacity.
The dynamic capacity payment model roughly has the same effect as the fixed payment
model. If it can be easily manipulated by producers, it is more attractive to them, but
otherwise it is probably somewhat less attractive to producers, because is leaves more
uncertainty. Because the charge is situation dependent, it may result in either higher or lower
total payments than in the fixed case for consumers.
The situation of the system operator is uncertain for both capacity payment models,
because it is uncertain to what degree this model really will bring enough capacity to the
market place to ensure traditional reliability criteria.
The proxy market price model is attractive for most consumers because it reduces the
probability of involuntary load shedding. The effect may be more ambiguous for large
consumers buying part of their demand on the spot market. For producers, the model may be
less attractive, because they can be exposed to high prices if they have imbalances in their
contract portfolio. The model is attractive for the System Operator, because it provides the
instruments that are necessary to use rationing to maintain system security.
The capacity subscription model is in principle attractive for consumers, because it allows
them to tailor their purchases of electricity to their preferences for energy and quality of
supply, cf. Section 3.4. Small consumers may perceive the increased complexity as negative,
while this should not be a problem for large consumers. Also for producers it should be
attractive, because it offers the opportunity to receive capacity payments. For the System
Operator, the model is attractive from a system security point of view, but may be perceived
as problematic due to increased complexity, at least in a transitional phase.
Finally, there may be a difference between real and perceived effects, especially for small
consumers. For example may incidental rationing due to capacity shortage be perceived as
extremely negative, while the positive effect of overall lower prices may not even be noticed.
The same is true for capacity subscription: some will argue that consumers have to pay for
peaking capacity that they previously got free. Although that is clearly not true, it may be
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difficult to convince consumers and politicians of the advantage: overall lower cost, which is
difficult to prove in an easy-to-understand way.
7.3.7 Corrigibility
Most of the policies discussed are corrigible: for all payment or price-based policies, these
prices can easily be adjusted12, and it is relatively easy to change to a different policy. The
capacity obligation model is somewhat less corrigible  if too much capacity is built, there is
no way to reduce capacity economically ex post. In the longer run however, the level of
obligation can be adjusted. The least corrigible model is the capacity subscription model. If
this model should turn out to be infeasible after it has been implemented, the investments in
communication and fuse technologies and software have been made, and are effectively
sunk. These investments are much higher than for the other price/payment-based policies.
7.3.8 Acceptability
Acceptability of the various policies is probably related to simplicity and perceived
stakeholder equity. Generally, it is very difficult to judge the policies on this criterion. The
results are very dependent on implementation details and the ability to communicate a
policys advantageous properties to politicians and the public. In this respect it will be most
acceptable to implement policies that result in few changes from status quo, like the capacity
obligation and capacity payment models.
7.3.9 Simplicity
The simplest model is clearly the energy-only model. The fixed capacity payment model is
also rather simple, though some complication occurs through the definition of availability and
the way the payments are transferred from consumer to producer. The dynamic capacity
payment model is more complicated, because it depends on rather complicated calculations of
the Loss Of Load Probability. The proxy market price model is comparatively simple, but has
some complicating elements that have been discussed. The capacity obligation model is rather
complicated: forecasts must be made, obligation must be divided between parties, audits may
be necessary etc. As an example, a considerable amount of paper is used to describe the
requirements in the PJM and New England markets.
Clearly, the most complicated solution is the capacity subscription model. A number of
organizational, hardware and software constructions have to be in place, and all parties in the
market are involved, not at least all households.
12 Even if price adjustment is easy and relatively cheap, too frequent adjustments can have a adverse
effect on the policy itself. If the level of the fixed capacity payment is varied regularly and
unpredictably, the market will no longer see it as a fixed payment.
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7.3.10 Implementation cost
The cost of a policy depends on the starting point from which it is initiated. The natural
starting point is the traditionally organized power sector, where small (domestic) consumers
pay a fixed charge plus energy tariff, while commercial and industrial consumers often pay a
form of demand charge in addition.
From this starting point, the energy only policy entails low costs, viewed from the capacity
point of view. Existing metering equipment can be used like before and few costly measures
have to be taken by the System Operator. However, this depends somewhat on the degree of
sophistication of rationing policies, which are a necessary part of this strategy. The proxy
market price model is slightly more expensive, because an organizational structure must be
built around the administration of these prices. Total costs depend heavily on how the market
agents hedge the risk of having to pay the high administrative price, e.g. by investing in
generation equipment or by activating the demand side.
The capacity obligation and payment solutions bring with them a relatively high cost of
administration. This is probably especially true for the obligation model: system forecasts
must be made, and obligations must be defined, calculated, audited and verified
The highest initial cost is probably incurred by the capacity subscription model, because a
controllable fuse and communication solution has to be installed for all consumers. Although
relatively simple solutions can be used, and mass production will reduce prices, the total
number of consumers is high and will require a high cost. It is difficult to use this model only
for some sectors of consumers, because this creates inequality between consumers who have
to pay for peak demand, and others who do not13. Still, in a transitional phase, a partial
introduction could be acceptable. There could also be an exception for consumers with a
(standard) fuse below a certain level.
7.3.11 System security
An important issue is the effectiveness of the various policies in maintaining an acceptable
level of system security. This is a difficult question, because it is not altogether clear what an
acceptable level of security should be. One possibility is to use the traditional criteria, based
on engineering judgement (e.g. 0.1 days of loss of load due to capacity shortage per year),
but many economists have argued that this is an unnecessary high level of reliability. So a
rephrasing of the criterion could be a policys effectiveness to maintain an agreed upon level
of system security. From a market economics point of view, the best result would be obtained
if each consumer could select his or her optimal level of security, given a market price for
energy and security. This would make the question of the level of security superfluous,
because it would be the result of market forces.
The capacity obligation policy is probably best at maintaining agreed levels of security,
because it controls the amount of capacity directly, and criteria are based on many years of
13 There is precedence though for this model in the existing use of demand charges for commercial
customers only.
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experience. The fixed capacity payment policy can also obtain a high level of security, if only
the payment is set high enough, but there is a risk of too high a level, even after traditional
criteria. The effect of the dynamic capacity payment model is more uncertain, which is also
the case for the proxy market price model. While the former probably will not result in too
high levels of security (because payments will become very low when such a situation is
approaching), the latter may have this result, because the threat of extremely high prices may
motivate overinvestment, even if the probability is small. In the energy only model, there is
no way to control the level of installed capacity, and therefore, the level of security.
Finally, the capacity subscription model comes close to the ideal situation, where
consumers can select their desired level of security by buying fuse capacity. So even if this
model may not obtain the traditional level of security, it comes much closer to an optimal
level. At the same time, the model legitimizes the use of (fuse based) rationing, which is
barely if at all acceptable in the energy only model. This is an example of how technology
progress (in metering and communications) can change the originally public good of security
into a private good, cf. Section 3.2.3.
7.3.12 Policy analysis summary
Table 7-1 on the next page summarizes the discussions from Sections 7.3.1 to 7.3.11, as far as
this can be done with a single good (+), satisfactory (o), poor (-) indicator.
Table 7-1: Summary policy evaluation
obligation fixed
payment
dynamic
payment
energy
only
proxy
prices
capacity
subscription
static
efficiency
- - o - o +
dynamic
efficiency
- - - - o +
invisibility - o o + o +
robustness
  engineering
  economic
+
-
o
-
o
o
-
-
-
o
+
+
timeliness o o o + + -
stakeholder
equity
- - + o o 0
corrigibility o o + + + -
acceptability + + o o o -
simplicity - + o + o -
cost o o o + + -
system
security
+ o o - o +
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As could be expected, and was clear from the previous discussions, there is no clear best
policy. Policies that perform well on some criteria perform poorly on other. However, by
analyzing the results systematically according to various criteria, some tendencies become
clear.
The simplest way to analyse the results numerically, is to assign the characteristics +, - and
o numeral values of 1, -1 and 0 respectively, and adding the values for each policy. This gives
the following result:
Table 7-2: Policy ranking; simple summation of criteria
obligation fixed
payment
dynamic
payment
energy
only
proxy
prices
capacity
subscription
points -3 -3 0 1 4 0
ranking 5 5 3 2 1 3
Alternatively, one can look at which policy performs best on most criteria, or worst on
least:
Table 7-3: Policy ranking; best on number of criteria
obligation fixed
payment
dynamic
payment
energy
only
proxy
prices
capacity
subscription
points 3 2 2 5 4 5
ranking 4 5 5 1 3 1
Table 7-4: Policy ranking; worst on number of criteria
obligation fixed
payment
dynamic
payment
energy
only
proxy
prices
capacity
subscription
points -6 -5 -2 -4 0 -5
ranking 6 4 2 3 1 4
This analysis assumes equal weights on the criteria. This may not be realistic, but on the
other hand, it is not possible to give generally valid weights. If there already is a capacity
deficiency, there is little time and it is natural to resort to methods that ensure reliability in the
short run, i.e. the system security criterion is given much weight. On the other hand, in a
system with ample capacity, static or dynamic efficiency will be given more weight.
The obligation and fixed payment policies are the two worst on all three simple ranking
methods. Specifically, these methods perform badly on market efficiency criteria  essentially
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they are not market-based policies14. The proxy prices policy is among the two best on all
ranking methods. The dynamic payment is middle of the road, while energy only and
capacity subscription are both best and worst, depending on the ranking method. However,
the energy only method is disqualified, because it does not satisfy the system security
requirement.
The proxy prices policy is a reasonable policy on most criteria. It is relatively easy, cheap
and quick to implement. Because there is little experience with the method so far, there is
some uncertainty with respect to if it is effective. One can anticipate, that the threat of having
to buy power at rationing prices will motivate suppliers to avoid coming in a buying position
in such cases, and that this will stimulate the adaptation of innovative solutions, especially on
the demand side.
The capacity subscription policy looks very promising on the issues of efficiency,
robustness and system security, but there is a considerable threshold to the introduction of this
policy, which is caused by costs and complexity.
Concluding, in an early stage after restructuring it may be appropriate to resort to the
capacity obligation or payment method if the capacity balance is tight at the time of transition.
For the medium term, or if there is ample capacity initially, it is sensible to introduce proxy
market prices to transfer the risk of a capacity deficit to market participants, with due
attention to the appropriate price level. If there are signs that proxy market prices are not able
to guarantee reliability, a long time objective can be to adapt capacity subscription, possibly
building on an infrastructure already initiated, e.g. at the distribution level. The main reasons
for moving towards capacity subscription are the efficiency gains, that are not the least caused
by the possibility of consumers selecting their own levels of reliability.
7.4 References
[7.1] Harvey Averch, Private Markets and Public Intervention, University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1990.
[7.2] Adam B. Jaffe, Frank A. Felder, Should Electricity Markets Have a Capacity
Requirement? If So, How Should It Be Priced?, The Electricity Journal, December
1996, pp. 52-60.
[7.3] Reliability Assurance Agreement among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Control
Area, Schedule 7, updated September 19, 2000 [cited 2000-10-30]. Available from
Internet <http://www.pjm.com/index.html>
14 This view is supported in [7.16] for the obligation model: The capacity markets are a holdover from
the regulated setting, when capacity decisions were not made in response to price expectations. (...)
once competitive electricity markets are established in New England, it would be appropriate for the
capacity markets to terminate.
URN:NBN:no-2136
Avoiding a capacity deficiency  a policy analysis 168
___________________________________________________________________________
[7.4] Composite Restated New England Power Pool Agreement, Forty-Second
Amendment, Attachment 2, Section 12 [cited 2000-10-30]. Available from Internet
<http://www.iso-ne.com/main.html>
[7.5] Final Installed Capacity Manual, posted 3/31/2000 [cited 2000-10-30]. Available
from Internet <http://www.nyiso.com/markets/>
[7.6] Basic Criteria for Design and Operation of Interconnected Power Systems,
Northeast Power Coordinating Council, Document A-2, August 9, 1995 [cited 2000-
10-30]. Available from Internet <http://www.npcc.org/>
[7.7] Narayan S. Rau, Assignment of Capability Obligation to Entities in Competitive
Markets  The Concept of Reliability Equity, IEEE Transaction on Power Systems,
Vol. 14, Nr. 3, pp. 884-889, August 1999.
[7.8] Richard Green, Draining the Pool: the reform of electricity trading in England and
Wales, Energy Policy, Vol. 27, 1999, pp 515-525.
[7.9] I.J. Pérez-Arriaga, Reliability and Generation Adequacy, in Reliability in the New
Market Structure, Part 1, IEEE Power Engineering Review, Vol. 19, Nr. 12, pp. 4-14,
December 1999.
[7.10] Juan J. Alba, The Spanish electricity pool, EES-EUTP Electricity Markets,
Fundamentals and International Experiences, Porto, Portugal, 26-30 October, 1998.
[7.11] J.L. Fernández González, G. González Morales, Analysis of long term supply
guarantee in the Spanish power system. Capacity payment and alternatives,
DistribuTech Europe, Madrid, Spain, 28-30 September, 1999.
[7.12] Lennart Söder, Who should be responsible for generation capacity addition,
International Conference on Electric Utility Deregulation and Restructuring and Power
Technologies 2000, London, England, 4-7 April 2000.
[7.13] Hugh Gleeson, A Retailers Perspective Of Australias National Electricity Market -
Where it has come from and where it is going, presented at CIGRE Study Committee
38 Colloquium Experience with Electricity Markets, Perth, Australia, 29 September
1999.
[7.14] Review of VoLL in the national electricity market, Issues Paper from the Australian
National Electricity Code Administrator of 12 May 1999 [cited 1999-12-08].
Available from Internet <http://www.neca.com.au/>
[7.15] Michael A. Crew, Paul R. Kleindorfer, Public Utility Economics, The Macmillan
Press Ltd., London, 1979
[7.16] Peter Cramton, Robert Wilson, A Review of ISO New Englands Proposed Market
Rules, ISO FERC Filing On The Market, NE Markets Review, September 9, 1998
[cited 2999-12-08]. Available from Internet <http://www.iso-ne.com/main.html>
URN:NBN:no-2136
Conclusions 169
___________________________________________________________________________
Chapter 8: CONCLUSIONS
The point of departure for this thesis has been a restructured power system with an energy-
only market solution  i.e. a market solution without explicit mechanisms to promote
investment in peaking capacity. The focus of the work is on the mature power systems in
highly industrialized countries with slow growth. Based on power system reliability theory on
the one hand, and the effects of uncertainty and risk aversion on the other, it has been shown
that in an energy-only market, it is impossible to guarantee the availability of the traditional
level of generation capacity. To some extent, most obviously in Sweden, this is confirmed
empirically.
I.
In a restructured power system with an energy-only market solution, it is not
possible to guarantee traditional levels of system security.
Because it is not possible to guarantee the level of security, rationing cannot be ruled out.
Traditional pricing theory also shows that optimal solutions do have a certain level of
rationing. Random rationing is expensive and socially unacceptable.
II.
Some form of rationing during peaking conditions is unavoidable in an
energy-only market. To make this acceptable and efficient, it must be
voluntary and price based.
Consumers have different preferences for the use of electricity and its reliability. This is
confirmed by surveys where consumers are asked to value uninterrupted supply. Traditional
systems do not normally consider these differences. This is partly due to technological
reasons: until recently, it has been difficult or at least very expensive to differentiate
reliability. However, probably there has also been too much emphasis on a one-size-fits-all
supply side oriented attitude.
III.
A more efficient electricity market will be obtained if differences in consumer
preferences with respect to reliability are taken into account.
An important role of peaking capacity is to act as reserve capacity to support system
security. Theoretically, the level of security in a power system should be such that the
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marginal cost of increasing this level equals the marginal benefit from lower outage costs.
Due to the complexity of the system and the uncertainty with respect to both costs and
benefits, this theoretically sound principle is not used as a practical guideline. Over time, a
number of criteria based on engineering judgement have developed, e.g. a Loss of Load
Probability due to generation capacity deficiency of less than 0.1 days per year. These criteria
are met by requiring that certain levels of reserves are maintained in power systems.
However, there is no one-to-one relationship between reserve levels and system security. In
many situations, the required level of security could be obtained with lower reserve levels,
especially if demand can be controlled quickly and efficiently.
IV.
By actively taking user preferences into account with respect to the security of
supply and using efficient solutions for load control, the need for generation
capacity is reduced. However, sufficient generation capacity must be kept
available to avoid system collapse.
V.
Reserve requirements are an indirect way to ensure system reliability. The
need for reserves and, consequently, peaking capacity can be reduced by
targeting reliability measures like the Loss of Load Probability LOLP or
Expected Energy not Served EENS directly. Research should be directed at the
development of tools and methods for maintaining acceptable reliability
without the use of fixed reserve levels.
It is reasonable that generators are paid for the provision of ancillary services (activities
that pertain to the provision of all electric services necessary for efficient and reliable
generation, transmission and delivery of active power). Efficient resource utilization
suggests market based solutions insofar as market power problems can be avoided. In this
thesis, a solution with explicit markets for three ancillary services is presented, where the
markets for energy and the ancillary services clear simultaneously. Test calculations show
that a market for ancillary services increases generator revenues and thus the profitability of
investments in generator capacity. However, the increase is offset by a certain reduction in the
energy price.
VI.
Markets for ancillary services are a tool for the efficient provision of these
services. They provide some increased revenue for generators, but this is
probably not enough to secure sufficient investment in generation capacity
Peaking capacity is needed to ensure uninterrupted supply during infrequent occasions of
high demand. The kernel of the capacity balance problem in a restructured market is that
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prices do not reflect short-term market conditions. Consequently, consumers will not reduce
their demand regardless of the spot price level, and random rationing becomes the only
solution to reduce demand. An innovative solution to the problem is the introduction of
capacity subscription. Each consumer subscribes on the level of capacity he/she prefers to use
during system peak conditions, by buying a fuse limiting demand to this level. The fuses
are activated by the System Operator only when unconstrained demand would exceed
available capacity. Capacity is traded on a capacity market, and prices will reflect market
conditions. The interesting features of this solution are that the demand for capacity will
reflect consumers real preferences for reliability during peaking conditions, and that the
consumer can weigh the procurement of capacity against advanced load control devices.
Thus, this solution promotes the demand-driven development of innovative solutions.
VII.
Capacity subscription
• guarantees that demand + reserve requirements will not exceed generation
during peak conditions
• is the only way to create a market for capacity, where consumer
preferences for reliability together with the cost of supply directly
determine the market price for capacity
• promotes the development of innovative solutions for load control
A number of policies have been implemented around the world to ensure power system
reliability through the availability of sufficient generation capacity. A comparison was made
between the following:
• capacity obligation
• fixed capacity payment
• dynamic capacity payment
• energy-only
• proxy market price
• capacity subscription
The energy-only method was included for reference. It is not an acceptable policy, because
it does not satisfy the requirement of system security.
No policy is optimal on all criteria. The obligation and fixed payment policies perform
badly on market efficiency criteria  essentially, they are not market-based policies. The
dynamic capacity payment method has some attractive properties, but depends on a pool-
based market solution. The calculation of the payment is opaque, and it is probably prone to
market power problems.
The proxy prices policy has many attractive properties. It is cheap and can be implemented
quickly. Because there is little experience with the method so far, there is some uncertainty
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with respect to whether it is effective. A condition for this is that market participants with a
deficiency actually are made to pay for this deficiency in the case of rationing.
The capacity subscription policy looks very promising on the issues of efficiency,
robustness and system security, but there is a considerable threshold to the introduction of this
policy, which is caused by costs and complexity.
VIII.
In an early stage after restructuring, it may be appropriate to resort to the
capacity obligation or payment method if the capacity balance is tight at the
time of transition. For the medium term, or if there is ample capacity initially,
it is sensible to introduce proxy market prices to transfer the risk of a capacity
deficit to market participants, with due attention to the appropriate price level.
Capacity subscription can be the long-term objective. The main reasons for
moving towards capacity subscription are the efficiency gains that are to a
significant degree caused by the possibility of consumers selecting their own
levels of reliability.
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